The 1st
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Session 3

Parallel Session 1.
Status and Prospects of Conflicts among Civilizations

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The 1st World Humanities Forum
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Parallel Session 1.

Status and Prospects of Conflicts among Civilizations

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"Completely different, exactly the same" – towards a universal ethics

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Purpose

Drawing on my research among Muslims in the Middle East and Europe, Hindus in Bali, Indonesia, and Buddhists in Bhutan, I shall explore what values people have in common that can provide the basis for a possible universal ethics, and what are the obstacles in its way. I shall ground my analysis in how people live their lives within a religious and cultural frame, and how universal values can be discerned at the grassroot levels that resonate across boundaries of ethnicity and civilization. Thus I will address one of the main questions posed by the organizers of this session: What are the possibilities of creating a new universal human civilization that can resolve the conflict of civilizations, and how should it be discussed?

Personal biography

To anchor my discussion, permit me to give a piece of my own biography:

I grew up in Northern Norway on an island in the Arctic Ocean 300 far beyond the Arctic Circle. My own family, like most of the people up north, was protestant Christians but our attitude to religion was lenient. For example, our community was tolerant of children born out of wedlock, indeed my own paternal grandmother was one. She suffered, I am sure, from the fact of not knowing who her father was, but she was never stigmatized. And she lived to be an old respected lady who died only in her 93rd year. My other grandmother, my mother´s mother, was among the first female teachers trained up north, and she became an ardent spokeswoman for the poor and the first female elected member of the local council in her place of residence. My mother followed suit in dedicating much of her life to helping children internationally

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through the Red Cross, besides working and raising a family together with my father.

So I come of a family with strong women. And I think it apposite to mention it here, for any effort to help bridge the gap between civilizations and make for a universal ethic will need to count on the women of this world. They are those who mainly raise children. In some civilizations, like the Muslim, they have been endowed with the main task of bringing up and socializing the next generation. So women must be taken into account in our discussion here.

At the age of 17, I was invited to spend a year in the United States as an exchange student in a suburb of Boston. It was a great year, and a culture shock. "Western" as both my American family, a wonderful family, and I were, yet we clearly belonged to different "civilizations."
My American school mates and I got along well, but I felt as if we belonged to different worlds. Especially I chafed at what I experienced as strong social conformity in this upper-class community.

I have gone back to the States many times since, and served as a visiting professor at Harvard University and the University of Chicago. Every time I feel as if I enter a world remote from my Norwegian homeland. Northern Europe and the United States constitute, to me, different civilizations or cultures.

Others may see it differently. We all have particular and partial visions. What I simply want to say is that the notion of "a" Western civilization begs the question of multiple, varied perspectives of people living and making their lives within these continents or categorical divides.

To fill in my perspective: As a 19 year old, I went to live one year in Alexandria, Egypt, with a relative working for the United Nations. I became fascinated by Arab culture and civilization and three years later went back to Egypt to study Arabic in order to be able to live with people and learn about their lives. In 1969, August, I moved in with a family in a poor quarter of Cairo. It was the beginning of a love affair that persists to this day. Over 41 years, I have come and gone to the same families, and their now grown children and grandchildren, that I befriended in 1969 to 1970 when I lived eight months among the poor. By now, I reckon I have spent some three years in all with them. They count me as part of their families, I count them as part of mine.

How did it happen? How did we communicate? How could we meet across religions and civilizations?

Interpretive charity

We met as one person meets another, through *wanting* to get along. There is a principle in linguistics that

we utilized, the maxim of *interpretive charity* (Griaule) which is a principle all of us utilize in our daily encounters with people even within our own family: we strive to understand what the other person intends; we go beyond words, so to speak, for words have multiple meanings; we utilize context to understand the other person´s intention. The people of Cairo whom I met and I "belonged" to different civilizations. It could have set us totally apart. But that was not what we experienced in our encounters with one another. On the contrary, "talking together makes wise" said Umm Ali, the matron of the house in the family that took me in as if I were one of them.

She and her neighbors vied with one another to make me their friend. Their hospitality was bottomless. They defined me as a Christian, since I was a Westerner, for they could not perceive of a non-religious person. And they used to point to how Christians and Muslims have the same god, Allah, though we use different names for him.

At the entrance to the poor quarter was a mosque and a church facing one another one different sides of the same alley. Muslims and Christians were neighbors and good friends. So it was until the rise of fundamentalism a couple of decades ago. In other words, there was a time in the Middle East, not long ago, when the kinds of mortal clashes among Muslims and Christians that have just claimed scores of lives in Cairo would be unheard of. The fragmentation of identities in our time is a relatively new phenomenon, and one that religious fundamentalists with a political agenda nurture for their own ends.

Other cultures, other times

My Middle Eastern experience as an anthropologist did not end with Egypt. For my Ph.D in anthropology I did fieldwork in the Sultanate in Oman in the Arab Gulf in 1974-76, and I have returned nine times in this millennium. Though Arab and predominantly Muslim like Egypt, Omani culture was quite different and I felt as if I entered a different world.

From Oman I went to Yemen, and then to Bali in Indonesia to learn about the lives of Hindus living in a nation with Muslims in the majority. My books on Egypt, Oman, and Bali detail lives in each of these societies as I came to know them. From Bali life took me to Bhutan, a Buddhist country in the Himalayas, where I worked for UNICEF and the World Food Programme. With my husband, the anthropologist Fredrik Barth, I was instrumental in arranging the first workshop on religion and health, bringing together the Monkbody and modern health institutions.

Since the mid 1990ies I have devoted much of my work to researching multiculturalism and human rights in Europe, and I became early on an ardent critique of multiculturalism as an ideology as it can easily be used to undermine individual human rights on the altar of the collectivity.

I have set out this argument in detail in my book *Generous Betrayal: Politics of Culture in the New Europe* (2002), and *In Honor of Fadime: Murder and Shame* (2008), both published by the University of Chicago Press.

Here let me explicate a basic element of my position, my view on culture and civilization.

Cultures Don't Meet, People Do

If cultures (or civilizations) can clash, they can also meet, or so it is commonly assumed. Indeed, the phrase *kulturmote*, "meeting of cultures," is much used in Scandinavian languages. But the idea is misleading and may have a number of negative effects if used as a basis for public action.

Cultures cannot meet, for "culture" has no agency. It is just a word, a concept, and concepts do not meet. So talking as if cultures could do this or that—meet, collide, or 0clash—begs the question of what drives people on. It is *people*, not culture or civilization, who have the power to act. And it is *people*, not culture, who can change life for better or for worse.Why belabor this point? Because it makes a difference how we use words. You can *do* things with words, as the philosopher Austin noted long ago (1975 [1962]). Place agency where it belongs, with human beings who have the power to act and who can use that power for good or bad. True, every one of us is a child of culture in the sense that we are deeply affected by our social environment and the models of and for life that we have acquired in the course of living. But cultural models derive their force or power from their ability to give direction to, and mobilize, *human* energy. As the anthropologist Robert Paul notes: "We are no longer content to say that people do things simply because that's their culture or because they've been conditioned by society to do those things," (1990:30); we have to invoke "an acting subject full of hopes, fears, desires and plans" (1990:4).

This acting subject is a feeling, thinking individual with the ability to adapt to new circumstance and respond to changing situations. Culture cannot do such things, for culture is a thought construct. If people "of different cultures" are to meet, it must be as people, as persons, for it is only thus we can meet. And then the stage is set for something that can foster mutual respect and understanding. Talk of"culture," and the picture that springs to mind is one of difference, divergence, and distance. Talk of "people" or "persons" instead, and the picture is one of humans who struggle with some of the same compelling concerns and who therefore—despite all difference—can resonate across time and place. A man in Bhutan put it beautifully when he said: "Our customs are different, but our lives are the same."

Lessons from Norway

Let me now proceed to draw some lessons from my experience of being a public advocate for human

rights in Norway.

Norway has traditionally been a very homogeneous society, but is now becoming increasingly multiethnic and multireligious. Of the country´s 4.5 million people today, c. 12 percent have an immigrant background. In Oslo, the capital, a city of half a million people, near to 200 different languages are spoken. More than 30 % of children in elementary school have an immigrant background.

Norwegian immigrant policies were based, in my view, on three unrealistic, or even utopian, premises about society and human nature. The first concerned respect. "Immigrants have a right-claim to respect (krav på respekt)." This the politicians and media never tired of telling the majority population. It was reiterated time and time again, the notion being that the way to a "colorful community", as it used to be called, goes through the hearts and minds of people: If we, the host population, were anti-racist and respectful of immigrants, then they would respond in kind and be grateful and loyal citizens.

Does this not attest to an idealist view of human nature? In no society that I know can you come uninvited and demand respect. Respect must be earned, not claimed, and the way to earn it is to be given a chance to prove one's worth. It demands something of both immigrants and natives. But practical policies are also called for which provide opportunities for immigrants to show their qualities and competence.

A second failed premise concerned the expectation that immigrants would become loyal citizens, if only their material needs were covered: hence handing out social welfare was the way forward. Immigrants in Norway are well treated materially: among Pakistanis, for example, Norway is said to be the most generous country in the world (Lien 1997). But it is not a given that gratefulness and loyalty will ensue. People do not necessarily respond with gratitude to being placed at the receiving end of a gift relationship. Rather, feelings of inferiority and bitterness might ensue. Life on social welfare does not engender self-respect. And self-respect is a basic human need. Unless this need is reckoned with, we are in deep trouble.

A third failed premise of the government's immigration policies concerned the concept of culture. It was assumed that "culture" referred to a static, objective body of traditions that immigrants *en masse* adhered to. Thus all members of one ethnic group were presumed to share a common culture, but since distinguishing ethnicities was difficult, it meant in reality that the members of one nation were presumed to be carriers of the same culture. But since the government could not know what "the culture" was, one needed experts to show the way.

It was essential to know because Norwegian policy is aimed at integration, not assimilation. It means that "they" should abide by the laws and basic values of society — such as democracy, gender equality, and the

rights of the child — whereas "we" should respect "their culture." But this is a contradiction in terms, for it assumes that culture is something other than laws and basic values; hence the two parties to integration should be able to have their cake and eat it too. Moreover, the idea of culture that was invoked, rested on a hollow foundation. By taking "culture" to be the Truth, the way was paved for power abuse and cultural fundamentalism. The critical question — who defines what for whom and whose interest does it serve? — was not asked. And thus the government and officials came to serve as liaisons of particular political interests rather than serving the common good, as they intended. Losers in particular were women and children.

Culture, power and pain

"Culture works to distribute pain unequally in populations," notes Veena Das (1989). It is not hard to find examples from Norway. Take the position of many Muslim women. They have been disempowered, deprived of competences and responsibilities they enjoyed back home, in part because some men — with the blessing of the Norwegian authorities — have usurped their position. lt happened in the name of culture, and for the best of reasons. Norwegian authorities have upheld the power of men who were quick to take advantage of this generous state of affairs. Some were able to ascend to a position of authority and power far beyond that they held "back home." Hence their self-respect and social status grew at the expense of other family members. Only after much harm had been done are official policies beginning to change.

Anthropology and advocacy

Given a situation like this, what can persons like myself, an anthropologist, do? First, it is necessary to realize that the notion of culture as static, fixed, objective, and uniformly shared by all members of a group is something anthropologists have done their share to spread. So is the idea that culture compels people to act in certain ways, as if they did not have motivation or will. Also, the interplay of power and culture is one that anthropologists have been slow to discover and slower still to dissipate. In short, though we have come to revise received notions of culture among ourselves, how active have we been in going public with our new knowledge? The answer from Norway is, far from enough.

Anthropologists have been criticized, rightly in my view, for being dealers in exotica (Keesing 1989). My own work, not just in Norway, convinces me that an exotic view of persons may easily become dehumanizing. To counteract racism and further integration it is necessary in my view not just to speak against a notion of culture as difference, but to include sameness in the model. "Completely different, exactly the same," as a Balinese priest put it to my husband, Fredrik Barth, (Barth 1993).

Speaking truth to power

In Norway the reductionist model of the person is now being replaced by one that considers all people as individuals, agents in their own right. It does not entail an advocacy of individualism (Cohen 1994), but a view of the person that honors the dignity of each human being. With this emphasis on the individual, goes a delimited view of culture. It is still seen as a power that shapes human behavior and affords community and communication, but not as a superpower that holds people in its grip. Power is seen as vested with persons and institutions, which may use it for various ends. But then it is they, not their culture, which are accountable. The connection between culture, power and pain is by now being well publicized, with documented good effects. One measure of the change is seen in practical policies, another in formal statements. No longer is there any talk of respect for "the culture" and of culture as static, frozen in time. Instead the focus is on human rights, and on the individual's right to have her cultural identity and her integrity respected.

Conclusion: Cultural and human rights

The most difficult question in any plural society regards the relation between cultural and individual rights. I do not have space here to address the matter in any depth, but it should be clear from the foregoing where I stand. I believe that it is not possible to advocate cultural rights and human rights equally at the same time. One is forced to take a position. My own position is that the integrity of each human being needs to be respected, at the expense of respect for culture if necessary. This is not a position I have reached without struggle. But it seems to me the only feasible one, given what I have learned from research and practical work about the pitfalls of trying to apply both equally, or of sacrificing individual welfare on the altar of "culture".

To conclude: a universal ethics will need to be based on a fundamental value of respect for the dignity of the individual human being. This must apply across religions, civilizations or cultures. All I have learned from doing anthropological research over forty years in different corners of the world and among people of different religions convinces me that basically, persons want the same things: peace, stability, security, and liberty. To this end, their material economic needs must be met and poverty eradicated. Then and only then can a universal ethics be realized.

Relativism, Universalism, and Pluralism in the Age of Globalization

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An Attempt for Globalization

The main thrust of this paper is to discuss issues involving "relativism," "universalism," "pluralism, etc. in light of Raimon Panikkar's[1] unique approach in dealing with these issues. Globalization process is not only a modern or contemporary human attempt to make the world one big house or oikos with one standard system, rule or nomos but also it has a long historical root. Time and again, we human beings have repeated the same attempt without success. We see numerous examples of this attempt in the West and East. From the Roman Empire to the British Empire, to the Spaniard expansion, to the Qin Empire, and to the Japanese Empire, human beings tirelessly tried to build a powerful kingdom, empire, and nation. It has been a common tendency of the people or nation with a power to dominate the world, to make the world one big country or nation with the same ideology, system, language, religion, and culture. This tendency has a mythic origin found in the story of the Tower of Babel in the Book of Genesis:

Now the whole earth had one language and the same words. And as they migrated from the east, they came upon a plan in the land of Shinar and settled there. And they said to one another, "Come, let us make bricks, and burn them thoroughly." And they had brick for stone, and bitumen for mortar. Then they said, "Come, let us build ourselves a city, and a tower with it top in the heavens, and let us make a name for ourselves; otherwise we shall be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth." The Lord came down

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1 I am deeply in debt to Raimon Panikker (1918-2010) who expounded the idea of pluralism in light of religious and cultural
diversity. Raimon Panikkar was one of the leading scholars and original thinkers tackled this vital issue throughout his entire life.
Among numerous books he wrote, Invisible Harmony, Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995, Intra religious Dialogue (revised edition),
New York: Paulist Press, 1999, and his last book, the Rhythm of Being: the Gifford Lectures,
New York: Orbis Press, 2010 are representative in dealing with these issues.

to see the city and the tower, which mortals had built. And the Lord said, "Look, they are one people, and they have all one language: and this only the beginning of what they will do; nothing that they propose to do will now be impossible for them. Come let us go down, and confuse heir language here, so that they will not understand one another's speech. So the Lord scattered them abroad from there over the fact of all the earth and they left off building the city. Therefore it was called Babel, because the Lord confused the language of all the earth: and from thee the Lord scattered them abroad over the face of all the earth." (11: 1-9, New Revised Standard Version)

According to Raimon Panikkar who interpreted this myth in light of his idea of pluralism, human beings, time and again, have repeated the dream of making one world without success: "In any case, after sixty centuries of human memory in the history realm, is there no way for us to awaken to the futility of this realm? What would happen if we simply gave up wanting to build this unitarian tower?"[2] Throughout history, we have made various attempts at globalizing the world. It has been attempted in terms of the extension of space, geographical territory, political power, commercial dominance, etc. Beyond the idea of the expansion of space, it has also been tried in terms of building a political or religious empire such as Christendom or an expansion of missionary institutions. In modern times, globalization has also been ideological dominance such as Marxism, Communism, Capitalism, or Democracy. Although Democracy is an institution rather than ideology, it has been conceived as an ideology in some parts of the world and has become yet another form of the Western and especially American dominance. Democracy, however, is primarily an institution not an ideology. Once we try to superimpose Democracy to all other parts of the world and cultures, it becomes yet another form of ideology. Once we absolutize and universalize one system, it becomes an ideology. Democracy is profoundly a "cracy" (institution) not an "ism (ideology)." Communism, Socialism, and Marxism as an ideology had an ambition to make their ideologies the absolute and global. Once the zeal for globalizing one's conviction becomes so powerful and urgent, it compels a sense of mission for globalizing their conviction. In this sense, ideology and religion are very close to each other in absolutizing and universalizing their belief system. Democracy, however, resist this temptation. Democracy by nature accepts and recognizes the limitation and imperfectness of its own system. It rejects the idea of making its own idea as the absolute. In fact, democracy is based on the premise of human fragility and propensity toward evil, and thus it tries to prevent the human from the temptation of making his or her belief system or ideology absolute. American theologian and political

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2 Raimon Panikkar has been one of the most inspiring thinkers and scholars advocating the pluralistic view of reality. I am much indebted to his profound insight. For his interpretation of the myth of the Tower of Babel, see Raimon Panikkar, "The Myth of Pluralism: the Tower of Babel" Invisible Harmony (Edited by Harry James Cargas) Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995, 53-54. The original version of this article was published as "The Myth of Pluralism: The Tower of Babel – A Meditation on Non-Violence," Cross Currents 29 (1979): 197-230.

thinker Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971) had expounded the democratic institutions based on the Christian assumption of human nature.[3]

The globalization process has also been found in human attempt to standardize in making one form of measurement or system as global. Human desire for universality in terms of communication, transportation, and even ways of thinking has been more and more apparent these days. Since the Enlightenment in the West, individual human right, reason and rationality have become global phenomena. Logic, reason, and rationality, for example, have become the universal standard for ways of knowing and judging truth, thus making reason as the absolute global criterion in establishing a global understanding. The term "global understanding" is problematic and in fact it is a misnoma. Understanding assumes "standing-under" the spell of the other in allowing us to stand under the specific circumstance or situation of "other." When we create a certain system, method, criteria for "understanding" other, we already betrays the very nature of understanding. Because we are using this specific "framework," "system, or method of our understanding" for understanding other. In this case, we are already imposing "my yardstick" to "understand" you. This is not "standing-under" in the genuine sense of the word to allow myself in order to see, to listen from "other's" perspective. In this respect, the "standard," the "global" understanding is not possible without imposing our own standard consisting certain criteria or framework of thinking we have created as for an objective and universal criteria, and impose them to others in order to understand them. This is "overstanding," as Panikkar aptly put it.[4]

Global perspective may also sound great in overcoming provinciality and partiality. This, however, is also misreading. Simply no one has the perfect 380 degree-vision to see the whole globe at once. We only look at the globe seen from one particular angle. We all have a global vision from a partial and particular perspective. Nonetheless, we still tried to build an illusory tower in the hope that we will be able to look at the whole globe. Again, the Tower of Babel is a powerful representation of human desire for external expansion, to cover the globe, to conquer the world, to own the universe, etc. This desire for spatial and external expansion has motivated human beings to go higher, further, and see more in believing that we will be able to see the whole globe at once someday. Spatial concept of globalization has resulted in political hegemony, economic monopoly, and cultural imperialism. In this respect, "globalization" means "Westernization" and "Americanization." In fact, the "modernization" process was almost identical with

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3 Reinhold Niebuhr, for example, understood democracy in relationship with human nature, "Man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible and man's capacity for injustice makes democracy necessary" The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness, New York: Charles Scripner, 1944, and 1972, xiii.

4 Panikkar discussed this idea of "overstanding" vs. "understanding" extensively in "The Pluralism of Truth" Invisible Harmony, 92-95.

the Westernization process. This world, again, is becoming one world, with one language, one system, and one universal standard. On one hand, this is an inevitable process especially due to the rapid development of technology. On the other, however, we see that we are involved in the same process that has resulted in dismay. The powerful Qin dynasty that unified the whole China for the first time in Chinese history and tried to impose one universal standard, one culture, one regal system, etc. lasted only 13 years. The longest dynasty with one monarch, one ideology, and one system was the Chosŏn Dynasty in Korea (1292-1910). This dynasty, however, was in the confinement of a small Peninsula with no ambition to expand their empire to make it universal or global as found in the Roman Empire.

The current financial crisis in Europe and America may be an indication, a sign, or a symptom of human desire for global expansion and universalizing a particular system of values, ways of thinking, is reaching to its limit. In fact, we no longer have "East" and "West" because East is rapidly becoming "West." The whole world is now rapidly becoming "West."

There is an indefatigable human desire and efforts to expand ourselves to farther and farther and to posses the globe and the universe. It seems to me that we are reaching to the point where we can no longer push ourselves to that direction without breaking both the globe and the human.
 An ecological crisis and the phenomenon of global warming is yet another serious indication of the human limit of expansionism.

The Whole and Part

We need a different way of thinking and understanding the globe and the universe. The globe and universe are not only external entities as a physical matter, but also it has to be internalized and spiritualized in terms human relationship to them. The whole and the part are no longer in dichotomy but in unity. The globalizing process is not mere an external expansion, a physical process, but an internal process of crystallizing one's own experience, a spiritual process of relating to the world and the universe. We have long forgotten the wisdom and insight: The whole is in part, totum in parte. The whole is not sum of the parts but each part exists for the sake of whole.[5]

Globalization is not an objectifying the globe but subjectively experiencing the world, not only externalizing the globe but also internalizing the globe and the world in relationship to us. Modern science, analytical mind, and scientific method have helped us put the globe as a detached entity, an object for our observation, use, and even abuse. The globalizing process has become a tangible and material

5 Raimon Panikkar, The Experience of God: Icons of the Mystery, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2006, 75

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process and lost the spiritual dimension in making the globe and the universe as parts of our own being, an internalizing process. In the physical process of extension, there is no intrinsic relation or unity between individuality and totality. The relationship between individuality and totality, particularity and universality, the local and the global is neither dualistic nor monistic but is non-dualistic because these are neither divided in two separate entities nor totally identifiable one entity.[6]

It is not my intention to discuss the nature of non-duality or "aduality" (advaita) in full spectrum but it would suffice to say that the issue of globalization in understanding the world as one or many is not a proper approach.

Western culture has been dominated by a dualistic way of thinking in dividing matter and spirit, mind and body, and the global and the local under the influence of scientific approach, rational and logical thinking. So Globalization in this sense has been heavily influenced by the Western scientific thinking and universalizing Western standard and Western values.

Relativistic Attitude

There are various strong movements resisting the globalization process. Against universalism and the globalization process, relativism is concerned a uniqueness and irreducibility of individual being. The Enlightenment mentality or thought, which has a great influence in shaping modernity, has deeply influenced modern West in advancing democratic ideas and institutions. One of the founding fathers of America, Thomas Jefferson (1743-1836), for example, was heavily influenced by this Enlightenment thought as he laid the ideological foundation of the United States of America. Individualism is one of the hallmarks of modern thought. Individual is undividable the last entity, a sacred atom (unsplitable). This individualism, however, also caused a dialectical tension with community, society, and nation. Every and each individual has become an atom, an unsplitable entity. In this respect, we may observe the rise of relativism. Relativism, unlike globalism, does not try to build one universal empire, Kingdome, and universal city. Relativism, however, believes that every entity is complete in itself and does not need others to be its own being. Here we may see two issues: one is an ontological assertion that each being is on its own, and second, the sense of value of every being is equally and uniquely belongs to each being. In this sense, there is no need or desire for other in terms of knowledge or being, an epistemological and ontological solipsism.

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6 Non-dualism or adualism is English translation of Sanskrit word, advaita. Raimon Panikkar has expounded the notion of non-dualism based on the Hindu idea of advaita. For more about Panikkar's explanation on the notion of avaita, see his last book, The Rhythm of Being, Maryknoll: Orbis Press, 2010, 216-7

Relativism is a form of reaction to universalism in relation to globalization. The risk and danger of globalization has prompted various forms of reaction, among those, relativism may be the strongest and the most direct reaction against universalism. Since universalism has been the underlying assumption for globalization, relativism has been expressed in the form of nationalism or sometimes exclusivism. Modern mentality and demographic ideals have also contributed to this tendency of individualism. Once this individualism becomes extreme, it has a tendency to absolutize individuality. This tendency can bring conflict and clash between different individualities, individual cultures, religions, etc., or indifference to other individualities including religion and culture. An extreme form of individualism has resulted in relativism. Relativism resists universalism and globalization and relativizes the world, the globe, truth, and reality. There is no absolute universal standard for anything. Relativism when pushed, however, has a tendency to become indifferent to others and totally self-centered.

What we see here is two phenomena of the modern mentality: individuation and relativization. On one hand, individuality has the most valuable entity, an irreducible last entity, and thus their own individuality is absolute but once they discover "others" may have the same kind of sense of "absolute," they may become relativistic. In this assumption humanity is nothing but the total some of individual beings. Here humanity is defined in terms of number and quantity but not quality. Humanity is more than just total sum of the people on earth in terms of number. Beyond the concept of number and quantity, humanity concerns the quality of being a human. The process of extreme individuation and relativism will eventually produce indifference, cynicism, and skepticism toward the human efforts of seeking unity, truth, and reality.

The sense of skepticism and relativism discourage human effort for seeking the universal truth. They may not feel any need for "universal" truth. In fact, for them truth may not universal. In this sense, each individual constructed a little universe of their own and there is no need to interact with each other. Human being is an isolated individual and living in his/her own solipsistic universe.

Relativity and Relativism

We have to make a clear distinction between "relativity" and "relativism." As discussed above, relativism does not need for other. This is certain belief system in asserting individuality and particularity without relating to universality or even unity with other beings. It asserts its own independence. Relativity, however, is a notion emphasizing the nature of inter-dependence of every being. This affirms that each being is in need of other in the sense that no single being can exist on its own independently. Relativity is an ontological constitution of all beings. Relativity is a way of recognizing the intrinsic relatedness of each being. Relativity is in this sense has nothing to do with relativism but a way of describing the "relationship" found in all beings. Every being is in relationship with other beings to become its own being. No single being exist in isolation without being relate to other being. In this sense, relativity is the very nature of

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being. The two words, relativity and relativism are entirely unrelated. The word relativity has been used in expressing the nature of radical interdependence of every being, "radical relativity."

One of the best examples of relativity is found in the idea of yin and yang. In order to be yin, it requires yang, and yang requires yin. At the same time, yang is not an independent being apart from yin, or yin independent of yang. In fact yang is found in yin and yin is in yang. Relativity is not to assert an "extrinsic connection" of one being to other but it is rather an "intrinsic relation" of every being. Every being exists in relation to other beings. In this sense, relativity is nothing but to affirm the relatedness of every being to other being in an intrinsic way. Relationship is not to be understood as an external string binding one being to another being, but it expresses the idea of the intrinsic relatedness of one being to another being. In this respect, relationship is the foundation that allows each being can found in existence both epistemologically and ontologically. A father, for example, is not a father without having to relate to his son. A son cannot become a son until he enters into the relationship with his father.

A son is a son in relative to his father and vice versa. This is the relativity of a being. Father becomes a father in relative to a son, a son to a father. A being is defined in relationship with other being. In this sense, relationship is a constitutive element of becoming a being.

Relativity found in relationship is neither dualistic nor monistic. A true relationship does not assume a dichotomy of separating two beings. Once relation becomes dualistic, it becomes a mere extrinsic connection in binding two different entities, and thus, relation becomes either formal or functional. In this context, relationship loses a dynamic interaction and interpenetration between two beings and it has no intrinsic awareness of other in its own being or the presence of other in his/her own being.

On the other hand, however, when relationship becomes monistic, it becomes monolithic. This relationship becomes totally one sided, one dominates the other because the object must eventually succumb to the subject, and the subject and the object become one and the same. In this context, relationship does not exist. Once we lose the relativity, we lose relationship. Relativity is the core and the defining characteristic of relationship. For this reason the nature of relativity is fundamentally non-dualistic. Relationship must possess relativity as the intrinsic nature of being.

Here the idea of non-dualistic is an important way of understanding relativity. It is neither one nor two as discussed above. The non-dualistic character of relativity allows relationship, vital, dynamic, and creative. Thus, relativity is the most construct of component of every being in relationship with other being.

Pluralism

Relativity is not yet pluralism. The word pluralism has become a fashion now, religious pluralism, cultural

pluralism etc. The meaning of pluralism, however, has to be clarified. To begin with the whole issue of pluralism, we must start with the observation that there are many different things, not just one thing. This is an affirmation that there is plurality, rather than singularity in the world. In other words, plurality is a simple recognition of our observation stating that there are many different things in the world. For example, when we recognize the fact that there are more than one culture or one religion existed. This means plurality, the plurality of religion and culture. We must first accept the fact that I am not the only human being in this world, my culture is not the only culture or my religion is the only religion in this world. This is a serious step toward pluralism, however, it is not yet pluralism. Plurality is the factual foundation for pluralism. We sometimes confused plurality with pluralism in thinking that the recognition and acceptance of plurality is pluralism. From the socio-political perspective, pluralism, often, is used in describing various social, ethnic, religious groups. Pluralism, in this sense, is a way of accepting diversity of people, religious affiliation, and cultural heritage. This is the level of plurality, but it is not yet pluralism yet.

Pluralism, unlike plurality, is a way of understanding reality, a form of reflection how a being is related to other beings in terms of basic structure of being. Pluralism is not a way of accepting that there are more than just one being, the awareness of many. Pluralism does not seek a unity among many. Recognition of many, plurality, does not mount to pluralism.

It does not seek to find unity by reducing each particularity to a common ground. Pluralism does not believe unity as essential or even indispensible ideal.

Pluralism does not to seek a universal system. As discussed above, building a universal system, making a universal path and constructing a universal tower are destined to fall. Pluralism, on the other hand, allows incompatibility, incommensurability among pluralities. In fact, pluralism arises at the moment of experiencing incompatibility. Pluralism does not attempt to reduce the incompatibility of the differences between two beings into "rational" and "logical" formula by appealing to reason, i.e., rational reductionism. Reason and rationality can definitely provide a common ground for universality. This is the power of reason that can transcend cultural barriers and religious diversity. Rationality has become the most effective means of communication because of the universality of reason. Religious and cultural diversities, however, should not to be reduced to rationality or reason alone. For this reason, pluralism makes us aware of human contingency, the non-rational element, and the mystical aspect of reality. On the other hand, however, pluralism does not reject intelligibility but understand intelligibility beyond reason alone. There is more than one form of intelligibility, the intelligibility based on reason only. Human being has an ability to know more than through reason and rationality. Reason is not the only way to monopolizes human intelligibility.

Furthermore, intelligibility is not the only way to seek a common understanding or agreement among different entities and beings. Pluralism tries to reach intelligibility as much as possible but it allows the dimension of unintelligibility. It is an existential attitude and genuine openness toward truth and reality.

Pluralism should not to be understood as an ideology in absultizing a particular system but an attitude to listen and discern the nature of reality and being. In this sense, pluralism is a way understanding that every being is pluralistically oriented and structured.

Here we see two dimension of Pluralism. From an individualistic point of view, pluralism is the fundament structure and way of being. Each and every being is already pluralistically composed to become its own being. From the communal and collective point of view, pluralism is a way of recognizing the nature of reality and being is mutually depended on each other (*pratitiyasamudpada*) [7]. These two dimensions, however, are not separable.

Pluralism assumes the interdependence of all beings as both an external relationship to other beings and an intrinsic structure of every being.
Pluralism in this sense is not an artificial superstructure or system to measure, not an ideology to impose, not a universal philosophy to educate, not a universal religion or ethics encompassing different religious beliefs, but it is an existential attitude to open to others, to nature and heaven and earth. Beyond the dichotomy of relativism and universalism, pluralism is a way of discerning the nature of reality and being. It is a way of finding wisdom to comprehend how to relate to each other without losing own being and identity. Pluralism allows us to engage in dialogue, not a dialectical dialogue but a dialogical dialogue. [8]Dialectical dialogue is based on the dichotomy of either or logic, and once we reject one we must affirm the other. Dialogical dialogue, however, based on idea of "dia-logical," or "through the logos" is a mutual understanding of the logos of each other at the risk of mutual transformation.

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After 9/11:
Suturing the Rift between the Islamic World and the West

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Literary Critic

9/11 was, and still is, an unprecedented evil form of revenge against civilians. It represented a mass murder perpetrated by people who thought that by killing themselves and American civilians they would destroy the pillars of the American empire. According to the Ideology of Osama Bin Laden and his followers from al-Qaeda it was the West, especially America, who imperialized Dar el-Islam (the lands of Muslims); they terrorized and killed Muslims and occupied Saudi Arabia and other parts of the Arabian Peninsula, and they wouldn't leave except if they are attacked in their own soil. Al-Qaeda Ideology, that draws a definite demarcation line between Muslims and non-Muslims, i.e. Christians and Jews, was echoed by George W. Bush who wrote back by talking about 'We and Them', calling for the extermination of the 'brutes' and annihilating the evil people and waging war on the countries he called the 'Axis of Evil'.

Now ten years after 9l11, that apocalyptic catastrophic act of killing, we should reflect on the event itself and think over the American counterattack, by waging two long catastrophic wars on Afghanistan and Iraq, as part of the war on terror. It is obvious that the two bloody wars did not bring peace and democracy either to Afghanistan or to Iraq. It did not also lessen the sense of fear of terror attacks against American and European cities and peoples. Peace is not achieved and national safety is not sustained in any part of the World. Wars continue, and the rift between nations widens. It is a vicious circle that determines the fate of relations between the Western and Islamic Worlds, dictating the ultra-right view of the 'I' and the 'Other'. In his most acclaimed and widely read book *What Went Wrong: The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East*, Bernard Lewis tries to explain the polarized state of relations between the Islamic World and the West. The main thesis of Lewis is that Muslims hate the West because they feel backward, poor, humiliated, compared with the West which was inferior to them few centuries ago. This inferiority complex determines the war of extremist Muslims declared against the Western World. It also explains the deep penetration of the western culture and dominance in the psyche of Muslims, a mechanism that shatters the consciousness of modern Muslims. In Freudian terms, Lewis explains what he thinks the real

motives of Osama Bin Laden and his followers. He states, that "In the course of the twentieth century it became abundantly clear in the Middle East and all over the lands of Islam that things had indeed gone badly wrong. Compared with its millennial rival, Christendom, the world of Islam had become poor, week, and ignorant. In the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the primacy and therefore the dominance of the West were clear for all to see, invading the Muslim in every aspect of his public and – more painfully – even his private life."[1] Explaining the reason of the conflict between the West and the World of Islam, Lewis adds that "It was bad enough for Muslims to feel weak and poor after centuries of being rich and strong, to lose the leadership that they had come to regard as their right, and to be reduced to the role of followers of the West."[2]

Lewis's theory is cushioned on Freudian Psychology without even giving a plausible explanation of the deteriorating relations between the West and the Islamic World. He relies on his own feelings to justify the war on terror declared by the American administration against extremist Muslim States and groups, offering his readers quasi historical facts. But to feel poor, backward, humiliated and ignorant, is not a case sufficient to explain conflicts on cultural and civilization lines. Lewis, and his group of New Conservatives, drop two centuries of western imperialism, the creation of Israel on top of Palestine and the dispersal of its people all over the World. The neo-conservatives shirk from seeing the American troops treading the lands of Islam again awakening the forgotten memories of the colonial past. What drove Arabs and Muslims to feel antagonistic to the West is not their sense of humiliation, but the hegemonic politics of the Western World represented this time by the American Empire. It is not often the hatred that "goes beyond the level of hostility to specific interests or actions or policies or even countries, and becomes a rejection of Western Civilization as such,"[3] as Lewis himself states in another piece written after 9/11, but the imperialist American new agenda, that fulfills the needs of neo- conservatives to push the American Democracy in throats of Arabs and Muslims. The answer to the traditional question 'Why they hate us' is not an existential explanation of the feelings of Muslims and Arabs toward the West; it is rather the inevitable deconstruction of the interventionist policy of America in the Middle East. Instead of saying that Muslims hate our values and principles, because they are seen by them as "innately evil, and those who promote or accept them are seen as the 'enemies of God',"[4] a well informed historian of Lewis's stature should ask himself a simple question: What did we do to them that they are driven to hate us? Lewis himself admits in the same article "Islam… is not an enemy of the West,"[5] because the majority of Muslims prefers the Western style of life; they desire "a closer and more friendly relationship with the West, and the development of democratic institutions in their countries."[6] Bernard Lewis thinks that the only hurdle in the path of achieving healthy relations with Muslims is the extermination of Muslim fundamentalists who are hostile and dangerous to the West! Such an interpretation of foreign affairs, devoid of historical facts and analysis, leads an outstanding historian, to embrace the neo-conservative agenda of waging war against the Muslim fundamentalists in their homeland, and the democratization of

the Arab and Muslim states through military intervention.

William Dalrymple sees Lewis's position, regarding the 'war on terror' and the interventionist policy of George W. Bush's administration, painted by an essentialist view of Islam. He claims that Lewis's work is determined by "the assumption that there are two fixed and opposing forces at work in the history of the Mediterranean world: on the one hand, Western Civilization which he envisages as a Judeo-Christian bloc; and on the other, and quite distinct, a hostile Islamic World hell-bent on the conquest and conversion of the West."[7] Dalrymple refers to Lewis's influential essay "The Roots of Muslim Rage" that inspires Samuel P. Huntington's article "The Clash of Civilizations?"[8] on which Lewis sees Islam and Christendom as two rival systems struggling with each other "for some fourteen centuries. It began with the advent of Islam, in the seventh century, and has continued virtually to the present day. It has consisted of a long series of attacks and counterattacks, jihads and crusades, conquests and re-conquests."[9] In such a cultural and historical analysis we could trace the confrontational policy with Islam that dominated the Ultra right political discourse during the eight years of George W. Bush's administration. Lewis, before Samuel Huntington, put the foundations of the 'clash of Civilizations' with the World of Islam, even before the emergence of al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden. The Orientalist discourse, built upon the idea of backward, despotic and inferior East, is transformed in Lewis's thinking to what he calls the 'crisis of Islam' in the Twentieth century. Islam in the twentieth century is backward, undemocratic, and inferior to Christianity and Judaism. In Lewis's thesis, this kind of fossilized, unchanging, and resistant to Modernity Islam fuels its followers, especially fundamentalists and fanatics, with rage against the superior, educated, wealthy, and democratic west. "Lewis argues that Islamic hostility to America has less to do with American Foreign policy in the Muslim world, notably American support for Israel, than a generalized Islamic 'envy' and 'rage' directed against its ancient cultural rival. This, he claims, derives from 'a feeling of humiliation – a growing awareness, among the heirs of an old, proud and long-dormant civilization, of having been overtaken, overborne and overwhelmed by those whom they regarded as their inferiors."[10]

The dangers of Lewis's ultra right thought come from his great influence on the neo-conservatives. His doctrine has become US Policy, which is based on "a set of wholly erroneous assumptions"11 about Islam and the Muslim World. Lewis's defective, even militarized view of the solution of the conflict between Islam and the West has to be tackled politically. The tensions and confrontations, nurtured by semi-historical discourses like Lewis's, are not fought on the borders of culture, civilization and ideology. If we resume to political analysis, rather than the 'the clash of Civilizations' doctrine, we could unearth the real motives of al-Qaeda ideologues and their followers who see the West as 'the real enemy' of the Muslim World. Rashid Khalidi sees that "too much of the extensive public debate about the relationship between the United States and the Middle East, particularly since September [11], 2001, has been taking place in a historical vacuum. By and large, this debate has been driven by widely inaccurate and often racist stereotypes about Arabs, Islam, and the Middle East. It has rarely been grounded in a careful reading of

how that region's often – stormy recent encounters with the west may affect the new phase of American involvement in that vast region between Morocco and central Asia and between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean."[12] Khalidi claims that"most commentators in the media do not realize that many influential Arab, Turkish, and Iranian thinkers and intellectuals have had a strong liberal orientation for more than a century. They are unaware of the pioneering early constitutional and democratic experiments that took place in the Middle East, and of the many efforts to establish parliamentary systems there, in the twentieth century. They are unlikely to know how Western powers repeatedly undermined these systems and how much resentment these and other foreign interventions caused among the peoples of this region over several generations. Many of these commentators, and many politicians, have pontificated about the complete absence of democratic traditions in the Islamic World and the middle East in particular, about how "Islam" is antithetical to democracy, and why "they" resent "us" because of our way of life. This contemptuous dismissal of real history, real experience, and real traditions in favor of crude stereotypes and gross oversimplification has passed with insufficient response from the only people qualified to counter it, whether experts living and working in the Middle East or academics who study the region."[13]

In contrary to what Bernard Lewis offers as a cultural, historical explanation of the conflict between the Islamic World and the West, Rashid Khalidi addresses the flesh and bone of the dilemma, pointing at the political realities of the Middle East, and the foreign interventions, mainly the American wars, that led to insurmountable tensions and conflicts between Arabs and Muslims, on the one hand, and the West, on the other. To alleviate these tensions Americans and Europeans should address the hopes of people and necessities of political life in the Middle life, i.e. to find a genuine solution to the Palestinian question. Al-Qaeda's ideology flourished in the vacuum of hopelessness and fatigue that overshadowed the peace process. The discourse of 'We and Them', that divides the World into two confronting blocs (Islam and the West), replaced the nationalist, socialist and liberal ideologies in the Arab Islamic Worlds, due to failure of the parties and regimes, believing in these ideologies, to solve the real political, economic and educational problems of their countries. Osama Bin Laden's al-Qaeda, and the other Jihadist Muslim groups resort to militarized confrontations, because of the continuing Western, mainly American, assaults on Arab and Muslim lands. In such a polarized World the rise of tensions, the attacks and counter-attacks, and 9/11 were the climax of a deadly embrace. But this human genocide, the killing of thousands of innocent people by using four hijacked passenger jets in suicidal attacks, could not be justified by any means. At the same time, it is not justified to counterattack by waging wars against two Muslim countries, and continue to kill their people for about ten years, saying that you fight al-Qaeda and Islamic extremism. What the Americans are really doing is destroying whole countries and killing civilian people.

Francis Fukuyama writes in the preface to his book *Our Post-Human Future* a refutation of his thesis of 'the end of history', and of the Lewis- Huntington thesis of 'clash of civilizations'. Even Fukuyama could not

take the notorious phrase of 'clash of civilizations' seriously. He claims that "the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, again raised doubts about the end-of –history thesis, this time on the grounds that we were witnessing a "clash of civilizations" (to use Samuel P. Huntington's phrase) between the West and Islam. I believe that these events prove nothing of the sort, and that the Islamic radicalism driving these attacks is a desperate rearguard action that will in time be overwhelmed by the broader tide of modernization."[14]

In that sense, especially after the killing of Osama Bin Laden, and the Arab Spring that advocates civil society, democracy and social justice, it is unclear why American and European troops are still fighting in Afghanistan. The claim that Islam is incompatible with democracy proved to be a false notion. Hearing the protesters in Tahrir square in Cairo, and other protesters in Tunisia, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, Morocco, Jordan and other Arab countries, chanting for freedom and democracy, we become certain that Islamic extremism is in retreat. The "focus on Islam as the reason for the lack of democracy in the Arab or Islamic World is intended to distract attention from other more obvious reasons, like the incessant interference of the Western powers."[15] The Arab spring proved that Islam is not incompatible with democracy. The call for civil states, and the persistent call for dismantling the security state in Arab countries, is a proof that even Islamists accept democracy as the doctrine of contemporary Arab civil life. There is "a significant Islamic modernist tendency that advocates democracy as being completely consonant with the true spirit of Islam, while the trend in favor of liberal democratic parliamentary systems in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was endorsed by much of the Muslim religious establishments at the time."[16] The Arab and Islamic societies are diverse like every modern society, and Arabs and Muslims react to the multiplicity of choices in every respect of life. Therefore, calling Islam and its followers undemocratic is a recurring Orientalist theme that fulfills the imperialist agenda of the Americans in the twentieth and the twenty First centuries. To bridge the gap between the West and the Arab and Islamic Worlds we must address the conflict that led to the horrible attacks of 9/11 and two big wars, in a more rational and disciplined way. Salman Rushdie claims in an article written after 9/11 that we "need a public, political and diplomatic offensive whose aim must be the early resolution of some of the world's thorniest problems: above all the battle between Israel and the Palestinian people for space, dignity, recognition and survival."[17] For Rushdie, it is the unresolved Palestinian question that led to 9/11 and its catastrophic consequences. Palestine is the core of the conflict between the Arabs and the West. Without finding a genuine solution of the Palestinian- Israeli dilemma the hostilities between the Arab and Islamic World, on one side, and the West, on the other, will continue. "There must be an absolute and immediate freeze on any provocative actions, whether as regards settlements, Jerusalem, water or any other issue that must be the subject of negotiations if there is to be peace."[18]

Bridging the gap also depends on stopping the discrimination against Muslims in the western hemisphere. The feeling of difference, and alienation, is a result of cultural and religious discrimination. As Salman

Rushdie puts it, "It is absolutely right that Muslims – that everyone – should enjoy freedom of religious belief in any free society. It is absolutely right that they should protest against discrimination whenever and wherever they experience it."[19] He adds that it is "absolutely wrong of them to demand that their belief-system – that any system of belief or thought – should be immunized against criticism, irreverence, satire, even scornful disparagement." Muslims should distinguish "between the individual and his creed, which is the foundation truth of democracy."[20]

We can trace this line of thought in Islam during the Andalusian era, which allowed the coexistence of different religions and competing beliefs. The real Islam, which is a continuing cultural and historical phenomenon, is tolerant to other religions and lines of thought. Although he feels anxious about modern Islam and Muslims, Bernard Lewis states that Islam, in its system of beliefs and values, is"one of the World's great religions. It has given dignity and meaning to drab and impoverished lives. It has taught men of different races to live in brotherhood and people of different creeds to live side by side in reasonable tolerance. It inspired a great civilization in which others besides Muslims lived creative and useful lives and which, by its achievement, enriched the whole World."[21]

The Andalusian culture and civilization could give the inspiration of how Muslims and Westerners should interact and live together. Culture, arts and philosophy flourished in Tolido, Granada and other Andalusian cities because peoples of different religions and beliefs lived side by side, influencing each other's culture and social life. "Throughout the medieval period, Christians and Muslims continued to meet as much as in the context of trade and scholarship as they did in the battlefield. The tolerant and pluralistic civilization of Muslim al-Andalus allowed a particularly fruitful interaction."[22]

In her monumental book *The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews, and Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain*, Maria Rosa Menocal draws a very insightful picture of the life of a great, tolerant and interconnected culture and civilization. Al-Andalus is an example that should repeat itself in modern times. 'This was the chapter of Europe's culture when Jews, Christians, and Muslims lived side by side and, despite their intractable differences and enduring hostilities, nourished a complex culture of tolerance."[23] Philosophers and theologians, like the Muslim Averroes, the Christian Peter Abelard and the Jewish Maimonides, "saw no contradiction in pursuing the truth, whether philosophical or scientific or religious, across confessional lines."[24]

To avoid the prospects of continuing conflict and bloody encounter with America and the Western World, a revaluation of the Arab- Islamic heritage of tolerance, coexistence and multiplicity of cultures and religions in the Islamic era, should take place. Intellectuals, educators and politicians must focus on the Golden Age of Andalusia that gives the example of tolerance, coexistence, cultural hybridity, freer thought

and cross fertilization of cultures and ideas. Although Identity Politics prevail in our time, shattering the unity of societies, and creating conflict zones all over the World, Arabs and Muslims could invest on that golden age and bring peace to the Middle East and the rest of the World. In that time, suturing the rift between the Arabs and Muslims, on one side, and the west, on the other, could take place.

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5. Ibid., 24.

6. Ibid., 24.

7. William Dalrymple, "Foreword: The Porous Frontiers of Islam and Christendom: A Clash or Fusion of Civilisations?," ed. Gerald MacLean, in Re-Orienting the Renaissance: Cultural Exchanges with the East (Basingstoke: New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), xi.

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9. William Dalrymple, Ibid., xi.

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Buddhist 'Genesis' as a Narrative of Conflict Transformation: A Re-reading of the Agganna-sutta

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Introduction

Philosophically and historically, Buddhism as a spiritual proposal for the cessation of suffering as well as a civilization force has had a relatively good record for peace. Scholars have offered different explanations for this phenomenon. Some argue that due to the absence of Divine Transcendence articulated through a Monotheistic God, Buddhism is better positioned not to impose absolute truth on others and thus is less prone to the use of violence in the name of "God" as the "only Truth". Others argue that historically, the Buddhist Churches have not had temporal power and therefore are less prone to use violence. There has never been a "Buddhist Vatican". Generally speaking, there is probably much truth in these explanations. However, it is beyond the scope and purpose of this paper to deal with this huge issue. My interest starts from a particular condition of the recent increase in violent conflicts in Buddhist Thailand, especially the problems with the Thai Malay Muslims in the deep South. These prolonged conflicts have raised serious concerns with the big picture of the future political stability of the whole nation. In a short span of one decade, Thai society has faced highly divisive conflicts, not only in the deep South, but also the continuing clashes between the red and the yellow shirts. The coup in September 2006 has not made things better.

As a Buddhist scholar, I feel the urgent need to invite Buddhism into the discussion of how to provide some "solutions" to the current crisis of violent conflicts. It seems to me that to be complacent and proud of the Buddhist legacy of relative peace in Thai history would be inadequate. My approach developed in this paper is a small attempt to unearth and re-discover resources in the Buddhist canon to address the question of conflict and conflict transformation in contemporary Thailand.

Religion, State and Conflict in Southern Thailand

About one decade before the recent eruptions of violent conflicts in Southern Thailand, the Thai Buddhist institution has shown signs of decreasing religious tolerance both in its relation to other Buddhist groups as well as in relation to the religious others, especially the Muslims and the Christians.[1]

I have argued elsewhere that only when Buddhism occupies the sole basis for the definition of Thai cultural identity, could Thai Buddhism exercise religious tolerance towards others.[2]

I would argue that due to the weakening self confidence of the Buddhist institution in the past decades and the resulting decrease in religious tolerance in Thai society, the Buddhist Church in Thailand has been less relevant to the search for solutions for the violent conflicts in the South.

In many cases, the Buddhist temples in the deep South themselves have been turned into military barracks.[3] While it needs to be said that the violent conflicts in Southern Thailand cannot be explained in terms of religious difference alone, it is hard to deny that the dominant indicator of the two main conflict parties, namely the Buddhist state and the Muslim insurgents, is based on religious identification. According to a major well respected report on the number of casualties in violent incidents in the deep South,

> *"In the past 82 months of violence, between January 2547 (2004) to October 2553 (2010) there have been 10,386 violent incidents, 4,453 deaths, 7,239 injuries, totaling 11,692 people. Among these, 52.02% (2,628) of those dead were Muslims, while 38.15% (1,699) were Buddhists. Among those injured, 60.13% (4,353) were Buddhists, while 32.68% (2,362) were Muslims. In other words, one can say that there were more Muslim deaths, while Muslims counted less than half of those who were injured."[4]*

1 Suwanna Satha-Anand, "Buddhist Pluralism and Religious Tolerance in Democratizing Thailand," in Philosophy, Democracy and Education, ed. Philip Cam (Seoul: The Korean National Commission for UNESCO, 1993), 193-213.

2 Ibid., 212.

3 There are some exceptions to these general observations. Take for examples, the initiativesby the National Reconciliation Commission whose members are well represented by Muslim leaders and Buddhist monks. Special mention should go to Phra Paisarn Wisalo. Please also see a research dealing with some Buddhist temples in deep South being turned into military barracks in Marte Nilsen, "Military Temples and Suffron-Robed Soldiers: Legitimacy and the Securing of Buddhism in Southern Thailand," in Militant Buddhism, eds. Vladimir Tickhonov and Torkel Brekke (New York: Routledge, forth-coming).

4 Srisompop Chitpiromsri, "Months 82 of Southern Fire: Unending Song of Violence, Justice and Peace" A Report made public in November 2553 (2010).

Researchers, government agencies, NGOs, journalists and peace activists have offered numerous studies and explanations of the above violent incidents.[5] This paper aims only to address one aspect of this complex phenomenon, namely to ask why is it that Buddhism as a religion of tolerance and peace could not have been more active and relevant to help address the problem of the increase of conflicts and violence in Thai society in the past decades. Thai leading intellectuals have pointed out a key explanation, namely the continuing patron-client relationship between Buddhism and the Thai state. According to Sulak Sivaraksa, "The institutionalization of the Sangha was typically linked to state control, so that instead of holding the state to the ethics of nonviolence, the Sangha has increasingly been called upon to rationalize violence and injustice." [6] This issue of "holding the state to the ethics of nonviolence" is highly relevant as it implies a very constructive and engaging relationship between Buddhism and the state. However, the past 7 centuries of that "engaging relationship" have been shaped more by state control than by a vibrant independent church with moral authority.[7] The construction of state-centered Thai Buddhism has concocted a version of Buddhism which has mostly justified ideology of the state through various phases in Thai historical development. In this long process of symbiotic relationship between Buddhism and the Thai state, it seems that the original reformist spirit of the Buddha has been eclipsed.[8] This tendency for institutionalized church to become conservative and less vibrant is well reflected in other religions as well. A leading Muslim writer, Gai Eaton once asked, "What is the point of religion if it does not change the world?" It seems that religion has lost its transformative power, its potential as an agent of change and a medium for social advancement. In this way, religion has also lost its transcendental claim to be a vehicle to bring society to a better place. The question that faces us now is: How do we rescue that transformative potential of religion so that it can aid social advancement?[9]

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5 Please see key studies as examples, Duncan McCargo, Tearing Apart the Land: Islam and Legitimacy in Southern Thailand (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2008). See also the Report of the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC). Overcoming Violence through the Power of Reconciliation (Bangkok: The National Reconciliation Commission, 2006).

6 Sulak Sivaraksa, "Buddhism and Contemporary International Trends," in Inner Peace, World Peace: Essays on Buddhism and Nonviolence, ed. Kenneth Kraft (New York: State University Of New York Press, 1993), 128.Please also see numerous examples of exploring Buddhism as an ethics of peace and conflict resolutions in John A. McConnell, Mindful Mediation: A Handbook for Buddhist Peacemakers (Bangkok: Buddhist Research Institute, 1995).

7 Please see a discussion of the "desirable" relationship between Buddhism and the state from the perspective of a leading monk scholar in contemporary Thailand in Phra Dhammapitaka (Por. Or. Payutto), State and Buddhism: Isn't it Time for Purification? (Bangkok: Buddha-dhamma Foundation, B.E.2539).

8 Of course, we cannot overlook the reformist attempts by the late Buddhadasa whose new interpretations of Buddhism for the contemporary world have received much welcome by more liberal minded scholars. However, one can perhaps say that the mainstream Buddhist Church has mostly paid lip service to the calls for new understanding of Buddhism by Buddhadasa.

9 Farish A. Noor, "Expanding the Horizons of Possibility in Muslim Normative Religio-Cultural Life," in Religious Activism and Women's Development in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Association of Muslim Professionals, 2011), 19-20.

The following will be an exercise in re-reading a key narrative in the Buddhist **Tripitaka** in order to highlight the "transformative" potential of "Buddhism," which was very much relevant to and engaged with the socio-cultural context of the time. It is hoped that this re-reading will serve as an inspiration as well as an interpretive possibility to re-vitalize the messages of the Buddha in context of violent conflicts in contemporary Thai society.

Re-reading the Buddhist "Genesis"

Generally speaking, the Agganna-sutta has been a focus of study by both Thai and foreign scholars as a Buddhist blueprint for the explanation of the origin of human beings and the development of political institution. It tells of celestial beings whose desire to taste "earth essences" led them, step by step, to a process of moral degradation, which in turn led to conflict, theft, telling lies and violence. At the moment of violent conflict, these beings decided to "appoint" or "elect" someone fair and charismatic to act as mediator in conflicts and imbued with the authority to inflict punishment. A political institution was thus created.[10] I will leave aside the lively debates among scholars whether the Agganna-sutta was meant to be a historical tale of human origin or a satirical allegorical tale to criticize the Hindu creation myth.[11] I will use the translation of Steven Collins as a basis of my re-reading of Agganna-sutta as a narrative of conflict transformation.

One key element of my re-reading is the often overlooked fact that this tale was told in a conversation between the Buddha and two young Brahmins who are on the verge of receiving full ordination. The conflict within the heart of the young Brahmins is the central "plot" of the whole narrative. In other words, the long narrative of celestial beings desiring earth essences and their gradual moral degeneration was a creative act of the Buddha in telling an alternative narrative of human origin as a replacement of the presumed Hindu creation myth. This act of replacement can be highlighted only when the whole sutta is read within the context of a dialogue or a conversation. The weight of the celestial beings' narrative is meant to be placed in the conflicting heart of the two young Brahmins. The "content" of the narrative needs to be contextualized within the broader narrative of the encounter between the Buddha and the two young Brahmins. The following is a brief account of the long narrative of Agganna-sutta.

The Agganna-sutta in Brief

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The Agganna-sutta can be divided up into 3 main parts. [12]

Part One: Story of the present (Passages 1-9)

Passages 1-7 begin with the Buddha's conversation with the two young Brahmins about Brahmins. The two Brahmins had a heavy heart as they were on the verge of receiving full ordination to become monks. As Brahmins they had been criticized by their families for aspiring to belong to an "inferior" group, as only the Brahmins belonged to the fairest and most superior of all classes. The reason for this was the belief in the Hindu myth of Brahmins "coming forth" from the mouth of the Lord Brahma at the moment of creation. The Buddha responded by saying that the Brahmins had forgotten "their past." According to the Buddha, the Brahmins were all born from the wombs and vaginas of their Brahmin mothers. One needs to imagine how radical this statement must have sounded for Brahmins during the time of the Buddha. The play with "birth" and "origin," the "primary" and the "best" continues throughout the whole narrative. [13]

Passage 8 conveys the incident when King Pasenadi pays respect the Buddha as the Buddha is the teacher of Dhamma and Dhamma is the "best."

Passage 9 indicates that ascetics are superior to kings and Brahmins.

Part Two: Story of the Past (Passages 10-26)

Passages 10-17 tell of celestial beings who were originally self-luminous. After tasting earth essences, their bodies lost self-luminosity. After the disappearance of earth essences, they started to taste fragrant earth, then creepers, then self-growing rice. The skin began to change and there arose "beauty" and "ugliness." Pride and arrogance found expression at this moment. After eating rice without cultivation, sexual differentiation appeared. "The female parts appeared in a woman, and the male parts in a man; the woman looked at the man with intense, excessive longing, as did the man at the woman."

Then they had sex and at first were chased away by other people who threw earth, ashes and cow-dung at them, saying "Away with you and your impurity, away with you and your impurity!" Later on,

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12 I follow the structure of division as developed by Steven Collins, but the brief accounts of each passage in each of the three parts are mine. Ibid., 332-334. This is to help offer a succinct account of the whole narrative of Agganna-sutta without having to go through the long details. Please see the full translation by Collins in Steven Collins, "The Discourse on What is Primary (Agganna-sutta): An Annotated Translation" in Ibid.

13 The word "play" here is used intentionally to indicate the debate among scholars whether the primordial tale was a serious account or was a simply a satire of the Hindu creation myth. Please see an overview of the debate in the General Introduction of Steven Collins' translation.

people started to build houses to conceal their sexual acts. Then a certain being who was lazy, started to accumulate rice instead of just collecting self-growing rice twice a day. Others followed. After some time, rice without cultivation disappeared. "Because these beings took to eating rice which they had stored up, powder and husk then covered the grain, cutting without regeneration and harvesting became known, and the rice stood in clumps."

Passage 18 recounts the beginning of private property as the beings decided to divide up the rice and set up boundary- lines.

Passages 19-20 recounts stealing, accusation, telling lies and punishment by physical violence. Conflicts escalated to the point that the beings "came together and lamented "bad things have appeared for us beings, in that stealing, accusation, lying and punishment have become known; what if we were to appoint one being to criticize whoever should be criticized, accuse whoever should be accused, and banish whoever should be banished? We will each hand over to him a portion of rice. Then, monks, those beings went to the one among them who was most handsome and good-looking, most charismatic and with greatest authority and said, "come, being, (you) criticize whoever should be criticized, accuse whoever should be accused, and banish whoever should be banished; we will (each) hand over to you a portion of rice. He agreed (and did as they asked); they (each) gave him a portion of rice.

Passages 21-26 recount the emergence of the 4 classes.

Part Three: Conclusion (Passages 27-32)

Passages 27-30 recounts the message that morality, rebirth and release are the same for all social groups

Passage 31 indicates that the Arahant is what is primary.

Passage 32 recounts the verse by Brahma Sanamkumara praising the person endowed with wisdom and good conduct as the best in the whole universe and ends with an account of how the two young Brahmins rejoiced in the words of the Buddha.

Identifying three dimensions of understanding a specific conflict

According to John Paul Lederach, a leading pioneer in the field of conflict transformation and peace building, an incident of conflict needs to be addressed from three dimensions, namely the immediate situation, the underlying pattern of relationships and the context, and the conceptual framework which connects the problems at hand with the deeper relational patterns.[14] A very mundane example is when

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14 John Paul Lederach, The Little Book of Conflict Transformation (PA USA: Good Books, 2003), 11.

family members have lively arguments over household tasks, like doing dishes. The conflict focuses on something very concrete and specific: the pile of dirty dishes. In fact what is at stake in this dispute is much more than who will wash the dishes. According to Lederach, "We are negotiating the nature and quality of our relationship, our expectations of each other, our interpretations of our identity as individuals and as a family, our sense of self-worth and care for each other, and the nature of power and decision-making in our relationship."[15] The difference in outlining the bigger domain of conflict in this example indicates the broader concern of "conflict transformation" as distinguished from "conflict resolution." In other words, conflict resolution might focus mainly on the conflict situation at hand. Once the negotiation succeeds in allocating compromise who will do the dishes tonight or how to take turns doing the dishes in the future among members in the family, then the conflict is "resolved." Conflict transformation points to deeper patterns of relationship or underlying meanings or culture which inform the relationship by delegating each party with specific roles. Take for example, in many Asian cultures, the younger girls in the family might be "normally" assigned the task of washing the dishes, if there are no domestic servants. If the normality of the gender relations is upheld, no conflict would arise in the first place. However, if in some developed societies where household chores are usually shared between the male and the female members, then negotiation usually does the task. From this perspective, the concrete and specific situation of conflict needs to be understood in terms of the deeper patterns of relationship which had been "scripted" by a pre-existing culture. In many cases a broader narrative of differentiation of gender roles informs the culture. Thus we have an alignment of the concrete, the deeper pattern of relationship and the "meta-narrative" which provides the conceptual framework for that relationship.

Let's go back to Agganna-sutta. At the beginning of the story, the moment of anxiety of the young Brahmins indicates the conflict between the force of tradition of their families and their choice of aspiring for full ordination. This conflict is very concrete and specific. And yet, the intervention of the Buddha places this conflict within the broader familial relationship of these two Brahmins with their families. The Buddha said, "Surely, Brahmins must revile and abuse you." The reply from the Brahmins confirms this statement by the Buddha. Then the Brahmins invoked the "conceptual framework" of that conflict by recounting the "reasons" given by their families regarding the Hindu creation myth, "Brahmins are Brahma's own sons, born from his mouth, born of Brahma, produced from Brahma, the heirs of Brahma."[16]

In line with the narrative of this myth, the young Brahmins then, "have left the best class and gone over to

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15 Ibid.

16 Steven Collins, "The Discourse on What is Primary (Agganna-sutta)," 339.

an inferior class, since you have become wretched shaven-headed (pseudo-) ascetics, members of some sect, no better than offspring of our Kinsman's (i.e. Brahma's) feet. It is not good, it is unseemly, that you have left the best class, and have become offspring of our Kinsman's feet." [17]

We can see that the very personal conflict of the young Brahmins is actually intimately linked to the deeper patterns of relationship with their families as well as other Brahmins in the larger society. The Buddha did not simply tell them to stand firm on their desire to receive full ordination and thus could have addressed their conflict of the heart. The Buddha went deeper into their past and let them articulate both that deeper pattern of relationship and the conceptual framework which informed that relationship. The self identification of Brahmins as belonging to the highest class in society was justified and explained by their "origin" from the mouth of Lord Brahma. The personal conflict was therefore linked to the familial relationship and the familial relationship was explained by the cosmological tale of the birth of Brahmins, as well as those other classes which were not directly mentioned here.

Replacing order of meanings

It is interesting to note that in order to address the specific conflict at hand of the two Brahmins, the Buddha challenged the account of the Hindu creation myth by directing their attention to the empirical present (or recent past) of the Brahmins as a human group. All Brahmins (including the two in conversation with the Buddha) were born from the wombs and vaginas of Brahmin mothers. This is how the Brahmins had forgotten their (empirical) past. This empirical present was further elaborated by recounting the episode of King Pasenadi paying respect to the Buddha. Then the empirical present was juxtaposed to a primordial past when the cycles of change had brought forth the celestial beings who were self-luminous but whose desire to taste earth essences, had brought them to the brink of collective turmoil before they decided to appoint a leader who could level out punishment for wrong-doers.

We could identify three inter-related incidents of conflict here. First, the conflict in the heart of the young Brahmins. Second, the conflict of the young Brahmins with their families and other Brahmins. Third, the conflicts in the primordial narrative about celestial beings whose desire to taste earth essences leads to a long process of moral degradation, gradually and respectively generated by pride, arrogance, sexual desires, theft, accusation, telling lies, and violence. The appointment of a political leader in passage 20 should not be seen as the only moment of conflict resolution in the narrative. Rather, we should pay closer attention to the moment of joy of the two Brahmins at the end of the narrative in passage 32 as implying

17 Ibid.

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that their conflict of the heart at the beginning of the story has been transformed. In other texts in the Buddhist Tripitaka, it was recorded that these two young Brahmins finally received full ordination and attained liberation. [18]

From our analysis of the whole narrative of Agganna-sutta, we could argue that the Buddha's approach to solving a conflict covers the three dimensions outlined by Lederach. The Buddha addresses the personal conflict of the two Brahmins in the context of the socio-cultural patterns of relationship both within the family and among the social classes, and last but not least, his creative imagination conjures up a world of "moral imagination" [19] which re-orders the values of things by offering an allegorical argument for what is primary and thus most important and the best. The Dhamma is primary, most valuable and best the newly proposed hierarchy of value by the Buddha which should inform patterns of relationship could thus be embedded in the mind of the two Brahmins. Only when the two young Brahmins subscribe to this new moral imagination on their own accord, can their conflict of the heart truly evaporate.

Re-reading a text and re-addressing a conflict situation

This attempt at re-reading the Buddhist "Genesis" is not an attempt to argue that the content of this sutta will be able to help solve the conflict situation in Southern Thailand. Rather it is an exercise of imagination and understanding which helps revitalize a fossilized Buddhist institution in Thai society. It is pointed out that the narrative itself recounts a conflict situation which points to a very deep structure of meaning of the whole fabric of society. The fact that the young Brahmins were in great anxiety and were in conflict with those closest to them indicates that the message of the Buddha had been a significant agency of social transformation at that time. The possibility of the decision of the young Brahmins to receive full ordination by their own choice and not by force of their tradition points to the potential of Buddhism as a religion for social advancement. The conflict of the young Brahmins was a conflict indicating a possible personal and social change. This reading of the conflict situation of the story helps bring out the often eclipsed potential of Buddhism as originally a reform movement which aimed to push society forward to a "better" place. That better place is not only the possibility of enlightenment or liberation or complete cessation of suffering, it also indicates a critique, a moral commentary on the existing Hindu class or caste system.

In this sense in aiming for spiritual liberation Buddhism was also offering possibility for social

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18 Please see Ibid., 319.

19 This term "moral imagination" is used by John Paul Lederach in another book which argues for the creative act of moral imagination as part of the process of peace building. See John Paul Lederach, The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

transformation. The approach to conflict transformation in the Agganna-sutta is but one crucial exercise of moral creativity on part of the Buddha, which could serve as an inspiration to look and to see Buddhism, not as a religion of state control, but as a religion which offers potential for social advancement. This often eclipsed face of Buddhism needs to be re-introduced and discussed so that Buddhism in Thai society could be more engaged with pressing social problems, including most significantly the violent conflicts in the deep South.

The current conflict situation in the deep South needs to be addressed by various deeper questions like: What are the roles of a Buddhist state to its religious minority? What does it mean to be Thai in relation to being Buddhist? What are the domains of meta-narrative of Thai society which needs re-thinking so that a process of conflict transformation would be more feasible for this Buddhist country? These questions and many more would help build a spiritual and intellectual resource from which a more lasting resolution of the violent conflicts in the Southern Thailand can be more aptly addressed.

The 1st
World Humanities Forum
Proceedings

Call for Papers Session 1

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Shifting Identities[1] in the Era of Globalization: Emerging Concerns for 'Marginals'[2] in India

Ashish Saxena

Central University of Allahabad

The Background

The inter-connectedness among societies and the rise of transnational processes, including global contingencies, which heighten the urgency of a global democracy, has gone hand in hand with the evolution of social systems in the advanced industrial societies….The agenda of democracy is an agenda of freedom (see Dahl; 1989). The spiritual challenge of freedom is one of transcending the opposition between self and other, and creating communities of discourse and practice where both can live as seekers of freedom. With the growing liberal democracy, the contemporary societies are increasingly confronted with minority and 'marginal' groups demanding recognition of their identity, and accommodation of their cultural differences. Consensus seems to be emerging that a commitment to liberal democratic principles is compatible with and does require support and public recognition of different cultures and identities. The reverberations of this 'politics of recognition' have reached the academia and in recent times, issues concerning multiculturalism and minority rights are in the forefront of debates in political and social theory. It is also observed that the resilience of cultural, linguistic, and religious differences among populations has led to a new search for understanding - not only the resurgence of ancient differences among peoples, but also the emergence of historically new ethnic groups. The issue has further led to

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1 This paper, while emphasizing the strong conceptions of Dalits as an "identity", preserves the common-sense meaning of the term - the emphasis on sameness over time or across persons. And they accord well with the way the term is used in most forms of identity politics.

2 Here the author follows David Cox (2001) who visualizes 'marginals' with a group of people sat on the borders of two cultures existing within a society, but were fully members of neither culture. In other words, marginalization is socially excluded, persons who ostensibly have no significant role in society. It has manifested in the following forms such as: less access to the state institutions; degree of violence; and exclusion from the special treatment by society; and reaction to varying degrees of violence. (It may be inclusive of categories like SC's, ST's, OBC's, women, workers and others).

increasing identity politics and is now mobilized and projected by the indigenous people, the icons of the historically marginalized groups, with a hope that their identities be acknowledged and accommodated by wider society in a new fashion. No doubt, the catalyst to this phenomenon is the twin process of democracy and globalization, which are providing more political space for protest and new network of alliances respectively. In such global era, the already declining role of the nation-state becomes crucial to accommodate the recognition of various identities vis-à-vis representation on the lines of multiculturalism, and simultaneously to maintain harmony in society. It thus becomes a vital issue to recognize and analyze the survival, development and mobilization of the historically marginal communities by 'self' and by 'others'.

Owing to the repercussions of the re-working on 'history', process of 'identity' formation surfaces which is seen as something constructed, fluid, multiple, impermanent and fragmentary. Explaining the process of new identity, one may say that the breakdown of hierarchies, the rise of individualism and social mobility, and the potential for radical social change all provided access to new identities to be pursued in this world and it is followed by a new flexibility of self-definition. Here Rose (1999; 268), rightly says that - concern with identity is indicative of a crisis that manifests itself in a sense that the acquisition and maintenance of identity has become both 'vital' and 'problematic' under ultra-modernity. In particular, the contemporary crisis of identity thus expresses itself as both a crisis of society, and a crisis of theory. Identity can be claimed . . . only to the extent that it can be represented as denied, repressed, injured or excluded by others.

Owing to the neo-agenda of development i.e. inclusive development, complex processes and procedures of institutional changes and the redistribution of economic and political power are made for attaining egalitarian society. It must be broadly conceived as the expansion of opportunities, enhancement of human capacities and universalism. Also the debate on colonial history has metamorphosed in post-colonial politics, 'marginals' life world and its understanding has also become central to new forms of contradiction. The 'subaltern studies' school of historiography has made a great contribution to retrieving the agency of the past, focusing on the 'politics of the people', the activities of subordinate groups in resisting colonial and elite domination. Most recent writings by postmodernist assume that cultural hegemony is both constituted and contested in relation to a fractured but powerful colonial history. They question the whole notion of dominance and the problem of center constructed by colonial and elite categories, which attempts to marginalize and exclude 'others' (all 'marginal' categories including 'scheduled castes'). Finally, the quest for indigenous discourse and indigenization has started exploring tradition and culture in a new way and re-deployed in both popular and more scholarly depictions to account for the resurgence of ethnic nationalisms and communal identities around the globe.

At this juncture, the Indian state in the post-colonial period too, has assumed a role of an interventionist to

bring about social transformation. Contemporary debates on development thus involve complex processes and procedures of institutional changes and the redistribution of economic and political power for better egalitarian society. According to Amartya Sen (1999), development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom and to locate the 'instrumental' perspective of freedom. Looking at the development landscape of India, it is to be emphasized that Indian society is highly diversified and premised on hierarchical principle resulting into unequal citizen in general and also regional inequality and rural-urban divide in particular. As a reactionary to this, the use of equal opportunity policy in the form of reservation, as a means of inclusion of socially excluded groups in India has become a subject of lively discussion. Keeping in view the past discrimination against the marginalized communities and retention of their dignity, equality of opportunity policy in the form of reservation has been viewed as an assertive means of inclusion of socially excluded groups in India. In this direction, the most important signifier emerging from the actions of the State is the 'Scheduled' Tribe and Caste. This 'signifier', which connotes a specially protected group entitled to certain State resources and benefits, also transcends the specific identity of the tribe/caste. It involves - Which communities are tribes for state purposes? How are they to be represented? Or recognized? What rights of citizenship - such as over land - should they control, and why?

Simultaneously, the implications of globalization on Indian Society are felt since 1990s and its effect on economy; media and sometimes on general society are almost regularly analyzed and debated in various fronts. Mahbub-ul-haq (1998) had already warned that developing countries must learn to manage it in their best interests or they would get drowned by its cross-currents. If globalization were superimposed on a poorly educated and poorly trained labour force with poor system of governance and infrastructure, it would not lead to growth nor reduce poverty.

In general, many social scientists have argued that marginalized groups (especially the SC's/ST's and OBC's) will be adversely affected. Keeping in mind these remarks, the point of focus of this paper is – What are the implications of this paradigm change for those who are weak, poor, 'marginalized' and down trodden? Can Nation-State tackle the "social concern" (welfare goals) for `marginals' in the globalization era? To put it differently, what would be the affect of the globalization on the principle of universalism and multiculturalism vis-à-vis 'marginal' groups, at regional, national and global level?

Needless to mention that the challenges posed by globalization to existing non-global forms of civic-rights and collective action vary fundamentally along two axis with regard to position in the social structure and with location in the geography of globalization i.e. 'context' and the 'space'. Following the proponents of 'critical globalism' who take a neutral-view of the process of globalization, it is presumed here that the globalization has dual implications on the 'marginal' group and categories - both negative and

positive. According to Scholte (1996:53) "globalization has often perpetuated poverty, widened material inequalities, increased ecological degradation, fragmented communities, marginalized subordinated groups, intolerance and deepened crisis of democracy; they also see that it has had a positive effect… various subordinated groups have of grasped opportunities for global organization".

Identity, State and the 'Marginals³': An Indian Experience

Here the discourse of Dalit identity is socio-cultural and is reflected as an identity politics, sometimes called the politics of passion, as opposed to interest politics, or the politics of class. The question here is the social disadvantage or advantage, of discrimination or affirmation, of a sense of deprivation or privilege that a group or the community experiences with regard to its cultural identity. This is a different level of articulation, not just of numerical aggregates, but of social groups. Here rights reside in the group not just the individual. "Untouchability" named a set of issues faced by more than one caste group, but at the same time a category of "Untouchables" would have created an entirely new caste identity, either by excluding some existing groups and including others, or by bringing disparate communities together on the basis of shared social stigma. Such debates did not, however, prevent the de facto creation of such an identity, to which the present "Untouchables" bears more than passing likeness: it is a political alliance of disparate groups on the basis of shared social stigma. Precisely because it is such an alliance, its significance is not primarily local, but regional, national, and international, its import greater as it moves outwards from local contexts. In both literal and non-literal ways," untouchable" becomes the English translation of "Dalit", or the concept that gives even the word "Dalit" its international salability. For the ideologies of purity/pollution that "untouchability" references are universally recognizable indices of human suffering-or, even more specifically, of the strangeness and arbitrariness of that which produces such profound human suffering. "Untouchability" thus becomes a metonym for the injustice that continues to exist in the world, and evokes emotions ranging from sadness to moral indignation and so also finding discursive affinity with race expressed as racism (See Reddy; 2005).

In India, the practice of universalism for 'marginals' started long back and the British first set up a positive discrimination program that aimed to advance the education of Untouchables in 1892. Another reform was undertaken in 1928, aiming to give an opportunity for the increasingly outspoken Untouchable leaders,

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3 Here author is using 'marginals' in a generic sense of 'oppressed', especially referring to schedule castes because these are clearly the main component of this category, but not necessarily excluding schedule tribes and others who are oppressed. To begin with chronologically, the term for untouchables in India was the 'depressed castes', then from the 1930s the most robust and long-lasting category, 'untouchables'. 'Harijans', Gandhi's term also dating from the 1930s, began to appear in the 1960s, 'SCs' in the 1970s and 'dalits' in the 1980s" (Simon and Karanth 1998:15)

like Dr. B. R. Ambedkar invited at the 1930 Round Table Conference for a system of separate electorates. Similarly, the affirmative action programs in favor of Untouchables were routinized after independence: so long as they took the form of reservations, they were never seriously challenged (see Jaffrelot; 2006: 174-177).

Later, Nehru rechristened them, divorcing their name from the notion of caste. He called them "Other Backward Classes," such a social category including groups "other" than the Untouchables and tribals. The first Backward Classes Commission was appointed in 1953. In December 1978, second Backward Classes Commission was appointed and presided over by B. P. Mandal. In northern India more than elsewhere, rejection of the report by the first Backward Classes Commission provoked intense debate, beginning in the 1950s, on the place of caste in Indian society and the role of positive discrimination policies. With the growing social polarization, Untouchables, who feared paying the price of a more generalized hostile reaction to the rationale of positive discrimination, sided with the OBCs resulting into the development of new political parties, such as the Samajwadi Janata Party and the Bahujan Samaj Party (Narender Kumar; 2000).

It is to be stated that while reservation policies played a role in the crystallization of the low caste movements in South and West India, their momentum was sustained by the ideology of "pre-Aryanism" or Buddhism in these regions. In the North, however, the state policies were more or less the starting point of the whole process. Caste leadership played an important part in this process. Jotirao Phule and B. R. Ambedkar are two of the most prominent lower caste leaders of their time. However, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan present a totally different model of backward caste mobilisations vis-a-vis Bihar. Despite a very strong presence of SCs and STs and a very substantial number of OBCs (about 48 per cent) in Madhya Pradesh, there is no backward class or caste movement in the state (see Verma; 2005).

Concurrently, the recent upsurge of assertiveness among lower caste communities in contemporary northern India cannot be understood exclusively in terms of their self-definition but also within the framework of attempts to acquire social respect through this. Their search for historical, traditional and iconoclastic heroes is a result of this movement (Narayan; 2001). The new 'dalit' movement in India is emerging, or seems like emerging. The dalit consciousness is by no means limited to the scheduled castes. It has begun to symbolize much broader spectra of the oppressed and hitherto excluded social strata i.e. 'marginals' (Kothari; 1994: 1591). The decade of the 1980s, saw the appearance of the first ruptures in the secular-nationalist discourse that had emerged out of the freedom struggle. For the first time, the overarching 'Indian' identity gives way during this period, to innumerable smaller, 'fragmented' identities. Out of the four major strands, the coming to the fore of issues of caste oppression in the north was significant (Nigam; 1996).

One has also to keep in view the critique by Nigam (2000) that Dalit politics embodies a dogged resistance to the binaries set up by modern politics in the era of nationalist struggle and subsequently in the contemporary moment. It refuses to get incorporated into either term of the binary of nationalism/colonialism and secularism/communalism. It represents in its very existence, the common sense of the secular-modern. This resistance to these categories of modern politics is, at its core, a resistance to the very universalisms that characterize the emancipatory discourses of modernity which placed at their very centre, the abstract, unmarked citizen - Universal Man - or the equally abstract 'working class', as the subject of history. Dalit politics in his reading is deeply resistant to both the ideas.

'MARGINALS' AGAINST 'GLOBALIZATION'- THE EMERGENT POSSIBILITIES

Globalization is a complex phenomenon and is a process by which the world becomes a "global village." It thus affects different aspects of any country--economic, political, social, and religious. Thus globalization being a central driving force behind the rapid social, political and economic changes can reshape the modern societies and world orders and no society escapes from its reach as it re-casts traditional patterns, creates new hierarchies, and most crucially reshapes the power, functioning, authority and objective of Nation-State. Regarding implications of globalization on 'dalits', Vivek Kumar (2007; 327) rightly says that 'Dalit Diaspora' has used the internet to unite the 'Dalit' world over. There are about 51 sites which provide information about Dalits in India and abroad. In general, we may say that globalization enhances democratic space for dalit population.

Keeping in mind the above discussions, let us try to analyze the possible pessimistic and optimistic implications of the process of globalization on Dalits of developing countries like India.

Implications of globalization on Dalits:

Globalization has had an adverse impact on all social groups, which have already been pushed down by centuries of oppression. It is a fact that in the last one decade the livelihood of Dalit communities became miserable. Under the old economic policies of Indian government, Dalits were given minimum protection and support in the field of education, land, capital and employment. Till 1980s there was a visible growth and development among Dalits in these fields. One can observe decrease in unemployment, increase in wages and fall in poverty mainly due to high expenditure of government on welfare sector and particularly in the rural areas. However in the present era of privatization, the State's indirect withdrawal ('disinvestment' heavily in public sector and imposed huge cuts in the welfare part of the budget and privatized all the sources of services and work places) from 'welfare' of service sector people, particularly Dalits, became vulnerable. Further the shift of decision making power into the hands of trans-national

institutions like the World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, World Banks and others has severely reduced the sovereignty of national government and resulted in a very serious drift.

In this context the struggle for dignity and social equity has to be the principal issue among Dalits, so that they are well equipped to contribute from their perspective and experience in struggle against satanic globalization. The civil society groups working among the Dalits are under pressure of local issues that they hardly get to link there pressing issues of identity and dignity with the larger issues of globalization. This can be understood in terms of 'new social movement' at global level. In all this process many Dalits on one hand losing their jobs from public sector industries and factories and on the other hand they are not able to find any new jobs in the 'open' market which is highly privatized and requires capital and specialized skills. Lack of reservations owing to profit motive of capitalist in the private sector debars Dalits entry into the competitive world. In this regard we find that the Dalits are at the lowest end of the economic and social ladder and are quite obviously at the receiving end of the elitist culture promoted by globalization. Economically, the earlier small gains made through reservations have been, in essence, reversed; and Socially the elitist culture (Hindutva), which marginalizes the poor generally, will have a double impact on Dalits.

Teltumbde (1996) in this regard rightly says that "……in social terms however, all Dalits, irrespective of their economic standing, still suffer oppression. This social oppression varies from the crudest variety of untouchables, still being practiced in rural areas, to the sophisticated form of discrimination encountered even in the modern sectors of urban areas. Although the statistics indicate that Dalits have made a significant progress on almost all parameter during the five post-independence decades, the relative distance between them and the non-Dalits seem to have remained the same. More than 75% of the dalit workers are still connected with the land; 25% being the marginal and the balance over 50% are the landless labourers. Out of the total dalit population of 138 million, the number of Dalits in service falling in the domain of reservation does not exceed 1.1 million, a mere 0.8%. They are in the category of dual disabilities i.e. socially and economically. The rate of growth of employment in the organized sector dropped from more than 1.7% per annum in the late 1980's to 1.2% in 1991-92 and to 0.6% in 1992-93. Thus these reforms had an adverse impact on different aspects". Similarly Prof. S. K.Thorat (2002) in "Newsletter conference for ASF" said, –"that the structural adjustment programme was reversing the economic policies of India that were built up as a result of the national movement. The Dalits were given special protection under the old economic policies in the fields of education, land, capital, employment etc. In the 1970s and 80s there was a decrease in unemployment, increase in wages and a fall in poverty mainly due to high government expenditure in the rural areas. However, in the present era of privatization and withdrawal of the State, the unemployment especially among the scheduled castes has increased manifold. The Dalits are at a crossroads with the reversal of the minimum support policy of reservation affecting the working and health conditions of the marginalized".

Taking another dimension, Shiva (1998) said that "the present process of globalization threatens to undermine aspects of agricultural policy. The trans-national corporations (TNC) are not guided by any philosophy of welfare of the marginalized. Liberalization emphasizes competition, efficiency and providing commodity for the market. Such an approach goes against the prevalent practice of poor farmers who produce for their own use and their methods are based on traditional wisdom. Land has been transferred to TNC's who produce luxury and non-food crops (cash crops) for export rather than staple food. There is also diversion of cereals from domestic market to export, resulting insecurity and inflation. The farmer's suffers from food insecurity as he has lost his land, resources and is unable to buy them from the market" The contract farming, which is promoted as a part of globalization had adverse effect on the farmers. The contract made with illiterate farmers is more one sided. Further the traditional societies emphasize cooperation; harmony and accommodation with personal relations as existed through jajmani and other caste based system. But the globalism emphasizes efficiency and competitive culture. Thus it appears that for majority of 'Dalit' and poor, globalization has meant further deprivation. Singh (2000) too agrees with the above comment and adds that markets are the vital mechanisms through which globalization extends its reach. Some of its effect upon the regional culture may be modernizing but there are significant areas where it has a disruptive influence upon the local cultures. It has not only disrupted the autonomy of folk cultures, but also destabilized the life of the artisans by creating a new network of competition and price war. In Indian context, the social costs of economic globalization and the neo-liberal policies related to it have already been very high. The Dalits, the landless, the 'Adivasis' will be the worst hit. Besides this economic reversal, the process of economic globalization has created a serious challenge for the democratic decision-making processes. In political terms the process of globalization has triggered off forces of change, which have set people rethinking about the political institutions under the growing forces of globalization (Kothari, 1995).

The Vikas Adhyayan Kendra (VAK) report in 1997 brings out many realities of India. For example, the reduction of fertilizer subsidies most severely affected the marginal peasants who cannot afford the higher prices. Agricultural as well as industrial unemployment increased especially in rural areas. The mechanization of agriculture through use of tractors and harvesters displaces labour. So the workers sell their labour power cheaply. Migrant labour is also increasingly used. Unemployed Adivasis, Dalits, and OBCs are given small advances during lean periods and are then compelled to work as seasonal migrants at very low wages. Thus nearly 800,000 cane harvesters from all over Matathwada are employed as an army of semi-bonded labourers by sugar factories. Thus bonded labourers are the outcome of globalization.

Relying and quoting from relevant data from website of peoplesmarch.com, let us specifically analyze the impact of globalization on the status of Dalits in different spheres of life as mentioned below: -

i) Impact on Workers/Labourers: - As per 'Peoples March Group' analysis- More than 75 per cent of the Dalit workers are still connected with land and in the urban areas, they work mainly in the unorganized sector. As per the Rural Labour Enquiry Report of 1987-88, over 63.14% of the total rural households were wage labour households as compared to 31.16% for others. In the same year, half of the dalit population was below poverty line as against 39.06% for others. In urban areas, the poverty ratio among Dalits was higher at 57% as compared to 37.21% among non-Dalits.

ii) Impact on Dalit vis-à-vis Employment sector: - In the sphere of jobs the wholesale privatization of the public sector taking place and the massive retrenchment of government jobs the question of reservation in the sphere of jobs has become irrelevant. And as the private sector has no job reservation policy the job opportunities that had been available to Dalits during the past three decades will now totally dry up. Dalits should understand the caste-class relation of the capital. Past liberalization is neither liberal to encourage Dalits into 'new openings' nor strong enough to break the caste domination over Indian market. In addition, the government, which has been systematically cutting expenditure on the people's welfare and has also cut its expenditure on schedule castes and scheduled tribes. The outlay for SC, ST and OBC welfare has declined from 8% in 1990/91 to 6.7% in 1994/95.

iii) Impact on Dalit vis-à-vis Social sphere: - Caste has often been viewed as defining features of 'traditional social order' of India. Dalits in contemporary India bear the anguished burden of a long unbroken legacy of the deepest social degradation. But after the 70's, the term "Dalit" has become increasingly popular, with its connotation of active anger, assertion and pride. The word "Dalit" literally means poor and oppressed persons. It not only includes scheduled caste but also includes tribal, woman, bonded labour, minorities and so on. Regarding the position of 'Dalits' in social structure, they were placed right at the bottom, below the ritually sanctioned "line of pollution". Regarding their location in the global geography they are placed under the category of developing nations.

Parallel to this issue, Beteille (2000) has rightly said that while ideologically caste has considerably weakened and the older form of untouchability is receding, atrocities committed on Dalits by the local dominant castes have in fact increased.

This is supported by Thorat (2002; 572) study that says that in rural areas the social behaviour of the high caste Hindus is still governed by norms and codes of the traditional caste system.

The atrocity data of 6th report of the commissioner of SC & ST, 1990-2000 and 2000-01 depicts 23,742 atrocities cases against Dalits in the year 2000 alone.

It became evident that despite the constitutional safeguard, liberalization, globalization and saffronization of Dalits', atrocities on them are going on unabated.

In brief, one may find that the major social concerns for marginals in the era of globalization are- massive structural unemployment, greater employment instability lower wage rates & casualization of labour.

However we have other face of the coin have the brighter aspects for 'marginals' as mentioned below.

SHIFTING IDENTITIES - 'MARGINALS' IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION:

In principle, the process of globalization ultimately leads towards homogenization of world-culture in some significant aspects. To quote Hannerz (1996:17) ' In the most general sense, globalization is a matter of increasing long-distance interconnectedness, at least across national boundaries, preferably between continents as well.' We can say that these processes of linkages across borders include a restructuration of spaces for 'marginals', leading to the disappearance of fixed links of them to villages, towns and national frontiers. In this regard, Waters (1995; 136) point out that process of globalization specifies greater connectedness and de-territorialization simultaneously. If we try to look it in positive terms then it tries to break the barriers i.e. de-capsulazation of communities and identities. At longer run this may lead to disappearance of inequalities, because it is not possible for ethnic identity to survive without a specific territory or place. This situation will have a positive impact on the people who were marginalized as against the dominating categories in specific territories. In this framework it may be perceived as a welcoming process for the 'marginals', it will not only put them out of the hands of high castes but also they get a fair scope for economic empowerment and social mobility which they can't get in earlier stratified system. Further, globalization policies will increase their free flow in the international market in terms of labour, goods, ideas and capital. Quoting Deliege (1999), one can say that "today in this global world 'marginals' aspire to more comfortable material circumstances and demand more dignity". This global/international mobilization will provide them the opportunity for global solidarity and for upholding human rights. In this regard, Jogdand (2000) has rightly argued that much cherished principle of growth with justice; social responsibilities and accountability; equity and self reliance have been rendered obsolete with the new slogan of liberalization and globalization. Here, Buell's (1994) argument stands valid that 'Tighter integration (due to globalization) has thus paradoxically meant, and continues to mean, proliferation of asserted differences'. To add, Mendelsohn and Vicziany (1998; 1) too points out that 'marginals' will almost everywhere become much more assertive about their human and political rights. Evident example to support the argument is the establishment of organization like World Social Forum (WSF) and specifically Asia Social Forum (ASF), which provide advocacy on issues regarding neo-liberal globalization and its impact on discriminated communities. To quote, Vivek Kumar (2007: 326) on the issue of Dalit Diaspora and Social solidarity says that Dalits settled abroad did not remain aloof from each other …… They created their own organizations to develop social solidarity with different Dalit communities. …… The Federation of Ambedakarite Buddhist Organisations (FABO) and Voice of Dalit International (VODI) are also working in UK to uplift Dalits back in India. … A more organized effort came in the US from literate NRI Dalits when they formed 'Volunteers in Service to India's Oppressed and Neglected (VISION) in 1975. To quote Ilaiah (2001 b), the National Campaign for Dalit Human

Rights has, thanks to Durban, become a "globally mobile" organization, with (one assumes) tongue-in-cheek reference to upward mobility.

If we try to put the above discourse on the measuring scale, we may arrive at conclusion that globalization is worse for 'marginals' but one can't negate the brighter side of the picture showing positive implications of globalization on them. As 'critical' globalism we should welcome the mixed result of the globalization on Dalits. Further, regarding the question of pathetic condition of 'marginals' in contemporary society can be supported by the fact that quantitative and politico-economic changes are observed and implemented rapidly in comparison to qualitative changes, and it takes time for assimilation and adaptation.

Individually, the Indian society has to fight the problems of poverty, illiteracy, cultural oppression, ethnicity etc. that are deep rooted in the society and impedes the growth of new development.

For imbibing and continuing globalization one has to be really global in personality terms so that he/she can reap the benefits of globalization in true sense.

Summing Up

Globalization is the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happening are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice-versa. To indigenous and marginal group, it signifies that they are suddenly catapulted from their traditional ways of life into tension and conflict, both within their own group and in their interaction with other superior groups at global level. Sociologically, it may be understood as a process of "universalization" whereby the parochial elements has to disappear.

Globalization depicts both manifest and latent functions on the society. Economic liberation is observed as the manifest consequences but it may lead to several latent consequences like decline of nation-state, threat to cultural identity, uniqueness etc. With reference to 'marginals', it may show differential impact. Instead of being a threat to such identities, it may become a means for their identity construction. By appropriating strategies of representation, organizations and social change through access to global system, local communities and marginal interest groups can both empower themselves and influence that global system. Further, we can't deny the role of Dalit Diaspora, Media, NGO's and civil society which can transform their fate in the globalized world.

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Session 3

The Global Exotic in East Asian Art Cinema: Kim Ki-duk's *Spring, Summer, Autumn, Winter and Spring*

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Introduction

In recent years, ceasing to reproduce Edward Said's well-acknowledged claim that the exotic or the Oriental is a product of the Western imperialist view of non-Western cultures, critics have more affirmatively re-evaluated the exotic that is characteristic of non-Western cultures. Addressing the issue of the Chinese exotic in globally circulating Chinese and diasporic Chinese films, for instance, critics such as Rey Chow and Olivia Khoo distinguish the Chinese exotic in the age of globalization from the previous form of "colonialist or imperialist exoticism,"[1] and highlight that the former indicates China's "self-exoticizing visual gestures,"[2] which is clearly distinct from the Western dominating exoticization of China. Another important point about the Chinese exotic, Chow and Khoo claim, is that it involves a degree of self-deferring alterity that diverges from the supposed "authentic" or "pure" Chineseness.[3] From this perspective, then, when globally circulated through cinema, the exotic would render national or ethnic differences irreducible to any presupposed essential properties, thus destabilizing the essentialist, hierarchical power structures that have determined such differences.

Although this retheorization of the exotic underscores heterogeneity and alterity as its definitive features, once we consider numerous recent East Asian films that have harnessed the exotic strategically, we might suspect that such a utopian understanding of the exotic overlooks or at least underestimates a crucial factor enabling its global circulation: the homogenizing power of neoliberal global capital. As is often the case with tourist industries in East Asia, the East Asian exotic has been and continues to be adopted

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1 Olivia Khoo, The Chinese Exotic (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2007), 12.

2 Rey Chow, Primitive Passions (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 170.

3 See Khoo, 14-15 and Chow, 59-60.

as profitable, among others, by East Asian blockbusters, especially martial arts blockbusters, such as Ang Lee's *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon* (2003), and Zhang Yi-mou's *Hero* (2002) or *House of Flying Daggers* (2004). This phenomenon is not only confined to the blockbuster scene where the production of a film is aimed at nothing but the box office. East Asian art house films such as Im Kwon-taek's *Chunhyangdyun* (2000) or Kim Ki-duk's *Spring, Summer, Autumn, Winter, and Spring* (2003) have also endeavored to employ exotic qualities in one way or another. If considered from Chow's and Khoo's idea discussed above, the exotic in both kinds of films is mostly consistent with the two characteristics of the exotic they propose: 1) the exotic qualities in those films are self-exoticizing gestures rather than reflecting the Western dominating view over East Asia; 2) as the films' exaggerated or intense manifestation of the exotic indicates, the expressed exotic qualities, far from being faithful to, but deviate from the allegedly "true," "pure," or "authentic" Chineseness, Koreanness, or Japaneseness. Despite this intense feeling of otherness the exotic features of the films involves, however, we cannot avoid feeling that the exotic we encounter through the films are to a large extent generic.

The guiding question for this paper is as follows: given that the exotic tends to be at once intensively affective and generic in global East Asian films, how can we understand this paradoxical character of the exotic in relation to the mechanism of current neoliberal global capitalism? In what follows, drawing on Lacan's reformulation of Marx's theory of the value of the commodity, I will argue that this globally circulating intense yet generic exoticism is a necessary result of neoliberal global capital's tendency to convert or translate uncountable affect into a magnitude of exchange value. In the following section, I will briefly discuss how East Asian filmmakers have participated in this conversion process, focusing on the affective change in their careers. In the final section, I will closely examine one of Kim Ki-duk's later films, *Spring, Summer, Autumn, Winter, and Spring* (2003) (hereafter, abbreviated as *Spring, Summer*) in comparison with one of his earlier films, *The Isle* (2000) to discuss how *Spring, Summer* performs such a conversion of affect into exchange value by harnessing generic exotic images of Buddhism and what the political and ethical consequence of this conversion would be.

The Conversion of the Exotic into Exchange Value

A lethal blind spot is often found on the part of the critics who uncritically applaud the currently booming transnational cultural exchange for its power of disseminating national or ethnic alterity globally. Those critics have a tendency to disregard or at least deemphasize the underlying premise that this exchange takes the form of commodity exchange. This implies that otherwise qualitatively different cultural products are treated as objects whose value can be quantitatively measured. Far from being a natural process, this commodification of cultural products already involves a violent transformation of those products. Marx already intimated this transformation in his discussion of the commodity form. When he

discusses the dual character of a commodity, that is, a commodity both as a use-value and as an exchange-value, he draws our attention to the opposition or conflict between these two kinds of value: "As use-values, commodities differ above all in quality, while as exchange-value they can only differ in quantity, and therefore do not contain an atom of use-value."[4] In other words, he emphasizes that when considered as commodities for exchange with other commodities, products become homogenous or abstract as exchange-values irrespective of their specific qualities, and thus begin to differ from one another only in their quantifiable terms. For this reason, despite the utopian imagination it often evokes, the current transnational cultural exchange inevitably homogenizes or equivalizes qualitatively different national cultures in terms of a common measure, which Marx claims is the duration of abstract human labor.

What makes matters more complicated, however, is that the exotic of a cultural product, by definition, involves something excessive or eccentric that cannot be reduced either to its use-value nor its exchange-value. Unlike a use-value, which, as Marx writes, "satisfies human needs"[5] , the exotic attracts us with its power of estrangement. The exotic is also clearly distinct from an exchange-value in that its defamiliarizing effect cannot be explained away by the duration of abstract human labor. It should be understood, I would argue, as something pertaining to the affective aspect, or what Lacan calls jouissance of a cultural product. [6]

What is *jouissance*? Lacan defines this term in a variety of ways depending on the context it appears, but I call our attention to the definition of the term he provides in relation to Marx's theory of the value of the commodity. As an exegesis of this usage of the term makes clear, *jouissance* is defined as the waste or useless remainder from "the signifying operations and equations"[7]. This definition clearly allows us to see how *jouissance* is the very term that refers to a supplemental aspect of a product that goes beyond, and is thus irreducible to, both use-value and exchange-value. Proposing a third term in addition to the two terms, then, Lacan draws our attention to the lacuna in Marx's theory of the commodity form and attempts to elaborate a new theory about the commodity form and its beyond.

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4 Karl Marx, *Capital Vol. 1*, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), 128.

5 Marx, 125.

6 Here, I use the term affect in the way Massumi defines it inspired by Deleuze and Guattari's deployment of it. He defines the notion as something emergent "outside expectation and adaptation, as disconnected from meaningful sequencing, from narration."[Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 25]. As will be clear in the following discussion, the term affect understood this way is synonymous with Lacanian term jouissance.

7 Alenka Zupancic, "When Surplus Enjoyment Meets Surplus Value," *Jacques Lacan and the Other Side of Psycho-analysis*, eds. Justin Clemen et al. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 157-159.

With the arrival of neoliberal globalization, however, otherwise inexchangeable *jouissance* or affect in turn begins to be translated in terms of exchange-value. As Foucault pertinently observes, one of the key features of neoliberalism is "an extension of market analysis to domains previously considered to be non-economic"[8] such as those of childcare, education, medical services, and, of course, cultural practices, where *jouissance* plays a crucial role. The global circulation and the transnational exchange of the exotic, thus, could be examined against this background. In the current age of neoliberal globalization, the exotic, which was a cultural remainder irreducible to economic exchange, is now counted in terms of the magnitude of exchange-value. What is more important to note, however, is that it not just becomes an object for economic exchange, but it begins to be strategically produced for obtaining profit, or surplus (exchange) value in Marx's vocabulary. In other words, as is in principle the case with any other commodity in capitalism, the exotic features pertaining to different national cultures are produced for the purpose of extracting a larger magnitude of surplus value rather than allowing people to enjoy cultural differences. This subjection of the exotic to capital indicates that it undergoes even more intense homogenization processes, in which it is produced as generic, losing its eccentricity.

We could understand these processes more clearly in light of Marx's notion of the real subsumption of labor under capital. He proposes this notion to clarify how capitalism is able to succeed in increasing the magnitude of surplus value without simply relying on the extension of the worker's labor-time. Crucial to this increased productivity is the introduction of machinery as a means of production and the consequent mechanization of production.[9] With this change, however, human labor is now reduced to a simple, minimal one that is necessary for the machine to operate. One important implication of this is that it effectively precludes an unexpected or unwanted element from intervening in the production process, thus serving to produce a mass of identical products in a short period of time.

As the production of the exotic becomes industrialized, it also goes through similar processes. It ceases to be an unexpected affect that emerged as a consequence of a chance encounter of one national culture with another. Rather, as contemporary tourist industries show, exotic features are produced on a large scale as a result of pre-established, pre-planned, and pre-calculated mechanisms. Lacking a sense of unexpectedness in this way, they cannot but be felt generic although they remain clearly distinct from the normal or the ordinary. But it is also significant to note that what are strategically produced as exotic today often appear more intense or exaggerated than those exotic features non-Western cultures seemed to preserve in the

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8 Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 215.

9 For the impact of the introduction of machinery on labor, see Marx, Chapter 15, and for the notion of the real subsumption of labor under capital, see Marx, 1019-1038.

past. The reason is because the only way to increase the magnitude of surplus value in the production of the generic exotic is by simply increasing the intensity of the exotic without changing its basic character just as we increase the temperature of water, for example, from 70 °F to 80 °F.

The Neoliberal Turn in East Asian Exotic Films

As neoliberal globalization swept over cinematic culture in East Asia in the 1990s, the cinematic production of the exotic in this region began to develop in the same direction. If before this turn films had somewhat naturally evoked exoticness as a feature of a nation's indigenous cultural heritage, films from this period on have sought for it more deliberately as an essential component of the production value of a film. Zhang Yi-mou's and Chen Kaiger's change in their filmmaking careers, for instance, vividly illustrate this neoliberal turn. In their earlier films such as Zhang's *Ju Dou* (1990) and Chen's *Life on a String* (1991), when they somewhat self-consciously displayed primitive aspects of rural China, they were mostly concerned with capturing realistically China's still remnant natural landscapes rather than calculating the production value of the exotic.[10] But as the high-tech spectacular qualities of their recent martial arts blockbusters such as Zhang's *Hero* (2002) and Chen's *The Promise* (2005) clearly reveal, dazzling exotic elements such as ancient Chinese rituals, buildings, or wardrobes began to be purposefully employed to extract higher magnitudes of surplus value. Although the exoticness of such elements has become more intense than ever with the help of high technology such as computer graphics, it has at the same time become more generic than the exoticness of their earlier films. Indeed, those deliberately included exotic elements have almost been reduced to stereotypical features that comprise the iconography of the martial arts film genre.

The same neoliberal turn has never left intact East Asian art house films as the current neoliberal governments have almost given up financing this kind of unprofitable films. Consequently, though this kind of films is not wholly aimed at the box office success, the production of those films is similarly put under the financial pressure. The recent change in Im Kwon-taek's career well illustrates this point. Before 2000, Im mostly chose Korean indigenous cultural inheritances relatively unfamiliar even to Koreans themselves as can be seen in his subject matter in *Sopyonje* (1993). But given that his more recent films such as *Chunhyangdyun* (2000) and *Chihwaseon* (2002) address more familiar subject matters such as Chun-hyang and Jang Seung-up that are supposed to be representative of Koreanness, he also followed the aforementioned East Asian blockbusters in harnessing the exotic as a means of attracting more global art house spectators.

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10 For the controversy over their primitivism, see Chow.

The Curious Case of the Exotic in Kim Ki-duk's Films

The major turn in Kim Ki-duk's filmmaking career also reflects this general transition I have discussed so far: the simultaneous intensification and generification of the exotic. But his shift is remarkable enough to reveal the significant socio-political implications of this transition in terms of how the current neoliberal regulation of affect delimits the way we perceive and feel otherness today.

It should be noted, among others, that unlike the East Asian filmmakers I aforementioned Kim had been very little concerned with the East Asian exotic in its ethnic or anthropological sense before he took a dramatic turn with the film *Spring, Summer*. Rather, the main concern of his earlier films from *Crocodile* (1996) to *The Coast Guard* (2002) was the affective states of social outcasts including homeless people, prostitutes, criminals on the run, and deserters. The lives of these people are not very clearly marked by Koreanness or any specific sub-ethnic traits, but are instead so abstract that they are supposed to exist anywhere in the world. Nevertheless, their lives could be called exotic in its expanded sense, for these outcasts' lives would seem unusually unstable or violent for those who maintain a degree of homeostasis in their courses of lives. Indeed, it was this intense foreign affectivity that enabled his earlier films to attract attention from global spectators in film festivals or art theaters.

Although his earlier films caused considerable controversy among film critics especially in terms of their portrayal of women, the reception of these films, I would argue, entails intense *jouissance* or affect in its Lacanian sense as I discussed earlier: with shocking images of extremely painful or mutilated bodies, irrationally excessive violence, and social antagonism, his earlier films make spectators confronted with the waste or useless remainder from signifying operations and equations. It should be noted that the very existence of the debate or controversy among film critics indicates that watching the films necessarily involves implacable and incomprehensible affects. Notably enough, many criticisms of his earlier films often accompany more or less intense emotional responses rather than sustaining their rational tones. Tony Rayns, for instance, who had previously applauded Kim's first two feature films, in turn began to criticize his later films, writing them as examples of "sexual terrorism."[11] No matter compelling his argument may be, the emotional disturbance inherent in the term "sexual terrorism" indicates that his films produce affective overflows that could not be smoothened out by any sense of exchangeability or reciprocality.

The two most glaring affective changes that occurred in his later films are 1) the employment of generic (East) Asian exotic features; 2) the alleviation of antagonistic or violent affects. The combined effect of

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11 Tony Rayns, "Sexual Terrorism: The Strange Case of Kim Ki-duk," *Film Comment*, Vol. 40, No. 6 (November/ December, 2004): 50-51.

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the two changes on his films is, I argue, that the generic (East) Asian exotic features plays a decisive role in alleviating antagonistic or violent affects. In other words, those disturbing affects that appeared as non-signifying remainders in his earlier films become softened or smoothened through generic East Asian exoticness. This point would not be clearer than when we examine *Spring, Summer* in comparison with one of his earlier films, *The Isle* (2000), a counterpart to *Spring, Summer.*

The two films are comparable both in terms of their plots and mise-en-scène. Both have a similar story of a criminal on the run, who, hiding himself in a shelter, saves himself with the help of someone who lives there. They are also similar in that they share a similar spatial and architectonic imagination: a shelter floating on the lake. But they are in stark contrast to each other in terms of the way they produce and deal with affects.

The Isle begins with the scene where a criminal on the run escapes into a fishing resort, where people enjoy fishing in floating cottages. The man meets with a mysterious speechless woman who runs this resort and also prostitutes her body to male visitors. After saving him from his suicide attempt and hiding him from the police, she becomes increasingly possessive about him. From this point on, the film portrays in detail how their relationship proceeds and becomes overwhelmed by their excessive uncontrollable sexual and death drives. It would be futile or even impossible to describe in words what happens to their relationship not simply because of the included gruesome scenes of masochist self-mutilation, but because the intense affectivity of their relationship itself goes beyond the limit of the symbolic order based on social exchange. As many critics point out, the film is very weak in terms of its plot motivation , but this weakness is understandable given that the logical consistency that determines the film's plot motivation is very often invaded, disrupted or even undermined by the film's uncontainable affective overflows. Of course, the film sometimes provides peaceful or reconciliatory moments,[12] but these do not seem to last for long but only temporarily.

With the film *Spring, Summer*, this destructive sharp edge of the affectivity of The Isle considerably becomes smoothened by the film's deployment of Buddhist motifs. As in *The Isle*, a floating shelter also appears in this film, but in the form of a Buddhist temple. Also as in *The Isle*, the male protagonist of this film, a Buddhist apprentice, who left this temple years ago and is now on the run after he killed his wife, comes back to escape arrest. But, unlike *The Isle*, where the male protagonist, passing through an uncontrollable hurtful affective relationship with a mysterious wild woman, drifts away toward somewhere else, the protagonist of *Spring, Summer*, before being delivered to the detectives, is given

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12 See, for instance, Darcy Paquet's review of the film. [Darcy Paquet, "The Isle," *Korean Movie Reviews for 2000*, http://www.koreanfilm.org/kfilm00.html#isle: no. pag, Web, 10 October 2011.]

by his master monk an opportunity to purify his excessive rage and repent of his sin by performing a painstaking task of carving a Chinese-character sutra out of the wooden floor.

Significantly, these two differences could sum up the affective change that occurred between his earlier and later films. In *The Isle*, the intense affect, which emerges as a stumbling block to the mainstream of a society founded on the principle of exchange, only comes to a resolution by exiting from such a stream of the society entirely. Consequently, such an affective remainder the film produces could not but be inexchangeable, untranslatable and thus economically meaningless, which ultimately means that this kind of affect refuses to be thought and counted in terms of the magnitude of exchange-value, thus remaining as the absolute excess of commodity economy. By contrast, *Spring, Summer* finds out a route or medium through which this troublesome affect can be considered exchangeable, translatable, and thus economically meaningful. The Buddhist exotic serves as the very route or medium for this exchange or translation. This does not simply mean that those meaningless affects of his earlier films are explained away or totally signified through a Buddhist religious philosophy. What is crucial to note, I would argue, is that those intractable affects are converted into a different kind of governable ones. Thus, although *Spring, Summer* retains something exotic or unexplainable in words like his earlier films, the character of the exotic has changed. Rather than remaining as absolutely untranslatable, the exotic has now become translatable, socially circulatable, or generic, and is thus able to serve as a bearer of exchange-value. Aside from the fact that Buddhism has already become a global religion rather than being confined to the local region of Asia, the images of Buddhism this film offers are very much standardized ones. These images neither involve any paradoxical truths nor raise any embarrassing questions that would inform the alterity of Buddhism. Nevertheless, *Spring, Summer* succeeds in increasing the intensity of exoticness through a sophisticated use of long takes and mise-en-scène techniques, thereby increasing the possibility of extracting a much larger magnitude of surplus value from the exotic features of the film though within global art house theater chains. This affective change that occurred between *The Isle* and *Spring, Summer*, then, clearly illustrates and epitomizes the character of the abrupt turn Kim took between his earlier and later films. Indeed, his later films starting from *Spring, Summer* similarly replace irreconcilable social outcasts that inform his earlier films with globally accepted others often adorned by generic East Asian exoticness.

Conclusion

I began this paper with a doubt about the optimistic views of the East Asian exotic in globally circulating films. Obviously, globalization has enabled East Asian exotic features to proliferate and circulate in every corner of the globe, thus contributing much to establishing a multicultural sense of the world. But, as I showed regarding the recent change global neoliberalism has forced East Asian filmmakers to accept,

this version of multiculturalism involves a homogenization and generification of East Asian otherness. Moreover, as I also showed in regard to the curious turn in Kim Ki-duk's filmmaking career, these processes of homogenizing and generifying the East Asian exotic have also infiltrated and influenced the East Asian art house filmmaking rather than being influential only in the East Asian blockbuster scene. Finally, I would highlight how these processes are not simply to be understood in terms of economy, but more importantly in terms of politics and ethics. Neoliberalism often appears politically and ethically neutral or irrelevant, but this is not true. By homogenizing our sense of otherness, neoliberalism excludes and suppresses other possibilities of perceiving and feeling others that are grounded less on a common sense otherness than on singularly plural senses of otherness. For this reason, this process of exclusion is detrimental to our hope of creating our different affective relationships with others. But, this hope is fundamental to our respect and responsibility for others.

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Conflicts of Human Civilization and a Healing Place for the Humanities:
The Balkans, Macedonia, Skopje

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Introduction

Macedonia, which served as a center of the ancient Greek civilization in history of Western civilization, is no longer functioning as a center in modern society. Rather, it has turned into a place for conflicts of civilization among Albanians from the Illyrian civilization, the Balkan ethnic group based on the ancient Thracian civilization, and Slavic people who came down to the Balkan Peninsula in the 6th century. These forces of civilization represented by Islam and Orthodoxy, Albanian and Slavic Macedonians coexist in Skopje, Macedonia, creating universality in their multicultural space. The creation of universalism is made possible through thinking and healing through the humanities. This research will look into various aspects of conflicts of civilization in Macedonia and look into the reasoning and healing through the humanities in Macedonia. This research will include the adaptation of double languages, joint research and education on history, embracing other cultures and a diversity of image data symbolizing the healing through the humanities. The second region, for which the research on healing through the humanities is required, is Kosovo. Kosovo is the region that currently shows the most divisive conflict of civilizations in the world. The conflict in Kosovo will be in stark contrast with that in Skopje. This research is also an intuitive study examining the possibility of healing through the humanities in Korean society, which is turning into a civilization of conflict and a multicultural society.

Body

1. What kind of country is Macedonia to Korean people?

Macedonia is a country that is located at the center of the Balkan Peninsula, with Bulgaria located to

its east, Serbia to its north, and Greece to its south. And it shares its borders with Albania. Due to its geopolitical position, the competition between countries has been fierce in this region since ancient times. Given the fact that Greece (Byzantine), Bulgaria, and more recently, the former Yugoslavia have been competing intensively to secure this region, Macedonia can be understood as the most important strategic place in this region.

When Korean companies or public corporations enter into the overseas markets and when the private sector begins to communicate more and more with foreign entities, Macedonia is the region that can be utilized as a bridgehead in the Balkans. Macedonia is culturally similar to South Korea. Due to its geographical position, Macedonia has not had many historical and cultural exchanges with South Korea until the 20th century. Thus, South Korean society's interests in Macedonian ethnic groups and countries remain a mere curiosity of exotic cultures. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of the socialist system, there has been a reverse-orientalism perspective of viewing Macedonia and other countries of the Balkans in South Korean society based on its capital and technological competitive edge.

Geographically, Macedonia is located far away from South Korea; but historically, it is very closely related with South Korea. The two countries share many things in common: both countries don't have full-fledged capitalism, lack experiences of agricultural revolution and civil revolution, have a vulnerable citizen class and a strong intellectual class, have experiences of colonialism, and have walked their unique roads to modernity, which is different from the Western society's road to modernity.

2. Macedonia, Skopje
2.1. Conflicts of Civilization in Macedonia's History: In Ancient and Medieval Times

Ethnic Identity	
Macedonia	- When ethnicity is considered, ancient Macedonian people are not Greek. -Ancient Macedonia maintained its own culture and identity. - Ancient Macedonian people maintained their identity despite suppression from foreign powers – such as Greece.
Greece	- Ethnically, Macedonian people are Greek. -Greece and Byzantine civilization culturally assimilated this region.
Bulgaria	- Medieval Macedonian people are assimilated Bulgarian people. -They are referred to as western Bulgarians.
Serbia	- Medieval Macedonians have assimilated to become Serbians. - Assimilation took place over the course of several centuries.
Language Identity	
Macedonia	- Macedonian is an independent language.

Greece	- It's true that the Macedonian language is a Slavic language. But it should not be used as an indicator of categorizing people in the region as Bulgarian.
Bulgaria	- There is no Macedonian language. The language used in this region is a western dialect of Bulgarian.
Serbia	- Macedonian people have traditionally used a language that is similar to Serbian.
Territorial Conflicts	
Macedonia	-Since the 19th century, the movement of restoring the country's native land has been promoted.
Greece	-As a result of such movement, some parts of the territory were restored.
Bulgaria	-The territory of Macedonia belonged to Bulgaria until the late 19 century.
Serbia	- In medieval and modern times, Serbia occupied a significant portion of the region. Currently, it is claiming sovereignty to the territory.

(Gounaris, 1996, Kim Chul-Min, 1999 Source Data)

Greece-Bulgaria-Serbia is the axis of conflicts in Macedonia in ancient and medieval times. Greece had conflicts due to territorial and ethnic identity issues while Bulgaria has a conflict structure in all areas – including ethnic identity, and territorial and language issues. With Serbia, territorial conflicts are being emphasized and the severity of conflicts is quite low in the identity and language areas when compared with Bulgaria.

Figure 1: Map of Macedonia and Kosovo>

2.1. History of Conflicts of Macedonian civilization: In the Early-Modern and Modern Times

<Picture1: Islam Mosque in Skopje>

<Picture 2: Orthodox Church in Skopje>

Conflicts in modern times can be divided into two: First is ethnic conflict surrounding Albanian people living in Macedonia. Second is conflict with Greece over the country name of Macedonia and over national flag.[1] In this research, we will be taking a look at only ethnic issues surrounding Albanian people.

Albanians are scatted over the Balkan Peninsula. Around 3 million Albanian people reside in Albania, and around 1.8 million and 600,000 Albanian people live in Kosovo and Macedonia respectively. Most Albanians live in the capital city of Skopje and other cities in the western Macedonian region (Altmann, 1992: 165). Albanians living in the western region named their region Ilirida and requested autonomy of their region. Furthermore, they also requested the elevation of their region's status to Narod given the fact that the ratio of Albanians is the largest among minorities. Such issues are still ignored by the Macedonian government due to the possibility of a second Kosovo war and equality issues with other minorities. The ethnic issue is absolutely related to issues concerning Islam and Orthodoxy. The percentage of ethnic groups in Macedonia is shown on the table below.
(Kim Chul-Min 1999: 319)

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1 The issue over the country name has existed since Sep 8th, 1991 when Macedonian citizens expressed their overwhelming support for the existence of the former Yugoslav states in a national referendum. The Greek government brought up the issue of the Macedonian map on which it is named Great Macedonia and the issue of Macedonia's national flag, which has a Virginia 16 square shape to the UN Security Council on Jan, 1993. In Aug 1993, the UN Security Council suggested F.Y.R.M (the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) and approved the registration of the country in the UN. However, there are still conflicts between Macedonia and Greece as the country still sticks to its previous name of ROM (Republic of Macedonia).

	Ethnic Group	Population	Percentage (%)
Majority	Macedonian	1,314,283	64.62%
Minority	Albanian	427,313	21.01
	Turk	97,416	4.79
	Gypsies	55,575	2.73
	Serbian	44,159	2.17
	Wlach	8,129	0.40
	Other	87,089	4.28
	Total (Minority Ethnic Groups)	719,681	35.38
	Total Ethnic Group	2,033,964	100.00

<Table1: Macedonia Population Composition >

Albanians, whose population is the largest among minority ethnic groups, argued that they have been living in the current Albania, Kosovo, and in the western and southeastern regions of Macedonia ever since the Bronze Age based on a theory on Illyrian native inhabitants (Kwon Hyuk-Jae 1998: 6). In addition, Albanians have consistently complained of discrimination against Albanians as an ethnic minority group in education, culture, and other rights-related fields.

2.2. Healing of Conflicts through the Hamanities

<Picture3: Signs in Albanian and Macedonian Language (left) and the Albanian District>

In the Macedonian Constitution, it is stipulated that Macedonians shall coexist with Albanians, Turks, Wlachs, Rumanians in the Republic of Macedonia and shall provide equal rights to all citizens residing within the country. In particular, Macedonia makes strong efforts to protect the rights of Albanian minorities. A case in point is the bilingual traffic signs both in Macedonian and Albanian. Both languages have been used even in the northern region of Skopje where the majority population is Albanian. A number of academic researches have been carried out to figure out the similarities and common grounds of the two languages based on the recognition that Albanian and Macedonian languages both belong to the Balkan language family.

Historically, Macedonia has been a place for multiple ethnic and religious groups – including Serbian, Bulgarian and Greek ethnic groups. Such various cultures and ambiguity over territorial boundaries have made it difficult to set clear boundaries between different ethnic groups and served as the major reason for the conflicts of civilization (Terzić 1995). Based on such a recognition, Macedonian and Albanian people are currently working together to establish their common history and foster their common culture. Although it is true that the Macedonian government is still wary of the possibility of the great Albanianism dominating the country, there are many national joint research projects that are underway to research Illyrian civilization and to determine the boundaries and roles of Slavic-Macedonia regions.

3. Kosovo, 'a Powder Keg of the Balkans' – Agony and antagonism of the aliens who are living together

The Balkan Peninsula, which became the beginning place of the First World War with a single gunshot in Sarajevo in 1914, still remains an explosive region just like the crater of an active volcano. And Kosovo in Serbia is the region where ethnic conflicts are most fierce out of many regions on the Balkan Peninsula. Historically, Kosovo was the sacred place for Serbian people. The Medieval Serbian Kingdom, which was developed based on the Principality of Raswika, established a national foundation in the era of the Serbian King Stefan Nemanja. Stefan Nemanja conquered the Pincipality of Zeta and built strong ties between the state and Orthodoxy, laying a foundation for the Medieval Serbian Kingdom in the current Kosovo-Metohija region. Stefan Nemanja's son Stefan Nemanjić built an independent Serbian Kingdom, breaking away from the shadows of Byzantine (1217), and thanks to the effort of Saint Save, the Serbian Orthodoxy became independent from the Bulgarian Ohrid Parish in 1219. Since then, Kosovo became a sacred place for Serbians as it is the first parish of the Serbian Orthodox Church. However, the status of Kosovo as a sacred place became weak after Kosovo was conquered by the Ottoman Turks. The Serbian Kingdom became divided internally over the king's throne and eventually fell due to the invasion of the Ottoman Turks after King Stephan Dushan, who is praised as the greatest king in Serbian history, died at the age of 46 in 1335. In the fight against the Ottoman Turks during the period between 1363 and 1371, King Stephan Uroš and his brothers died, and the Medieval Serbian Kingdom became a tributary state to the Ottoman Turks. After the First Kosovo War between the Christian coalition and the Ottoman Turks in Jun 1389, Kosovo fell under the rule of Turkey and many Albanian people in the region converted to Islam. Also, an increasing number of immigrants began to come into this region. On the contrary, Serbian people who believed the Serbian Orthodoxy had left their hometown moved to Hungary or Transylvania. As a result, Albanian people became the majority and Serbian people became the minority in Kosovo (within the Serbian territory), creating a gap in the ethnic group composition (Albanians became the majority).

The conflicts in Kosovo under the Socialist Yugoslavia resulted in the consecutive victories and defeats of Albanian and Serbian ethnic groups depending on domestic or global political atmospheres. Alexander Rankovic, a Serb who made efforts to expand Serbianism (Serbian Nationalism), repressed Kosovo separatism and engaged in various maneuvers to enhance the status of Serbian people in the region. However, the eavesdropping of President Tito's official residence in 1966 sparked a heated discussion on raising the status of Albanian people, and in 1968, Kosovo eventually earned autonomy by breaking away from Serbia. The new constitution, Novi Ustav, was adopted in 1974 as a means to maintain Yugoslavia as a multiethnic country and to prepare for the time after the death of the President Tito. And in accordance with the new constitution, Kosovo was able to exert a power of representation within the federation. The atmosphere in the region, which was focused on guaranteeing the rights of Albanian people, is well illustrated in the protests for the status of the Republic of Kosovo, which took place in May 1980 after the death of President Tito. Albanians in Kosovo called for the creation of Republika Kosova, a separated Republic under the framework of the federation, and called for the status as the majority ethnic group in the region. Under Socialist Yugoslavia, the last two important events related to Kosovo took place. The first one is Slobodan Milošević's speech on the hill in Kosovo in 1987 when Slobodan Milošević visited Kosovo to investigate the growing protests of Albanians in the 1980s. The second one is the disposal of Kosovo's autonomy in Mar 1989. In 1987, Slobodan Milošević made strong nationalist comments against Serbians in Kosovo and suddenly became a leading player for expanding Serbianism among Serbian people. When Slobodan Milošević was elected to be Serbian president in 1989, he abolished autonomy for Kosovo and Vojvodina and declared the expansion of Serbianism in Socialist Yugoslavia, thereby triggering the collapse of the federation and the conflicts between ethnic groups. Amid a series of bloody conflicts, on Mar 24, 1999, NATO forces conducted raids on Kosovo and Serbian lands to protect the human rights of Albanian people living in Kosovo. Since then, the Balkan region started to garner global attention. As the 'Kosovo War' lingered on for a long period of time against people's general expectations, G7 countries - the US, Germany, the UK, France, Italy, Japan and Canada - and the ministers of G8 countries (G7 countries and Russia) agreed in principle on the peaceful resolution of the Kosovo War on May 6th, 1999. On Jun 2nd, 1999, Russian and EU envoys met with Slobodan Milošević and delivered the message of G8 countries. On Jun 3rd, 1999, Serbia declared that NATO-led peace keeping forces would deploy about 50,000 troops and divide Kosovo into 5 districts to conduct peace-keeping operations in accordance with the G8 countries' 'Kosovo peace formula,' which was later approved in the Yugoslavian Parliament. On Jun 10th, 1999, the two sides reached a consensus on the 'Kosovo peace formula' for the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo and for the presence of UN peace keeping forces in Kosovo, thus resulting in the end of the 79-day Kosovo War.

Since then, UNMIK (The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo) and NATO-led KFOR (Kosovo Force) have conducted and monitored peace-keeping activities in Kosovo on the basis of SCR 1244

(Security Council Resolution 1244) adopted by the UN Security Council on Jun 10th, 1999. Those peace-keeping forces in Kosovo are tasked to guarantee safety and peaceful living of residents in Kosovo, to guarantee the return of about 200,000 deportees and refugees, and to encourage Serbia to offer Kosovo large autonomy.

<Picture 4: Albanian Refugee Camps in Kosovo and A Bombed Islam Mosque >

80:20 is the ratio of ethnic groups in Kosovo. Albanian people take up as high as 80% of the population in Kosovo while Serbian people account for less than 20%. The discord and hostility between these two ethnic groups are a main source of conflicts in Kosovo. In addition, the US and western European countries' support for Albanian ethnic groups and Russian and other Slavic countries' support for Serbian ethnic groups are making the Kosovo situation worse.

Kosovo has become a place for confrontation between pan-Albanianism and pro-Serbianism and between pan-Illyrianism and pan-Slavism. In order to solve such confrontations and conflicts in the region, a radical method of 'dividing Kosovo by exchanging the populations between different ethnic groups' can be considered, or a gradual method of inducing a soft landing to 'a multi-cultural society' by overcoming victim mentality can also be considered. It's the duty of humanities scholars to think about possible solutions and suggest wise choices for those who are living everyday in the fear of death and destruction in Kosovo.

Conclusion

Macedonia, which is called the powder keg of Europe and which went through civil war in 2001, still experiences conflicts of civilization between different ethnic groups or religious groups. However, as shown in the picture above, the conflicts occur as Albanian and Macedonian people in the region occupy the left and right side of the same background. An Albanian traditional pattern symbolizing eternal life and a Macedonian traditional doll symbolizing fertility and luck are still displayed together in every corner of the capital city Skopje. Can the solution of promoting coexistence be applied to Kosovo? And how can it be applied to an increasingly multicultural society of South Korea?

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Transculturation and Cultural Identity of Chinese Ethnic Minority Films: The Cinema-Aesthetics of Zhang Lü(張律)

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1.

Zhang Lü is a director who has a unique background. He is an ethnic Korean living in China and has Chinese citizenship, but he is more closely related with the Korean film society rather than with the Chinese film society. He received many awards in international film festivals and is widely known in the international film society, but his presence is not well known in the Chinese film society.

In analyzing transcultural implications of China's 5th and 6th generation films, Joo Jin-Sook and Hong So-In focused on the contextualization of Zhang Lü's films in the international film society and stated that "Director Zhang Lü's films are drawing the reality of Modern Chinese society in the global film market – that is dominated by eminent western film festivals – and are regarded as films that show the lives of suppressed and marginalized ethnic minorities in an increasing capitalized Chinese society." "As Zhang Lü's films tries to describe the lives of ethnic minorities in Chinese society, his films began to be considered minority films that are not included in or try to break up the concept of the state in films. His films are understood as modern Chinese films as they try to approach conflicts in Chinese society from a critical point of view and as they shed light on socially otherized individuals in Chinese society."[1] According to Joo Jin-Sook and Hong So-In, Zhang Lü is a Chinese director who makes films about the lives of minorities in Chinese society with the main focus on the conflicts in Chinese society and socially otherized individuals.

However, in the Korean film society, Zhang Lü's films are treated as Korean films. This is perhaps because

1 Joo Jin-Sook and Hong So-In「Boundaries, Minorities and Women in Zhang Lü's films」,『 Research on Films』issue 42 (Seoul: Film Studies Association of Korea 2009), p598, p599

he received financial support from Korea for his first feature film 『Tang Poetry』and because he is an ethnic Korean living in China. Although nationality is not one of the main criteria classifying films, Zhang Lü seems to regard most of his films as Chinese films. But 『Iri』is an exception: at the International Rome Film Festival in October 2008, Zhang Lü said "Apart from my nationality and cultural identity, I think 『Iri□ is a Korean film because it was made on Korean land with a Korean staff in the Korean language."[2]

What Zhang Lü was implying with his comments at the International Rome Film Festival was that, except for 『Iri』, his other films fall in the category of Chinese films, not in the category of Korean films. Zhang Lü's comments serve as the basis for categorizing his films as Chinese minority films. Given the fact that Zhang Lü first writes scripts in Chinese and translates them into Korean, Chinese is his citizenship language and first language. As language is usually used as one of the major standards for determining a person's identity, Zhang Lü is certainly an ethnic Korean living in China who has Chinese citizenship. Kim Tae-Man stated that the main characters in Zhang Lü's films are Chinese minority Diasporas who are living the lives of aliens in China and Mongolia, experiencing suppression, tensions, and deficiencies, desperate to communicate via their language, body and way.[3]

Meanwhile, Yook Sang-Hyo added that "Zhang Lü's films view the Diaspora phenomena in East Asia from the Diaspora's perspectives."[4] However, things cannot be defined in such a simple way.

2.

Woo Hae-Kyung, who directed the documentary 『Zhang Lü』, participated in the production of Zhang Lü's film 『Dooman River』as a staff member - securing a double position as Zhang Lü's staff member and as the director of the documentary film about him. Woo Hae-Kyung established a few roundabout ways to approach Director Zhang Lü: the first way is Jacques Derrida's 'Of Hospitality,' the second way is Hamid Naficy's 'Accented Filmmakers,' and the third is Edward Said's 'Freud and the Non-European.' The last one is 'semi-refugee of Seo Kyung-Shik, a Korean-Japanese Diaspora intelligentsia. Jacques Derrida's 'Of Hospitality' is related with the themes of Zhang Lü's films while Hamid Naficy's 'Accented Filmmakers' is about his background, and Edward Said's 'Freud and the Non-European' is about his attitude on film

2 Woo Hae-Kyung, 「Research on Producing the Documentary
  <Zhang Lü, Zhang Ryul >」Film Theory Department, Korean National University of Arts, 2010, p10

3 Kim Tae-Man, 「Trauma of Korean Diasporas in China」, 「Chinese Modern Literature」54th issue (Seoul: Korea-China Modern Literature Society, 2010), p263~264

4 Yook Sang-Hyo, 「Silence and Absence: Diaspora in Zhang Lü's Films」, 「Korean Contents Society Journal」Vol.9 No.11 (Korean Contents Society, 2009), p163

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production.

The English title for Woo Hae-Kyung's documentary 『Zhang Lü, Zhang Ryul』is 『Of Hospitality』, which highlights the foci and keywords of Zhang Lü's films. Jacques Derrida's 『Of Hospitability』dealt with the hospitality for aliens and strangers. Nam Soo-In equated such hospitality shown in 『Of Hospitability』with the unconditional hospitality shown by Bienvenu Myriel, the bishop of Digne in 『Les Miserables』, who opened the door to a total stranger and exercised unconditional hospitality toward Jean Valjean without asking his name or asking where he is from. Nam Soo-In pointed out that Jean Valjean is a good example highlighting the influence of unconditional hospitality although readers get to close the door of their heart as they observe the misfortune faced by the bishop afterwards. Woo Hae-Kyung used an unusual method of citing Jacques Derrida's quotes in dividing parts in the documentary.

Hamid Naficy named filmmakers who experience the lives of Diasporas directly or indirectly 'Accented Filmmakers' and classified their films as 'Accented Cinema.' According to Hamid Naficy, accented filmmakers show different characteristics and tensions compared with the so-called mainstream directors as they are working outside the mainstream film industry and working outside the mainstream studio system. Such different tensions and a heterogeneous nature do not belong to the usual narrative and result in a unique 'accented style.'[5] Woo Hae-Kyung categorized filmmakers as exilic filmmakers, diasporic filmmakers and postcolonial ethnic and identity filmmakers, and she classified Zhang Lü as a post-colonial filmmaker.

Then, Woo Hae-Kyung explored the identity of Zhang Lü based on the arguments made by Edward Said and Seo Kyung-Shik. Seo Kyung-Shik defined himself as a 'semi-refugee' as he was Korean Japanese forced to give up his rights just like other refugees in the Japanese society; but he was not stateless because he maintained Korean nationality.[6] And Woo Hae-Kyung applied the same logic to Zhang Lü's status in China. Unlike Seo Kyung-Shik, Zhang Lü has Chinese citizenship. Thus, Woo Hae-Kyung did not define Zhang Lü's identity in a simple manner, and she tried to analyze his identity from the Diasporic and Beijing immigrant intellectual' point of view. Zhang Lü has been reluctant to examine his national identity. In his interview, Zhang Lü talked about his fluid identity that is not fixed.[7] Woo Hae-Kyung analyzed Zhang Lü's identity from the two different perspectives and argued that his identity is

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5 Naficy, Hamid, An Accented Cinema: Exilic and Diasporic Filmmaking, Princeton 「Silence University press」, 2001, p10.
　　Woo Hae-Kyung, p14~15

6 Seo Kyung-Shik, 「The Gap between Refugees and Citizens」, Lim Seong-Mo, Lee Gyu-Soo, (Seoul: Stone Pillow, 2006), p222~223, Woo Hae-Kyung, p 19

7 Jeong Sung-Il, Huh Moon-Young, 「He stands on the boundary」, 「Cine 21」795th, Mar 15, 2011, p79

the foundation for his films. In Woo Hae-Kyung's analysis, Zhang Lü' identity is the 'fluid identity' that flows between a 'Diaspora ethnic Korean' and a 'Chinese intellectual.' Moreover, 'the identity as a global citizen' should be considered to determine Zhang Lü's identity in a more precise way.

In a lecture titled 'Freud and the Non-European' provided at the Freud Museum in the early 21st century, Edward Said took issue with the identity of Freud as he analyzed 『Moses and Monotheism (1939)』. Edward Said stated that "there are two identities of Freud: the scientist who is looking for objective achievements in his research, and the Jewish intellectual who is exploring the relationship between himself and his ancient religious belief through exploring the history and identity of Jewish people. But these two identities do not fit smoothly."[8] Woo Hae-Kyung tried to relate Edward Said's discussion to the identity of Zhang Lü and stated that "the process of Zhang Lü's film production, drawing the lives of ethnic Korean or minority North Korean defectors living in China, is similar to the process of Freud's analysis – Freud as an objective scientist and Freud as a Jewish intellectual who explores his own religion. But the existing discussions on Zhang Lü's films focused only on the films themselves and emphasized Zhang Lü's identity as the intellectual. On the contrary, this documentary emphasized Zhang Lü's identity as an "objective scientist." [9]

There is the need to discuss Edward Said's analysis in greater details: Edward Said stated at the end of his lecture that "we can get a lot from 'Freud's unresolved identity sense' because it is related with "Freud's profound illustration on inherent limitations that prevent the different identities – even the strongest collective identities – from integrating into one identity."[10] "The fact that Freud was a non-European Egyptian citizen"[11] is noteworthy. Edward Said's argument showed that 'the essence of global citizenship', which was described as 'inevitable emotional experiences', "will be able to serve as a somewhat solid foundation for the bi-ethnic country – rather than being the antagonists in reality in the Jewish-Palestinian history and on the Jewish-Palestinian land."[12]

When such discussion is taken into consideration, Zhang Lü's identity flows between a 'Diasporic ethnic Korean who is living in China' and the 'Chinese intellectual' and, in some cases, encompassing both identities to become 'a global citizen.' This is expressed as 'dignity,' which is frequently mentioned by Zhang Lü.

8 Edward Said, 『Freud and the Non-European』, Translator Joo Eun-Woo (Pajoo: Changbi, 2005), p42~43

9 Woo Hae-Kyung, Ibid., p16

10 Edward Said, Ibid., p82

11 Edward Said, Ibid., p82-83

12 Edward Said, Ibid., p84

3.

Zhang Lü's singularity is well illustrated in his unique film grammar. An array of questions the interviewer threw at the interviewee is closely related with complex film grammar. Korean critics and audiences have difficulty understanding Zhang Lü's films, and there are many reasons behind that. In case of 『Dooman River』, it is difficult for the audience to understand the story of the movie if they have no knowledge on the Yanbian region and its history. What is more important is Zhang Lü's esthetic attitude. Zhang Lü said that he does not pursue an esthetic, but esthetic senses are essential in film production. His basic philosophy in pursuing an esthetic is 'filming authentic figures while following emotions and avoiding risk of distortion.' Zhang Lü stated that "if you keep distance from the emotions you are following, the films is not distorted. But if you just follow emotions, the films can be distorted. I shouldn't be fools - just follow a range of emotions in film. So it's important that you keep distance from the emotions."[13] But this is easier said than done. 'Keeping distance from emotions while following a range of emotions' is not easy. The director's emotions are as important as camera angles and the movements of characters in the film. Particularly, Zhang Lü focused highly on the range of emotions. It's not too much to say that all his films start from such range of emotions. According to Jeong Sung-Il, Zhang Lü's scenarios are very simple, and the rest of the details are directed on site, or the complementary scenario is distributed to actors and actresses on the shooting dates. In some cases, just the basic concept of the film is informed to the actors and actresses, and the director just lets them express themselves. For Zhang Lü, authenticity that does not distort emotions is important. Thus, he doesn't use a film set and looks for the perfect places to express the authentic nature of characters. Zhang Lü said "I'm trying to look for the perfect place to express truthful emotions. When I see the place, I can tell 'Yes, this is the place for the film. This place will be able to tell the reality of the lives of characters.' So my instinct is trying to find such places for the film….When I find the right place, I shoot the film there, however, desolate the place is."[14]

For people who are used to Hollywood film grammar, Zhang Lü's films are not easy to understand because his films make it difficult to go beyond the limits of our reality for the general audience who is seeking to obtain vicarious satisfaction while watching the imaginary world of films. Zhang Lü asked actors and actresses to 'avoid exaggeration and control their movements and emotions.' He said "my style is about delivering the eternal truth. Whether something is truthful or not is very important to me. So I direct actors and actresses to the specific details, asking them to act in this way or that way. When dishonest acting is revealed over time, the story of the film gets damaged."[15] What he is arguing is that

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13 Jeong Sung-Il, Huh Moon-Young, 『He stands on the boundary』, 『Cine 21』795th, p 80~81, Mar 15, 2011

14 Jeong Sung-Il, Huh Moon-Young, 『He stands on the boundary』, 『Cine 21』795th, p 84, Mar 15, 2011

15 Jeong Sung-Il, Huh Moon-Young, 『He stands on the boundary』, 『Cine 21』795th, p 90, Mar 15, 2011

dishonest acting damages the story of the film over time. Zhang Lü's attitude about acting reminds us of Alfred Hitchcock, who once stated that "Actors should act in the simple and neutral way, and cameras should take care of the rest. The rest is about the essence and psychological referent."[16] The scenes filmed via camera - rather than via artificial acting - are included in the actual referent. That is why Zhang Lü is looking for the right places for the scenes. As a matter of fact, Zhang Lü's approach to acting is not new. In the past, Gilles Deleuze suggested the concepts of 'non-professional actor' and 'professional non-actor' related with neo-realism in Italy: "Actors who are able to remain silent and remain still – rather than making artificial movements – and actors who are able to make people watch them in silence, and actors who can try meaningless dialogue endlessly are the actors who can be called 'the actors as the medium'."[17]

The major elements that comprise Zhang Lü's film esthetics are as follows: Keeping distance from emotions while following authentic emotions, avoiding and controlling exaggerated acting and looking for the right places for shooting. Zhang Lü's film esthetics strictly avoid clichés, which is the starting point of Gilles Deleuze's philosophy. For Gilles Deleuze, cliché is a collection of things that comprise a world that lacks comprehensiveness and continuity.[18] Park Seong-Soo interpreted the purpose of Gilles Deleuze's 『Cinema』as follows: When the world does not have new theories or ideologies that can help seize new changes, it becomes dominated by clichés. Our inner world is no exception. When our inner world has no new ideologies or theories, it turns into an ideological situation that lacks alternative ideologies and new thoughts, and it is literally 'a suffocating situation' according to Gilles Deleuze. All the endeavors made to avoid clichés become another cliché story or narrative, and that is the paradigm of classical reasoning and films described by Gilles Deleuze. Gilles Deleuze's 『Cinema』is planed and released to avoid clichés with new images, new signs, or with the new arrangement of images.[19] There is no evidence that Zhang Lü studied Gilles Deleuze's film philosophy, but he is closely related with Gilles Deleuze's theory as Zhang Lü also avoids clichés. Through this analysis, it can be learned that Zhang Lü is pursuing 'human dignity' in the film production.

 4.

Zhang Lü pursued human dignity and tried to 'integrate hospitality and gratitude in a dialectical way.' His latest film, 『Dooman River』, which was released in Seoul this year, sparked diagrammatic or conceptual disputes. Jeong Han-Seok said "there are a number of illusional experiences that are sparked by

16 Gilles Deleuze, 『CinemaI:Movement-Image』, Translator Yoo Jin-Sang (Seoul: Viewpoint and Language, 2002), p364
17 Gilles Deleuze, 『CinemaII:Timet-Image』, Translator Lee Jeong-Ha (Seoul: Viewpoint and Language, 2002), p44
18 Gilles Deleuze, 『CinemaI: Movement-Image』, Translator Yoo Jin-Sang (Seoul: Viewpoint and Language, 2002), p374
19 Park Seong-Soo, 『Deleuze』, (Seoul: Eroom, 2004) p92~94

momentary events in this film" and took issue with the story telling methods in some scenes of the film – such as the scenes of a North Korean defector raping Soonhee and Changho throwing himself in the river – saying that "the concept of appropriateness was intervened although it was meant to be inevitable."[20] On the contrary, Nam Da-Eun argued that the first scene of Changho lying on his side and the Tofu room scene should be dealt with in a different way, saying that "the two different scenes are treating Changho as a dead person, or Changho is viewing himself as a dead person."[21] Moreover, Nam Da-Eun examined the relationship between Changho and Jeongjin, saying that Changho seems to share his destiny with young North Korean defectors who face the risk of dying. In one of the interviews, Huh Moon-Young pointed out that the scene of Changho throwing himself in the river is too much and abstract, and Zhang Lü responded that "Changho and Jeongjin already moved beyond those steps." Here, what Zhang Lü was referring to with 'steps' is a promise of life and death. By crossing the river, Jeongjin is risking his life. As Jeongjin is risking his life, Changho has no other choice but to risk his own life as well. From the outsider's perspectives, viewers might think Changho should not risk his own life. But Zhang Lü believes that the relationship between Changho and Jeongjin is founded upon truth. To take it one step further, Nam Da-Eun believes that the relationship between them is an exchange relationship based on human dignity. Through analyzing film shooting methods, Nam Da-Eun believes that "they exchange what they have with what is lacking," and "When Jeongjin and Changho exchange rice, promises, football, a model missile, and even their own life, there is a constant movement not to make themselves 'the other.' By moving to the place of 'the other' every time death is an issue, the two characters create the vitality of film. This is an attempt to reach materiality of emotions, surpassing concreteness of everyday life." Nam Da-Eun's interpretation focuses on understanding the inner heart of the director.

While focusing on the conflicts between people in the North and Yanbian, this film is not reduced to a movie that deals with friendship between a North Korean body who escaped from North Korea and an ethnic Korean boy living in China, but rather it is sublimated into the essence of global citizens because of the film's 'successful integration of hospitality and gratitude in a dialectical way.' When they first meet, Jeongjin asks for food, and Changho serves as a food provider for Jeongjin. Changho is providing food not out of pity. Jeongjin receives food without an obsequious attitude while being grateful for the fact that Changho is providing something to eat. But Jeongjin has no physical means to express his gratitude, so the body (football) is the only means to convey his grateful heart toward Changho. That is why Jeongjin risks his life to cross the river to stand on his promise. And presenting a model missile as a gift is noteworthy. Nam Da-Eun believes that this model missile – not a postage stamp – is the message the director intends

20 Jeong Han-Seok, 「Moments that are swaying like a magical illusion」, 『Cine 21』795th, Mar 15, 2011
21 Nam Da-Eun, 「Zhang Lü's <Dooman River>, Advocating its 'Conceptual Nature'」, 『Cine 21』, 796th, Mar 31, 2011

to deliver to the audience, saying "their destiny is just like missiles, not like exchanging letters: once they are launched, they cannot come back and have to explode somewhere." Jeongjin's gratitude is leading to hospitality toward Changho, whom he once hated so much because of his sister, and in return, Changho feels grateful toward such hospitality. This such chain of 'hospitality-gratitude/hospitality-gratitude' ends when Changho throws himself into the river, but their human dignity does not disappear.

However, Changho is not just expressing gratitude toward hospitality. North Korean defector Changho raped Soonhee even though Soonhee's grandfather provided him with a place to sleep and Soonhee gave him food and liquor. It's understandable that he felt deja vu and fell into panic when he watched a TV program praising North Korean leader Kim Jeong-Il, but it may be asked whether Changho had to commit rape. (Of course, replacing the rape scene with the scene of a TV program highlights the director's unusual courtesy for the character Soonhee out of good manners.) Jeong Han-Seok interpreted it as another diagram while Nam Da-Eun analyzed it as the process of explaining Soonhee's following actions such as determination, abortion, bridge and divided emotions about her hometown.

Human dignity, which is pursued through integrating hospitality and gratitude in a dialectical way, can also be observed in 『Desert Dream』. When Soonhee and Changho arrive on the Mongolian meadow, Hanggai shows warm hospitality in accordance with the Mongolian nomad traditions. In return, Soonhee and Changho help with Hanggai's work – planting trees, drawing water, collecting horse droppings. Then, one incident takes place highlighting Zhang Lü's way of expressing human dignity. In that scene, Soonhee stabs a sheep. Soonhee's expression of gratitude toward Hanggai's hospitability and revenge for Hanggai's rudeness is the height of human dignity. Hanggai takes lessons from Soonhee's moderate attitude of controlling the inner heart and shows his gratitude by giving blessings to Soonhee and Changho (or Changho believes that Hanggai gives blessings to them).

In 『Grain in Ear』, a fake hospitality is described. Soonhee expresses gratitude toward hospitality, but soon she is betrayed. And when her son Changho is dead, she decides to seek revenge. The dialectical way of integrating hospitability and gratitude is not seen here, but the ultimate dignity is expressed in some other ways. For instance, in the second sexual intercourse scene, Soonhee's naked body is not shown. In the sexual intercourse scene with Mr. Kim, an ethnic Korean in China, Mr. Kim's body is shown in the scene, but Soonhee's naked body is not present. In the scene of Soonhee and Mr. Wang, a public official, Mr. Wang's naked body is seen through the eyes of Soonhee. Director Zhang Lü stated that "I felt bad about showing her naked in the scene. For that scene, it was too much for Soonhee. She already had too much hardship. So I thought I shouldn't let that happen." For Zhang Lü, human dignity is the ultimate value.

5.

Zhang Lü's films deal with people who are on the edge of boundaries. A case in point is 『Desert Dream』. The subtitle for this film is 'Hyazgar' which refers to the boundaries in the deserts and meadows. In this film, the relationship between characters is expressed with the boundaries. Hanggai, a Mongolian nomad, and Hoonhee and her son, ethnic Korean defectors, meet on the boundaries of the deserts and meadows. Although Hanggai and Soonhee cannot communicate beyond the boundaries of Mongolian and Korean languages, they communicate by planting trees, boiling hempseed oil, collecting horse droppings or through other labor. Changho hopes to stay with Hanggai while Soonhee hesitates between staying and leaving. According to Gilles Deleuze, "The boundaries are what should be dealt with in films for cineaste and for real people."[22] The boundaries here refer to the boundaries for filmmakers and real individuals and the boundaries between the potential and actual reality that need to be integrated. This is to explain the third image in Gilles Deleuze's film philosophy of 'time-image' and is "about **the affiliation of time** integrating pre-time and post-time. His paradox introduces the sustained gap in the moment."[23] Gilles Deleuze's explanation is consistent with the last scene of 『Desert Dream』.

Kim Tae-Man interpreted the last scene as follows: "In the contrast between the static left and the fluttering right, it was implied that the future is filled with both hope and despair." The green forest is said to be a lucky charm in Mongolia. The wavering of the 'green fringe' signifies 'the constantly wobbling body and uncertain future' and poses a fundamental question asking where the end of that way is."[24] That means there are both the green fringe -which can be read with Hanggai's hospitality - and the fluttering and stoppage because the future cannot be predicted. Kim So-Young analyzed this part from the filmologie point of view, saying "Such intrusion sparks surprise because it is a plan sequence (shot sequence). The green fringes that are wavering look like they are welcoming people or they can be seen as a harbinger of misfortune."[25] The plan sequence in which green fringes are wavering over the reddish brown bridge before the camera pans is a 'single shot sequence' as explained by Kim So-Young. This was the term created by Bazin Andre to describe 'a tracking shot: constantly moving camera in serial sequences.'

Changho and Soonhee, who come across the boundaries, again try to go beyond the boundaries. It's uncertain where their final destination is when they go across the Mongolian border. The image of Soonhee urging Changho – who is hoping to stay with Hanggai – to move on to their journey reminds us

22 Gilles Deleuze,『Cinema II: Time-Image』, Translator Lee Jeong-Ha, (Seoul, Viewpoint and Language, 2005), p301

23 Gilles Deleuze,『Cinema II: Time-Image』, Translator Lee Jeong-Ha, (Seoul, Viewpoint and Language, 2005), p303

24 Kim Tae-Man, 「Trauma of Korean Diasporas in China」, p262

25 Kim So-Young, the book introduced earlier, p17~18

of Lu Xun's 'traveler.' And green fringes – signifying hospitality – are wavering in front of Changho's eyes. If our eyes follow the eye of the camera that is panning moment by moment, which feels like it is integrating with Changho's turn at the same spot, it would be the wish of Changho and the heart of Hanggai. Gilles Deleuze said "Making film is about paying more attention to people rather than to film itself or rather than to Mise-en-Scène. That is because people cannot go across to the camera's side when the camera doesn't go across to the people's side."26 Such comments made by Gilles Deleuze apply aptly to Zhang Lü's films.

Most films directed by Zhang Lü – except for 『Tang Poetry』– have a bilingual background: Chinese and Yanbian languages in 『Grain in Ear』, Mongolian and North Korean languages in 『Desert Dream』, Chinese, Korean, Putunghwa (普通话) and Sichuan (四川) dialects in 『Chongqing』, North Korean and Chinese languages in 『Iri』and Yanbian North Korean, and Chinese languages in 『Dooman River』. In case of 『Desert Dream』, there are communication problems between characters, and in 『Chongqing』, the Sichuan (四川) dialect is suppressing the Putunghwa (普通话) dialect. As mentioned by Jacques Derrida, what is important for aliens is a place to go back when they die and their native language. So even when they have nowhere to go back to after death, they consider their native language their emotional hometown or their last bastion. For example, in the film 『Grain in Ear』 and 『Chongqing』, Soonhee is teaching Korean to her son, and a father is leaving the house because he doesn't like his daughter who doesn't use the Sichuan (四川) dialect. But their wish to maintain their native language only belongs to their generation. Their children's generation is used to the local language or the Putunghwa (普通话) dialect, and they do not pay much attention to their native language or dialect.

EDOUARD GLISSANT:
Poetics and Politics of the Whole-world

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<In 1987, in an article in The UNESCO Courier entitled "Brief philosophy of a baroque world," Edouard Glissant writes:

> «Being-in-the-world involves keeping account of all kinds of being-in-society. There is not a "model" considered as unstoppable. [...] There is a naturalization of the baroque, not only as art and as style but as a way to experience the diversity-unity of the world. »[1]

In 2005, he founded the Whole-world Institute[2]: a place of creation "dedicated to the memories of the world's peoples and places", where the Whole-world can be thought of as "an aesthetics as well as a policy and as a poetic as well as a philosophy." Glissant states that no more people of the world is once and for all secluded, but all of them are part of the Whole-World, which means "the realized totality of the known and unknown data of our worlds "[3], including "all sudden presences, as well as all times and spaces of the world's peoples"[4]. A poetic thought of Relation – which is "to awake a being and an awareness of the world, in constant movement, and of the links in it and with it"[5] – would involve a fundamental rethinking of the Western view of Being, wich has ossified the links between human diversities. Only a "dismantling of the previous agreements of thought,"[6] and "a great insurrection of the imaginary" would

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1 Glissant, Édouard. « Brève philosophie d'un baroque mondial, » in *Le Baroque*. Le Courrier de l'Unesco, n°9. (1987) : 18-19.

2 http://www.tout-monde.com

3 Glissant, Édouard. *La Cohée du Lamentin : Poétique V*. (Paris : Gallimard, 2005). 87.

4 *Ibid*. 236.

5 Glissant, Édouard. *Les Entretiens de Baton Rouge : avec Alexandre Leupin*. (Paris : Gallimard, 2008). 74.

6 Glissant, Édouard. « Entretien avec Édouard Glissant : Mondialité, diversalité, imprévisibilité, Concepts pour agir dans le Chaos-monde, » *Les Périphériques vous parlent*, n° 14 (mai 2002).

enable a resolution to the cause of thousands of years of massacres and genocides, and that legitimate exclusive claims relating to atavistic traditions of nation-states:

«The identity claim can never stand on its own. The imaginary is the only real recourse in this situation. Other remedies are temporary (to send armies, a higher power): everything that will explode after broods. The imaginary has to be reversed: if I give part of me to the Other, I do not lose myself. [...] It's because [imaginary] has an impact on the individual, that it has an impact on communities. Something has to change in the individual, as well as in culture and spirituality of the community. »[7]

For Edouard Glissant, it's no longer possible to thing of being as a premise (such as the Platonic ideal), or as a perfection that mankind has lost (as a Christian). In any case being cannot be the purpose of a universalism, as generous as it might appear (such as humanistic values or certain political ideologies). According to Glissant, it is in the infinite repetition of human diversities (and in the converging nodes of their differences), forward, and no longer backwards, that the infinite beauty of being and the promise of new aesthetics are looming:

«Philosophy does not call the truth. It arranges the truths of the world to describe the beauty. Thus, the concepts, intuitions and practice of breaking links are materials; and if beauty is the splendour of truth, they are granted truths that signal the encounter between differences, the beauty incessantly here. »[8]

Some objected that this wandering poetics could only point to a "reduction or a dilution of being." To this the poet answered: "I can change by exchanging with the other without loosing myself nor denaturing myself "[9], "If exile can erode the sense of identity, the thought of wandering, which is thought of relative, most often reinforces it "[10], or " Thus the conscience of the nation is a conscience of the Relation "[11]. But can we talk of an ethic of Relation without killing this poetics in the bud? For the practice of such a poetics, which would be determinant for this necessary "conversion of being" in today's world, means to

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7 Glissant, « Entretien avec Édouard Glissant : Mondialité, diversalité, imprévisibilité, Concepts pour agir dans le Chaos-monde ».

8 Glissant, Édouard. *Une nouvelle région du monde* : *Esthétique I.* (Paris : Gallimard, 2006).123-124.

9 Glissant, Édouard. *La Cohée du Lamentin* : *Poétique V*. (Paris, Gallimard, 2005). 25.

10 Glissant, Édouard. *Poétique de la Relation* : *Poétique III*. (Paris : Gallimard, 1990). 32.

11 Glissant, Édouard. *L'Intention poétique* : *Poétique II*. 2ᵉ ed. (Paris : Gallimard, 1997). 201.

give up the desire to be a "constitutive view of the world"[12]. >

1. "The last moment of knowledge is always a poetics."[13]

Edouard Glissant considered himself primarily as a poet because he placed the poetic experience at the forefront of the knowledge processes. We wish to honour him for that, and we also want benefit as much as possible from the poetics of Relation and the thought of Whole-World, now that the humanities meet for the first time in Bessan and the question is asked as such: in plural.

Edouard Glissant concedes: "of what I write, what is to be written, escapes in spite of me."[14] His thought seems to take on the task to capture the elusive: the infinite details of the everyday life and the real; words overheard, as important as fugitive; the brightness of languages, and the irreducible opacities of the peoples, as beautiful as surprising, and the underground links of their imaginaries. The poet says that it is because "the whole Relation is changing faster than the idea that of it". Furthermore, Glissant believes that it takes a poetic approach to think the living fact of the world. A poetics of Relation is neither a theory nor a philosophical category, and does not proceed by either symbols or concepts. Glissant only speaks in terms of "concept of reality,"[15] "living symbol " and " category of beings". He also warns us about all kinds of nominalism: "words hold less a revelation than a possibility for the imaginary to form or reform itself." For this reason, says Glissant, "We do not name the Relation"[16]. Only a non-systematic approach and a constantly new experience of language can describe the Relation and seize its bright, fluctuating and unforeseeable resulting. In terms of anthropology, the humanities "are creolizing" into an "immeasurable mixing of cultures"[17], and spaces are joining together in an "archipelagization". The sacred of the Whole-world does not manifest itself in a vertical and transcendental relation between acuity, an order, a will or an intent, with man at the bottom. Instead this happens in a horizontal and transversal Relation, in the

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12 *Ibid*. 18.

13 Glissant, *Poétique de la Relation* : *Poétique III*. 154.

14 Glissant, *L'Intention Poétique* : *Poétique II*.16.

15 Glissant, « Entretien avec Édouard Glissant : Mondialité, diversalité, imprévisibilité, Concepts pour agir dans le Chaos-monde » : «I think that today the pressure of multiplicities is such, that rightly or wrongly we tend to skip the passage through the symbolic and to go directly from the real to the concept and from the concept to the imaginary. [...] When I look at the great works of humanity, the Native Americans, the Chinese, the Indians - for there is also metaphoric meaning – this latter does not lead to the symbolic, it leads to concepts of reality which are both partial and total, but not universal ».

16 Glissant, *Les Entretiens de Baton Rouge : avec Alexandre Leupin*. 102.

17 Glissant, *Poétique de la Relation : Poétique III*. 152.

infinite field of cross-breeded world materials, between human and human. Edouard Glissant finds the sacred in the "depth of expanse."

2. "The place is *incontournable*." [18]

The adjective "incontournable", which is difficult to translate into English, is polysemantic in French. In the first and literal sense, it means *impossible to get around*; but also means *what cannot be enclosed or delimited*. Contrary to the geo-political reality and arbitrary notion of "Territory", the Glissant's notion of "Place" has no significant connection to any mapped borders:

> «The border is no longer one of the possible data of being, but, in our world, passages that flee off, and in-betweens, which are easy or difficult to cross, but will be crossed in every way henceforth. »[19]

To say also that place "cannot be get around" means that its specificities cannot be eluded in order to question the terms of a "relation-identity", where Glissant sees the reality of humanities today. This is in contrast with the "identity-root ": the notion with which Glissant characterizes the atavism of nation states (the identity = 1 language, 1 territory, 1 linear story). In today's world, he says, every place in the world is "expanding from its irreducible centre as well as its uncountable borders"[20]. And he adds: "To be born in the world is for every individual to enter, abrupt and learned, the simple or tapped truth of his concrete, knowing that nothing is of any worth that has no relation to the other"[21]. One of the political resolutions of the Relation can be found in the following Glissant proposal:

> «Act in your place, think with the world. »

In the link that each place has to all others places, a "New region of the world" emerges where all are in presence. Every individual now experiences scandals on Wall Street, everyone is shaken by Haitian misery, Fukushima's nuclear and seismic tragedy, as well as the terrors and unspeakable injustices experienced by the people of Yeonpyong, Damascus or Sirte, the West Bank and East Jerusalem. On the other hand, whose heart hasn't been filled with hope when experiencing the Tunisian spring, even though

18 Glissant, Édouard. *Tout-monde*. (Paris : Gallimard, 1993). 29.

19 Glissant, *Une nouvelle région du monde* : *Esthétique I*.180.

20 Glissant, *Tout-monde*. 29.

21 Glissant, *L'Intention Poétique* : *Poétique II*. 22.

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we are not Tunisian, or when kicking the Berlin Wall, celebrating the release of Mandela or Obama's inauguration, or witnessing the courage of the Japanese people: the regions of the world are becoming Islands, isthmuses, peninsulas, advances, "mixing and crossing lands, but which still remain."[22]

A thought of Relation can never be fixed or frozen. It is always beautifully and fortunately "quivering":

> «Any archipelagic thought is a quivering thought, a thought of non-presumption, but also of openness and sharing. »[23] And « […] it opens on what Montaigne called the entire shape of the human condition, the form, not the One[24], nor an essence, but a Relation in a totality. »[25]

All notions of Glissant's work in this fashion: *poetically*. They slide, change, and harmonize with the same fluid material as that of the living. They are its provisional seizures, spontaneous crystallizations or the fugitive and unfinished fragments. They are entirely arranged and subordinated to all the infinite, contradictory and above all unforeseeable aspects of what the poet calls the "chaos-world":

> «I call Whole-world our universe as it changes and continues through its exchanges and at the same time, our vision of it. The totality-world in its physical diversity and the representations that it gives us: we can no longer sing, tell, or work in the suffering of our only place, without plunging to the imaginary of this totality.
> And I call Poetics of Relation the possibility of imaginary which leads us to conceive the elusive whole of this Chaos-world, and also allows us to remove some detail, and especially to sing our place, unfathomable and irreversible. The imaginary is not the dream, nor the hollow of illusion. »[26]

3. "Epic is in all of us."[27]

At the turn of the century, the work of Edouard Glissant has sharpened our perception, our attention and our sensitivity to what the Relation relates, and prepared us patiently to it: "What it tells, of itself and by

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22 Glissant, Édouard. *Traité du Tout-Monde* : *Poétique IV*. (Paris : Gallimard, 1997). 181.

23 *Ibid*. 231.

24 Glissant, E. *Poetics of Relation* (transl. by Wing,B.). University of Michigan Press, 1997. 48: « The One is distinguished form oneness, by the total lack of any generalizable understanding in this latter. »

25 Glissant, *La Cohée du Lamentin* : *Poétique V*. 75-76.

26 Glissant, *Traité du Tout-Monde* : *Poétique IV*. 22.

27 Glissant, *L'Intention poétique* : *Poétique II*. 201.

itself is not a story (History), but a state of the world, a state of world "[28]. A relation of histories would amount to historicize the relation of each people with all the others. Each historical "telling" would be "relative", "relinked" and "relayed"[29]: "a modern epic and a modern tragedy would express a political consciousness [...] but one disengaged from the civic frenzy"[30]. We believe that today the epic question should be seen in the way that Glissant indicates as an attempt to write "the advent of an unexpected diffraction"[31], and to finally "meet the world in its thickness and its wandering"[32].

Would the real and total historicization of the world (in its infinite resolution) begin with the end of History, or rather with the end of Western History? And what would this history with a capital "H" be, if not a parallax of the humanities histories, a "generalized History"[33]? From this point, how can we write history without reproducing the same "yawning gap of histories ": this "complex and deadly a-historical process"[34], whereby memories, languages, and cultures undifferentiated are swallowed undifferentiated into this king of black hole? A terrifying vision of the splendour of the "Same" and "identical"!

Epics in relation (or "the epic of the world-community") would substitute the historical epics, both spiritual and ideological, that promote a conception of being seen as an absolute and transcendent presupposition, corroborated by a "linear and atavistic" historical logic: "the True"[35]. The "relative, relayed and related" epos of Relation would supplant History, release the narrative, and make the emotion and the value of the testimony uninhibited. It would also deploy the infinity of the parallaxes, "which can not be a genre, the genre of History, for they are diversity."[36] The very word "history" - from the Greek histos, the art of weaving, and by extension, *what is woven*[37] - may tell already at its beginning the unity-diversity of history of all places without exception:
"Place is the seam of Time"[38].

28 Glissant, Édouard. *Philosophie de la Relation* : *Poésie en* étendue. (Paris : Gallimard, 2009). 72-73.

29 Glissant, *Poétique de la Relation*, *Poétique III*. 40.

30 *Idem*. 67.

31 Glissant, *L'Intention poétique* : *Poétique II*. 203.

32 *Ibid*. 216.

33 Glissant, *Poetics of relation (transl. by Wing, B.)*. 48: « Christian individuation did not result in a return flow of history, a cyclical renewal; on the contrary, by universalizing linear time – before and after – it brought a chronology of the human race into general use, initiating a History of Humanity.»

34 Glissant, *L'Intention poétique* : *Poétique II*. 29.

35 Glissant, Édouard, « Rien n'est vrai tout est vivant ». Mars 2010. Institut du Tout-monde. http:// tout-monde.com.

36 Glissant, *Philosophie de la Relation* : *Poésie en étendue*. 75-76.

37 Rey, Alain, dir. *Dictionnaire historique de la langue française*. 2ᵉ ed. Tome II. (Paris : Le Robert, 2006).1723.

38 Glissant, Édouard. *Faulkner, Mississipi*. (Paris : Stock, 1996). 318.

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However, the Relation has no morals, and the thought of Relation is absolutely not a humanism thought. As Glissant always reminds us, one is made of "turbulences in the expanse"[39], and the other tells a "moving totality"[40] that contains "elements that can destabilize the entire system"[41]. The "relation of the relation is intransitive between any and all"[42] "disjunctive and constitutive"[43], Edouard Glissant specifies. It is neither linear nor a vector for equivalencies. The world-community epic, because it "is and expresses the impulse of those that the same threat or defeat gather in the same place,"[44] tells the "difficult Relation"[45], the "difficult dive into the chaos-world "[46]. Relation is a phenomenological discourse and a phenomenal principle[47], where «the shock, the intricacy, the repulsions, attractions, complicities, opposition and conflicts between the people's cultures in the contemporary world-totality»[48] are analyzed as they appear.

If for Edouard Glissant, "the epic is in all of us"[49] and offers itself as the only and consubstantial way, to historicize the footsteps of the peoples, it is also because "our beginning and threatened community is what is and will be the Whole-world"[50]:

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39 Glissant, *Introduction à une poétique du Divers*. 69.

Glissant, Poetics of relation (transl. by Wing, B.). 53: « Public consciousness was incapable of discussing a resolution: generalizing (politicizing) the discussion would have meant the community was no longer inscribed in the primordial and sacred legitimacy provided by filiation but in the problematic (threatening) relation to the other. This relation would already consist of what, without elaborating, I call "expanse" [l'étendue].»

40 Glissant, *Poétique de la Relation*, *Poétique III*. 147.

41 Glissant, « Entretien avec Édouard Glissant : Mondialité, diversalité, imprévisibilité, concepts pour agir dans le Chaos-monde ».

42 Glissant, *Les Entretiens de Baton Rouge* : avec Alexandre Leupin. 130.
   Glissant, « Entretien avec Édouard Glissant : Mondialité, diversalité, imprévisibilité, concepts pour agir dans le Chaos-monde » : « If we consider globalness, that is to say the accomplished quantity of all the imaginable culture clashes, not in a universal manner but in effect, what is giving it a permanent form is not the universality of the phenomenon, but the intransitive relation that the phenomenon triggers».

43 Glissant, *L'Intention poétique*, *Poétique II*. 52.

44 Glissant, *Faulkner Mississippi*. 33-34.

45 *Ibid*. 305.

46 Glissant, *Introduction à une poétique du Divers*. 37.

47 Heidegger, Martin. *Être et Temps*. Trad. François Vezin. (Paris : Gallimard, 1986). 64: « "Phenomenal" will be used to designate what is given and can be explained by presenting the face of the phenomenon. Thus, we do speak of phenomenal structures. However all that comes from demonstration and explanation, and that constitutes the conceptual apparatus required in this investigation is called "phenomenological"».

48 Glissant, *Introduction à une poétique du Divers*. 82.

49 Glissant, *L'Intention poétique*, *Poétique II*. 201.

50 Glissant, *Les Entretiens de Baton Rouge* : avec Alexandre Leupin. 78.

«Today it is the affirmation of the peoples (the struggle to snatch the right to act and talk) that is tragic; it is freedom – the new imposed and granted Relation – that will carry the epic. Modern Tragedy will sing the liberty of men; modern Epos, their commuted agreements. Long ago, the Epos was "concrete", while the Tragedy could exceed, and be "abstract" and "universal"; today it is Tragedy that would be concrete, it is the struggle of the peoples that points out the dark knotted and delivering forces. And it is Epos that will be able, as the most distant planet, to circulate through the human desire of (re)linking and relating. Tragedy belongs to men and earth; the Epos will soon be about the interplanetary "One" (One again, until it cracks and diversifies again). »[51]

4. «Being is relation, but Relation is safe from the idea of being. »[52]

What to say of this "conversion of being"?

The answer lies in the following question: "How can we see the world without living it: "it seems to be what you have achieved in your immunity", "You keep wanting to be the constitutive view of the world "[53], the poet says at the "promoters of the One. » What does not fit in the One, what is disproportionate to this ideal and suggests a different order that forces and might threaten its rules of proportion, take a subversive twist. It is precisely on this point that the inversion has to be realized, and the conversion, the reversal of values, and the overthrow and insurrection of imaginary:

«According to perhaps Heidegger, the difference is the avatar that beings are trying to impose on being. From that the difference, already seen as a decrease, was deemed as complete amputation. All and any differences. Even worse: a contrast to the Absolute was needed. And the difference was established only as an eternal virtuality that was rejected continually by the dense dazzling of being.»[54]

Did Heidegger not indicate that the history of metaphysics was a total "forgetting of being"? Did he not see that "the forgetting of being" was the very structure of our Western society? That the systematic search for "the being of beings" had obscured for both their "ontological difference"? Did M. Heidegger not also point out the fundamental role that art could play in fulfilling beings in the presence of being? For us, this is where the work and the Relation (the relative related-relayed-relinked) of Edouard Glissant have

51 Glissant, *L'Intention poétique*, *Poétique II*. 199-200.

52 Glissant, *Poétique de la Relation*. 199.

53 Glissant, *L'Intention poétique*, *Poétique II*. 199-200.

54 Glissant, Édouard. « Personnifications de la philosophie du tout-monde ». *Écritures et pensées en archipel*. 21 octobre 2008. http://www.tout-monde.com

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succeeded magnificently, and where perhaps, in some ways, philosophies have failed. Why? Because his work is not just a philosophy but a poetics. Because it is never the wise philosopher who addresses our reason in an abstract or conceptual and indirect fashion. It is always the man, the poet, the novelist, the writer who hits our emotions, our intuition and our experience by restoring our organic link with the world. It is because he makes us return to the pregnant material of Whole-world, that he accomplishes this "conversion", this reversal, this passage in us. His poetics is the modality as *praxis*, the sine qua non of this passage: "What is a philosophy of Relation? An impossible as it would not be a poetics "[55]. The poetics provides a fair dialectic[56] to the fields of logical discourses and digs into the "ontological difference" that Heidegger spoke of: "The world being realizes being: – in beings"[57], Glissant wrote in 1990.
In *The Caribbean discourse*:

> «Neither the Parmenian text, "Being is", nor the opposite of Heraclitus, "Everything changes", whereby the metaphysical in the West were conceived, but a transphysics whose statement could be resumed as follows: that beings (which exist by totality) relays itself. What exists by relative totality.»[58]

And in *A New region of the world*:

> «The difference is the operating force of the varieties and identities movement, making them take form, and the different is that by such a movement varies from one variety to another, and precises itself from an identity to another, or rather implies that the varieties and identities vary without distorting, and thus contribute to the fabric of the living and its relation to its surroundings. »[59]

<div align="center">*</div>

"Nothing is true, everything is living" has been the ultimate axiom of Edouard Glissant[60].

From Relation – that the poet sees and draws from his clear-sighted solitude, and that he brings to us by

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55 Glissant, *Philosophie de la Relation, poésie en étendue*. 82.

56 Glissant, Edouard. *L'Imaginaire des langues* : *Entretiens avec Lise Gauvin*. (Paris : Gallimard, 2010). 77: « It's not the system that is challenged. What is challenged is that the system is systematic. This is what is challenged. We can have systems that are non-systematic. We can have chaotic systems. We can have erratic systems. We can have a multi-dimensional system. Then they are no longer systematic systems ».

57 Glissant, *Poétique de la Relation*. 201.

58 Glissant, *Le Discours antillais*. 251.

59 Glissant, *Une Nouvelle Région du Monde*.108.

60 Glissant, Édouard, « Rien n'est Vrai, tout est vivant » : clôture du Séminaire de L'Institut du Tout-monde. Mars 2010. http:// www.tout-monde.com

declining it, in infinite varieties of signifiers (in "common-places"[61]) - these are the images that strike first. They pulsate to be picked fresh from the lively real and remind us noting that the real signals at every moment, and that knowledge is there in its renewed motion, without us to dematerialize the sign, or extract and abstract it, and to create out of it a taxidermic idea. The poet has brought this foam, and the sea of signs (the "earthling-marine sign", the "chaos of signs"[62]) is now opened: the elements have taken direction and flavour again. Their primary beauty is blooming after long winters. The "rhizomes" have pushed their endings to the "groundwaters", flirted with the "pits" and projected aerial mangroves, at the edge of chaos vortex, and to the rocks of the islands ... all the way to the place of each of us.

Among the misrepresentations that alter and threaten the unity-diversity of the world, in addition to the conquering cultures, the "arrow-nomadism"[63] and/or assimilating-civilizing missions, the most damaging phenomena of the contemporary world are, according to Glissant, processes of generalization, globalization, universalization and standardization, folklorisms and economies of monopoly.

Think the Whole-World it is "to think in places"[64] ("Act in your place, think with the world"); it is to take measure of the necessary and inevitable "interdependence" between peoples; it is to consider borders as in-betweens, or passages, and not like limits; it is to consider identity as a Relation and no more as an atavism-root; to place the difference into the fabric of the Relation, not the "same": because it is "the difference" and not the same, that is the elementary particle of the relational fabric"[65].

It is to think not in terms of "values" but in basic priorities, recognized by all, guarantors of the diversity. To think for example of what Glissant calls "opacity": "an attribute of the being-as-beings, whose philosophy takes to account without tempting to clarify "[66]. Opacity is this blind spot, this part that is hidden and irreducible to any transparency, this mystery that each individual and every people is a carrier of ("For you have the right to be obscure, first of all to yourself ", says Glissant[67]). It guarantees, in the

61 Glissant, Édouard. « Analyse de la Relation » in *Une Journée avec Édouard Glissant*. (Paris: A.L.I, 2007): «I call common-place (with a hyphen), and that might be a problem, a place where a world thought meets a world thought: that's it, this is not the same thing as getting into community or as the place of the community or communities. It is not the same thing. It is the very opposite. It is the place where a world thought meets a world thought. By effraction, sometimes with dismay».

62 Glissant, *Une Nouvelle région du Monde* : *Esthétique I*. 13.

63 Glissant, *Poétique de la Relation*. 26.

64 Chamoiseau, P., Glissant, E., *L'Intraitable beauté du monde : Adresse à Barack Obama*. (Paris : Gallaade, 2009). 52.

65 Glissant, *Une Nouvelle région du Monde*. 105.

66 Glissant, Édouard. *Philosophie de la Relation* : Poésie en étendue. (Paris : Gallimard, 2009). 70.

67 *Ibid*.

encounter with the other, the surprise of the difference and allows us to capture its "dazzlings":

> «Cheering the right to opacity, and turning it to another humanism, is however to give up joining the truths of the expanse to the measure of a single transparency, that would be mine and that I would impose. Furthermore, it is to establish that the inextricable, planted into the dark, also leads its non-imperative brightness.»[68]

Finally, to experience Relation is also not hesitating to create active concepts of opposition against lethal vectors of standardization, especially like the super-standard concept and process of "globalization" against which Glissant uses the notion of "globalness":

> «What we call globalization, which standardizes from the bottom, which means the reign of the multinationals, the ultra liberalism on world markets, is for me the negative flipside of something prodigious that I call globaness. Globalness is the extraordinary adventure that all of us can live today in a world that, for the first time, really and so immediately, overwhelmingly, without waiting, can be seen as a world both multiple and one.»[69]

"End of century or end of History?"[70] The poetic thought of Edouard Glissant is all in this passage in the twenty-first century where "Transhistory"[71] extends itself and where frolic the terrible and sumptuous "Transrhetorics"[72] of the Whole-word. The last challenge that this great poet launched to the humanities could be formulated as follows: the return to the *physis* and the living as a dimension of the (recovered) being, would it not be today's the biggest epic issue of the "world-community":

> « […] the primordial work of differences»[73]?

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68 *Ibid*. 69.

69 Glissant, « Entretien avec Édouard Glissant : Mondialité, diversalité, imprévisibilité, Concepts pour agir dans le Chaos-monde ».

70 Glissant, *Traité du Tout-monde, Poétique IV*. 113.

71 *Ibid*. 112.

72 *Ibid*.

73 Glissant, *Une Nouvelle région du monde, Esthétique I*. 107.

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A Preliminary Exploration for Comparative Political Theory: Transversal Cross-Cultural Dialogue

Jung In Kang
Sogang University

Although comparative political theory is needed more urgently than ever before in this rapidly globalizing world, "comparative political theory or philosophy is either completely non-existent or at best embryonic and marginalized type of endeavor," as Fred Dallmayr observed ten years ago (Dallmayr 1999, 1-2).[1] In this paper I would like to make a preliminary exploration of comparative political theory from an East Asian perspective.[2] I firmly believe that it is imperative and possible for East Asian intellectuals to actively reinterpret and re-appropriate traditional political thought to engage comparative political theory as a way to overcome enduring Western-centrism,[3] for the following three reasons. First, the traditional political theory of East Asia, including China, Korea and Japan, is potentially compatible with Western political theory, which has dominated the world with the hegemony of modern Western civilization, because of its value as the common property of humankind; this "compatibility" can and must be retrieved and secured. Second, to make an ecological analogy, it is necessary to appropriate, expand, and renovate this legacy for the sake of preserving biodiversity, because East Asian civilization possesses precious potential and actual resources (including political theory) not possessed by Western civilization. Third, East Asians are in a strategic position to effectively develop this legacy, because it constitutes part of their identity and

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1 In order to deconstruct Western-centrism, I myself have long engaged with comparative political theory and published many articles. For some of the works published in English, see Kang (1999; 2000; 2003) and Kang and Eom (2003).

2 Of course, this is not meant to say that comparative political theory from other national or regional perspectives is not important or desirable.

3 I use the term "Western-centrism" instead of "Eurocentrism," which is more commonly used, for Western-centrism more explicitly includes the United States, Canada, Australia, and the like, which have inherited and developed European civilization in non-European territories. Moreover, in the postwar world, it is the United States as the world hegemon that has set the terms and agenda of global politics more powerfully than Europe. For more detailed examination of the concept of Western-centrism see Kang (2004, Chap. 2).

therefore is more familiar to them.

In this paper, first, I will diagnose the objective conditions that move the Western-centric world into a more polycentric globe. Then, I will examine the idea of transversality, cross-cultural dialogue, and biological analogies to suggest a proper guideline for deconstructing Western-centrism and engaging comparative political theory.

Toward a Polycentric Globe

I would like to examine auspicious objective conditions that lead us in the direction of deconstructing Western-centrism toward a more polycentric globe, which would make possible transversal and cross-cultural (or cross-civilizational) dialogue and comparative political theory between the West and the Rest, on more equal terms.

First of all, I would like to note the positive aspect of globalization, i,e,. the vital necessity to acknowledge the appearance and ascendancy of the indivisible global common good. For example, we may suggest the need to meet collectively the danger of the extermination of humankind through nuclear war, the appearance of a global ethic of responsibility for the ecosystem in great peril, vital concerns about the international guarantee of human rights, supranational efforts to improve the social and economic conditions of the world's poor, and the like. We may also add the viability of a global economy that is not only benefited but also threatened by this increased mutual interconnectedness. As a matter of fact, we have been witnessing one of the worst global economic depressions, which had its origin in the breakdown of the U.S. financial system and its uncontrollable and unpredictable chain reaction all over the globe. Such cases demand the acknowledgment of an indivisible "global common good." In short, as Peter Taylor points out, with the advent of globalization "we have moved from the optimistic situation when the 'goods' of modernity were promised to all to the pessimistic situation with the 'bads' of modernity threatening all" (Taylor 2000, 68).

Therefore, an urgent need for supranational cooperation in pursuit of the indivisible global common good—which no individual state, however large and powerful it may be, can achieve on its own—is felt everywhere globally. As such, the concept of "global" is one that represents something universal, for all of humanity. The globalism that spawned this consciousness is therefore a radical challenge to the dominance of Western civilization and has the potential to fundamentally subvert Western-centrism.

Another auspicious condition for overcoming Western-centrism is strong economic performance shown by non-Western regions and nations including East Asia, Brazil, India, and Russia in recent years.

Although we should never deny the significance of the monocentric dominance (indeed awesome!) of Western civilization led by the U.S. in military affairs as vividly demonstrated in the wars against Iraq and Libya, the dynamic economic growth and performance of East Asia (notably China, but except Japan which is still strong), Brazil, India and Russia show the globe moving in a more polycentric direction for the long-term perspective. .

Let us look at the recent trends in the last ten years. In 2000, the gross national income (GNI) of East Asia (including China, Japan, South Korea, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) was 20.9% of the global total, that of North America was 34.1%, and that of the European Union (EU, including twenty-seven nations as of 2010) was 28.4%. In 2010, the GNI of East Asia was 22.2% of the global total, that of North America was 27.2%, and that of the EU was 27.35%. While the relative weight of Brazil, Russia, and India in the global GNI total has increased impressively from 4.3% to 7.7% in the same period, the increase of East Asia is rather modest. The decrease of the EU also appears to be modest from 28.4% to 27.35%; however, its decrease from 2005 to 2010 is considerable, from 30.19% to 27.35%. Above all, the decrease of North America is notable from 34.1% to 27.2%. Most of the loss comes from the U.S., as it recorded a similar decline from 30.5% to 23.4%, i.e., 7.1% loss, while China had a phenomenal increase, from 3.6% to 9.1%, i.e., 5.5% increase (http://data.worldbank.org). Confronted with China's phenomenal economic growth and increasing military spending and the relative economic decline of the U.S., the "China threat" theory and the term "G-2" is now in academic vogue. No one can predict how the global political order will be shaped in the long run. But no one can deny that the world is moving clearly in the polycentric direction with the rise of East Asia (notably China), Brazil, India, and Russia.

Transversality

An attempt to overcome Western-centrism must transcend the monistic universalism which arranges the world in terms of binary oppositions such as the subject and the object, the reason and the emotion, the mind and the body, and the West and the non-West. etc., and bestows privileges upon either of the two in them. It should not fall into a trap that leads us to identify only isolated differences and diversity. In order to solve this puzzle, it seems helpful to take advantage of the concept of transversality which poses a fundamental challenge to the notion of monistic universalism, a product of modern European civilization. Transversality in geometry is defined as "the crossing of two diagonal lines in any given parallelogram" (Jung 2009a, 417).

In my discussion of transversality I will rely upon recent works by Hwa Yol Jung who has extensively circulated it in political philosophy to deconstruct Western-centrism. Jung defines transversality as "the crossroads of truth across the boundaries of different cultures: it is the way of thinking about truth

cross-culturally" (Jung 1995, 15). In order to take advantage of transversality, we need to examine what implications it has for comparative political theory.

First of all, the transversality articulates the problematique of Western-centrism by stressing that the universality of modernity as it is pursued and claimed is only based on, and representative of, Western-centrism. No political theory can have any privilege of truth, for there is no such thing as a universal political theory that contains all political theories.[4] Thus, no political theory, past or present, Eastern or Western, can make a monopolistic claim on overarching universality. Thus, it is important to forge a transversal connectedness by listening to different voices from divergent cultures and societies and recognizing the other as such, enhancing communicability among them and fashioning integration that will preserve diversity.

Second, transversality does not present non-Western political theory as an alternative, while recognizing the diversity and differences between West and non-West. Although there exist diversity and differences that cannot be united by unitary universality, the world will be plagued with the arrogance of diversity and differences that refuse communication, if only they are stressed and left alone. Thus, transversality refuses to totalize them into a single whole, on the one hand, or to leave them alone, on the other. Recognizing diversity and differences in transversality is not intended simply to adhere to them, but to transfigure them. According to Jung, transversality refers to the process of re-forming a newly transformed self through interaction with diversity by finding "what is lacking in one" and complementing that by what is found in the other, that is, a self-transfiguring process of one's encounter with the Other and becoming another being (Jung 2009a, 432).

Third, transversality helps us overcome methodological pitfalls (fallacies) into which the attempt to overcome Western-centrism is liable to fall. The attempt by the non-West to deconstruct monistic universality of Western values often stresses positively differences that the non-West finds in comparison with the West and ends up reproducing binary oppositions embedded in Western-centrism. As the visual angle is confined to the dichotomy of the West and the non-West, the consequence oscillates between an assimilative and a reverse model (i.e., Orientalism-in-reverse) by bestowing universality upon either of the two. However, transversality informs us that cultures are always plural, that genuine global cultures are realized when each culture maintains its own indigenous root and sustains vital communication with other diverse cultures, and that each culture also develops by mediating itself with global cultures transversally. Seen from this perspective, transcending Western-centrism is made possible only when we interrogate

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4 This is an adaptation from Maurice Merleau-Ponty's remark: "There is not a philosophy which contains all philosophies" (quoted in Jung 1999, 277).

Eastern and Western political theories from a broader perspective of intersecting diverse cultures and transgressing across the past and the present.

In short, the concept of transversality seems to open up the horizon to overcome all "polarizing dichotomies" of universality and particularity, identity and difference, and the West and non-West (Jung 2009b, 28), and "advances the cause of cross-cultural fertilization or hybridization as well as cross-disciplinary engagement in which truth as communicability privileges, and is monopolized by, neither the West nor philosophy alone" (Jung 2009b, 29).

However, as a non-Western scholar I have some lingering questions regarding the postmodernist discourses in favor of differences and the Other. They stress the need to recognize and acknowledge differences of the Other, while Western-centrism has ignored them. So from the Western perspective, such stress seems to make good sense. However, it may sound glib for both Westerners and non-Westerners in some respects. How would Westerners conduct themselves when they witness the harsh authoritarian regimes, rampant political corruption, patriarchal oppression of women, and the like in many non-Western countries, all of which are necessarily enmeshed with their own indigenous cultures? Do they have to abstain from criticizing them in the name of recognizing the different cultures of the Other?

From a non-Westerner's perspective, another question arises as well. We as non-Westerners have learned not only to recognize but also to respect, either voluntarily or forcibly, the differences of Western civilization-their enlightenment, their reason and philosophy, their liberalism, their democracy, their feminism, their science and technology, their industrialism and capitalism, and so on-in the name of universality. In a way, their differences have been regarded as superior and privileged according to Western exceptionalism and our differences as inferior and deviant according to Orientalism. So, it does not seem easy for us to recognize and acknowledge the differences of the West on an equal footing, although it is probable that some of the contradictions of Western universality will gradually but clearly recede in the postmodern world.

In this context, Immanuel Wallerstein's examination of the universality claim of European social science seems helpful in rethinking what the universality means:

> European social science was resolutely universalist in asserting that whatever it was that happened in Europe in the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries represented a pattern that was applicable everywhere, either because it was a progressive achievement of mankind which was irreversible or because it represented the fulfillment of humanity's basic needs via the removal of artificial obstacles to this realization. What you saw now in Europe was not only good but the face of the

future everywhere (Wallerstein 1997, 96-97).

As a social scientist who is familiar with all the bewildering diversity and multiplicity of various phenomena in the social world, however, I do not take "universal" as "applying equally and as a matter principle everywhere in the 'universe'" like scientific truths or Hegelian-like idealist philosophies as Wallerstein interprets, but as "prevalent over all" or more modestly "widely applicable" (Lummis 2002). But the reason why the universalist claim of European social science was plausible is well indicated by Wallerstein. He suggests the reason to be a Western unilinear progressive view of history and European supremacy, i.e., that modern European civilization has preempted the progressive achievement of humankind. From this European universality and supremacy came the universality of European social science and the task of Europeanization (or Westernization) was imposed upon the inferior non-West.

In other words, the principal ideas and values, such as democracy, liberalism, capitalism, human rights, and enlightenment rationality, originated exceptionally in the West and represented the progress of humankind, so that other civilizations had to or wanted to pursue them as their desirable end (telos). In this way, the Western civilization occupied a superior place, enjoying original (genetic) and teleological privileges. Thus, non-Western societies had to set Western civilization as their reference point, while pursuing Westernization in the name of modernization.

Thus, the universality of European social science seems to derive from genetic and teleological privileges of Western civilization which it relies upon, rather than its impressive scientific method or logical reasoning. Thus, the universality of Western civilization in general and Western social science in particular is not a kind of universality of scientific knowledge (universal truth), but that of hegemony (consensus), i.e., moral and intellectual plausibility.

This point applies to the universal values of Western modern civilization. Today, we accept human rights as universal values, not in the sense that they are valid across all of time and space, but in the sense that they are "prevalent over all" or "widely applicable." They are hegemonic in the same sense that English is a universal language or Internet Explorer is a universal browser. This applies to the notion of human rights as well. Human rights were developed as European universal values in response to the emergence of capitalism and the sovereign state, which monopolized the legitimate use of violence. However, they are not valid across all time and place. For example, the provision that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest" (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 9) will have no meaning in a society that has no police or prisons. In the same way, the "right to form and to join trade unions" (Article 23, 4) will not be useful in a society whose economy is not based on wage labor. Thus, these rights were not useful in a tribal society of Africa where the sovereign state was absent or in 16th century Korea where capitalism

was unavailable. Thus, the prevalence of human rights as universal values in the contemporary world (in the sense that they are widely applicable) is derived from the fact that non-Western societies came to adopt capitalism and the sovereign state, i.e., a program of capitalist industrialization under the auspices of a sovereign state government by way of colonialism, imperialism, and violent conquest or its threat, or by means of rational persuasion.[5]

In other words, the West transformed the reality of non-Western societies into the Western kind by transplanting/spreading and generalizing Western institutions and practices, notably sovereign states and capitalism, all over the world. As a result, non-Western societies, too, came to accept the values and ideas necessary for Western civilization as universal ones. In other words, the disease endemic to the West turned into a pandemic as the non-Western world was Westernized so that the Western medicine became universalized as well. This shows the hegemonic process by which most of Western modernity has become universalized. Thus, the universality of human rights (*given ex post facto*) enjoys the same status as that of labor unions and English. I do not deny the universal nature of Western modernity in the sense of "prevalent over all" or "widely applicable," nor approve the claims of transversality by some postmodern theorists. In other words, I would reject modernity's claim for universal truth, but accept its claim for consensus-*prima facie* universality-which is always in the process of revision according to temporal and spatial contexts.

Returning to the relevance of the idea of transversality for comparative political theory, theorists of transversality have not yet advanced the concrete and viable methodology of how to engage comparative political theory (or philosophy) transversally. However, their theories point to cross-cultural dialogue among different cultures and civilizations. Thus, I will focus on cross-cultural dialogue and then suggest biological analogies as a proper method for comparative political theory.

Cross-Cultural Dialogue

Various theories of multiculturalism have been advanced enthusiastically in Western academia. Liberal universalism (Barry 2001) is opposed to liberal multiculturalism (notably, Kimlicka 1989 & 1995) within the liberal tradition. Outside liberalism, anti-liberal value pluralism (Gray 1995 & 1998) is competing with interactive multiculturalism (Parekh 2006). However, liberal universalism and liberal multiculturalism take liberalism as universal in principle in their theorizing. So, they might gain *prima facie* plausibility within Western nations where liberalism is accepted as a universal frame. However, in order to hold a

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5 My discussion in this paragraph is heavily indebted to Lummis(2002, 67-68).

cross-cultural dialogue on a global level transversally for comparative political theory, the universality of liberalism should not be taken for granted; such an assumption will be susceptible to the criticism of Western-centrism. Thus, Bhikhu Parekh's interactive multiculturalism, which does not presuppose the universality of liberalism, fits our purpose well and merits serious examination. In this paper I develop the idea of cross-cultural dialogue, primarily relying upon his work.

For Parekh a group of human beings create a distinct culture as they seek the meaning and significance of human life and develop human capacities. Though human beings are all equipped with common capacities, these are differently defined and developed by distinctive cultures. As such, culture mediates human universality. It is very rare for any individual culture to thoroughly realize the full range of human possibilities. In most cases, each culture develops some capacities and sensibilities and neglects or marginalizes others. Here lies the reason why cross-cultural dialogue is needed. One will not be able to rise above a bounded horizon if one is imprisoned within a culture that has been developed in a particular way. Thus contacts and exchanges with other cultures do provide opportunities to deepen and enrich knowledge and understanding of one's own culture. They facilitate borrowing attractive elements, which do not exist in one's own culture but have been developed by others, and integrating them into oneself. Accordingly, cross-cultural dialogue can be said to be an essential condition for the flourishing of human life (Parekh 1998, 212-213).

Parekh notes that culture is not static but contains within itself heterogeneous strands and differing interpretations competing with each other (Parekh 2008, 156-157). It is because a culture is neither homogeneous nor fixed that it is possible for every culture to borrow other cultures' elements and incorporate them into itself through cross-cultural dialogue. In the light of this insight, Parekh proposes that we break away from an obsession of defining liberalism as a fixed doctrine and instead conduct a free intellectual exploration, deconstructing it into a series of principles or values and accepting only those that are relevant in combination with those drawn from other cultures. In fact, he regards his theory of multiculturalism as an example of such an exploration. There, he approves of such liberal values as human dignity, equality, critical rationality, respect for others, and tolerance, but reinterprets them in the light of other cultures. For instance, he values rationality not in an argumentative and combative form but in a persuasive and conversational one; he cherishes individuals, but appreciates their cultural embeddedness; and he underlines universal values, but admits that they are mediated through particular cultures (Parekh 2006, 368-369).

Parekh coins the term "interactive multiculturalism" for this theory, which is the result of his intercultural experimentation. This method of intercultural experimentation may be called interculturalism, given its stress on respect for other cultures, heterogeneity and fluidity of cultures, and the importance of

intercultural dialogue.[6] Parekh illustrates the method of interculturalism by examining the thoughts of Mahatma Gandhi. According to Parekh's account, Gandhi was born into an orthodox Hindu family and grew up receiving the education of a Hindu tradition. He then came in contact with Christianity, Judaism, and other Western thought during his stay in England and South Africa and raised critical questions about his tradition. Gandhi had long been attracted by the Hindu idea of non-violence (*ahimsā*). He realized, however, through his study of Christian thought and practice that the Hindu idea was passive, only avoiding harm to others but taking no active interest in their well-being. Then, he took the socially oriented Christian concept of *caritas* (or *agape*, God's supernatural love and love of neighbors), "integrated it with the Hindu concept of non-violence, and arrived at the idea of the active service of all living beings inspired by the principle of universal love." Further, he saw that "Christian *caritas* was excessively emotional" and thus could imperil internal calmness and emotional self-sufficiency, and "reinterpreted and revised it in the light of the Hindu concept of non-attachment (*anāsakti*)." Through this cross-cultural dialogue or transversal comparison, that is, interrogating the Hindu concept of non-violence from a Christian viewpoint and reinterpreting the Christian concept of *caritas* in light of a Hindu viewpoint, Gandhi "yielded the novel idea of an active and positive but detached and non-emotive universal love." Thus, he created new thought by hybridizing or cross-fertilizing the Hindu tradition, Christianity, and liberalism. Gandhi exerted himself to carry out a dialogue between "different moral, religious and cultural traditions, destabilized settled identities and created new ones" (Parekh 2006, 370-372).

We may take a critical comparison between human rights of modern liberalism and human relationships of traditional Confucianism as an example of cross-cultural dialogue as a method of comparative political theory. Any political community should guarantee a minimum of human dignity, including the right to subsistence, although this may be differential and discriminatory. Human rights and human relationships meet each other on the horizon of this primordial problematique. A comparative study of political theory based on cross-cultural dialogue would ultimately require the human relationships approach to justify itself in light of individual freedom and equality and transform and reformulate its negative elements in response to the principle of individual freedom and equality. In contrast, such study also challenges the human rights approach to ask itself whether it has ignored care and responsibility for others, which is stressed by the human relationships approach, and whether it needs to mitigate or overcome such

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6 Parekh explicitly refers to his theory as "creative and interactive multiculturalism" (Parekh 2006, 372), but does not give a specific term to his theoretical method featuring transgressing settled boundaries, borrowing from other cultures, and combining elements of one culture with those drawn from others. He only mentions "intercultural experimentation" when he describes the development of Gandhi's thought as an illustration of this method (Parekh 2006, 370).

problems as the breakdown of community, the loss of authority, atomistic and isolated individualism, and the like, which could be caused by "rights talk." A cross-cultural dialogue recommended by comparative political theory does not aim at constructing a parallel layout of Eastern and Western political theories but at attaining a confluence. Such a comparative work would pioneer a new hybrid of political theory transcending Western-centrism and East Asian particularism.

It is necessary to make use of the method of cross-cultural dialogue when we attempt to traverse East and West to overcome Western-centrism. When we work on a comparative political theory as East Asians, cross-cultural dialogue will help us reach an expanding and evolving consensus. In the first stage, we will ask critical questions about Western thought from the viewpoint of East Asian thought and concurrently do the same about East Asian thought from the viewpoint of Western thought, so as to build mutual understanding of differences and identify areas of overlapping consensus. Then, in the second stage, on the basis of this initial work, we will carry on further exchanges with regard to differing or conflicting areas and elements so as to expand the existing consensus. Charles Taylor makes a similar point in his article, "Conditions of an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights":

> This is the situation at the outset, in any case, when consensus on some aspect of human rights has just been attained. Later a process can follow of mutual learning, moving toward a "fusion of horizon" in Gadamer's term, in which the moral universe of the other becomes less strange. Out of this will come further borrowings and the creation of new hybrid forms (Taylor 1999, 136)

Cross-cultural dialogue is not only applicable to different cultures, for example, between East and West, but also to the past and the present. In the process of modernization (=Westernization), non-Western societies like Korea have witnessed the phenomena of the present represented by the Western civilization and the past represented by East Asian civilization. Thus, the international (or inter-civilizational) cross-cultural dialogue between East and West is somewhat similar to cross-temporal dialogue between the past and the present on a domestic level, which is quite commonly held among Korean scholars.

Biological Metaphors and the Horizon of Comparison

In order to compare diverse and divergent political theories traversing West and East spatially and the present and the past temporally, we may well take advantage of an evolutionary theory of biology which sheds light on the mode of existence and evolutionary process of both Western and Eastern political theories. In this respect, biological concepts such as homology, analogy, and convergent/divergent evolution are helpful.

Homology in biology refers to the "similarity of the structure, physiology, or development of different species of organisms" due to their sharing a common evolutionary ancestor. In contrast to homology, analogy refers to a "functional similarity of structure based not upon common evolutionary origins but upon mere similarity of use." Thus, the "forelimbs of such widely differing mammals as human beings, bats, and deer are homologous" sharing a common evolutionary ancestor (*Encyclopedia Britanica*;www. britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/270557/homology). Their different shapes and functions represent adaptive modifications in their different evolutionary process. In contrast the wings of birds and insects represent analogous structures. They are used for flight in both types, but they have no common ancestral origin at the beginning of their evolutionary development. While the wings of birds originated from forelimbs, those of insects usually originated from their skins.

In early theory of evolution, homology was stressed while analogy was rather ignored as nature's deception. However, recent theory of convergent evolution pays close attention to analogy, for it is interested in explaining how species of different ancestry acquire the same or similar biological traits through their evolution in a similar ecosystem. It is interesting to note that homology refers to the divergent evolution (or functional differentiation) of organs sharing a common ancestor (original identity) but adapting to different environments (divergent evolution), while analogy points to the convergent evolution (functional assimilation or teleological identity) of organs not sharing a common origin but adapting to a similar environment.

Such biological knowledge is helpful in articulating a new orientation in comparative political theory by tracing and comparing vital needs (or functions) and surrounding (natural and historical) environments and their evolutionary interaction in East and West without being overwhelmed by the original or phenomenal (or current) differences between the two. I will illustrate this point by citing recent theorizing of Confucian constitutionalism pioneered by Hahm Chaihark (2000). As is known widely, the idea of constitutionalism is of Western origin, and liberal constitutionalism is usually associated with the rule of law, the guarantee of basic human rights, the separation of powers, judicial review, and impeachment. Therefore, it was commonly understood that the idea of constitutionalism was lacking, and there was only arbitrary monarchical rule of Confucianism and other philosophies in the history of East Asian political thought.

However, if we trace the origin of constitutionalism to Aristotle and Cicero in the West, we come to find that "constitution" originally referred to a "moderate and balanced form of government" or a "mixed government," rather than the full array of modern Western constitutionalism. According to Carl J. Friedrich, the idea can be reduced succinctly to a simple question, "How to rule the rulers?" (Friedrich 1968, 320). It is primarily defined as the system of restraint on governmental actions. Thus, if we return

to the original problematique, constitutionalism is one of the essential problematiques with which all political communities must have been confronted and preoccupied to sustain their existence as a viable political community. A political community that is not equipped with some institutional arrangement by which the power of rulers is checked would be doomed to self-destruction, for absolute power necessarily ruins rulers and political communities; an automobile without a brake would kill not only passengers and pedestrians but also the driver him/herself.

Following this kind of insight and asking what the institutional arrangement was that controlled Confucian rulers, we come to find that Confucian *li* (禮; rituals or rites), a form of intermediate norms between morals and laws, played a constitutional role in checking the power of rulers. In this way Hahm has formulated a theory of Confucian constitutionalism, suggesting that "prime minister," "royal lectures," "institutionalized remonstrance", and "court historians" were vital elements, in addition to the rule of *li* and its accompanying arrangements such as legal codes and customary laws (Hahm 2000).

This kind of theorization based on the idea of convergent (analogous) or divergent (homologous) evolution leads us to go beyond merely comparing phenomenal similarities and differences between East and West, and explore the original basic needs/spirits/functions of political community and their homologous or analogous evolution at a deeper level. It would enable us to conduct a richer and more fruitful dialogue between the East and the West and between the traditional and the modern.

Thus, the attempt to traverse the East and the West or the past and the present cannot begin with the assumption of monistic universality, for it posits a particular concept, theory, norm, or value of a given culture/civilization as the universal and superior and thus suppresses the existence of multiplicity and differences and their inherent values. Instead, it should begin with the assumption of "pluralist universalism" on the basis of which comparing the self (or culture) with the Other and cross-examining their respective formation is made, so that we may create a new confluent universality (Parekh 2006, 126-27).7 This process naturally involves self-understanding, self-criticism, and self-transcendence by constant cross-reflections upon the self (or culture) and the Other. Such a process is not so much preoccupied with the "same or similar answers," which would presuppose tacitly the inclusion of some cultures (or

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7 Parekh notes that there are broadly three answers to the "question whether there are universal moral values or norms and how we can judge other cultures"; namely, "relativism, monism and minimum universalism"(Parekh 2006, 126). After critically examining and dismissing them, he suggests "pluralist universalism" as an alternative, stressing the creative interplay between universal moral values and "the thick and complex moral structures of different societies, the latter domesticating and pluralizing the former and being in turn reinterpreted and revised in their light, thus leading to what I might call 'pluralist universalism'" (Parekh 2006, 127). For more of his account of the existence of universal moral values, see Parekh (2006, 127-134).

communities) and the exclusion of others, but with a set of primordial problematiques with which every political community is confronted and preoccupied and which may give birth to various answers. For even if some diverse institutions and practices originated and took divergent paths in historically particular environments, and thus evolved into apparently incommensurable forms, they are nothing more than flexible and various responses to the similar fundamental needs (or functions to satisfy them) of political communities after all. That is, currently diverse responses are situated (embedded) in overlapping/ convergent problematiques: what values a political community seeks to realize, how it realizes them, and how it has to respond to the historical vicissitudes.

Conclusion

On the basis of the methodological ideas that have so far been suggested, which include concepts of transversality, cross-cultural dialogue, and the analogies of convergent and divergent evolution, we can conduct comparative political theory that traverses and conceptually links seemingly divergent theories. For example, we may address Plato's philosopher-kings and the Confucian idea of rule by virtuous men, both of which address the idea of what constitutes the ideal political leader to realize an ideal state; or we may intersect the conservatism of East Asian Confucian scholars with that of European conservatives, both groups that were vehemently opposed to the advent of liberal and industrial civilization, despite living under radically different historical conditions. We may also compare the divergent conceptions of public opinion as seen in the principles of political legitimation given by Confucianism and liberalism or between political theories of realism like those of the Chinese Legalists and of the Machiavellians. Likewise, we may contrast the embryonic Confucian feminism seen in East Asia with early liberal feminism represented by Mary Wollstonecraft.

We may compare East Asia and the West transversally in terms of these questions, because some responses appear comparable in form, some seem to share a common origin, and others seem to meet the fundamental needs (or functions) of the political community, i.e., the convergent or divergent horizon of the problematiques, This may be suggested in a more abstract way: What does a political community guarantee for its members at a minimum? What are the basic elements of ideal society? Where is the ultimate locus of political legitimacy? How does a political community inherit and sustain political legitimacy? How does a political community respond to revolutionary upheavals such as the industrial revolution, the French revolution, and the like? What are the criteria of the legitimate members in a polity that accompany inclusion and exclusion—slaves, women, immigrants, etc.? How do secular and transcendental values interact in a political community?

As my reflections so far have suggested, the theories of transversality have made attacks against rigid

dichotomies including those of identity and difference, ideas of overarching universality, and the essentialization of culture and civilization including Western-centrism, all of which may seem valid points. Yet my examination and analysis of the concept of cross-cultural dialogue, alongside concepts of universality as "widely applicable" and "pluralist universalism," and my discussion of biological metaphors stemming from the theory of evolution present a different picture: namely, that such criticism seems to go too far with the exuberant, iconoclastic zeal in which any theory is likely to be immersed in its incipiency. As the history of political theory in both the East and the West has demonstrated, to refashion and transfigure the old concepts of universality, identity and difference, reason and so forth (instead of rejecting them *in toto*) are as important as inventing completely new concepts. Thus, it is possible to see the idea of transversality as being the basic élan for a comparative political theory and to regard cross-cultural dialogue as its concrete method. As evolutionary theory can suggest, the guiding spirit of such an approach is that human cultures and civilizations are never in a state of stasis or immutability, but rather exist as a steadily flowing, changing wave.

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Session 3

Despair of Wall Street and Hope of High Line Park
-Globalization of Economic Crisis:
Chance for Poietic Human Dwelling?

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1. Despair of Wall Street: Collapse of Postmodern Globalization?

Wall Street used to be the street where the fund managers with astronomical amount of salary were enjoying the luxurious life style of which everybody on earth was envious. But all of sudden this street has been turning into the epicenter of the financial earthquake pushing the globalized life world of humanity into fear of bankruptcy and into despair. If the modernity has been entering the process of collapse due to the economic panic 1930's followed by World War II and then the rise of postmodernity, does the ongoing economic crisis not imply the collapse of postmodernity and then the rise of a new epoch? The suspicion would be raised: is the crisis not an 'epochal moment, where the very center of postmodern globalization is being challenged at the most fundamental level?

Are the humanities as the one and only discipline being aloof from money entitled to ignore this fundamental historical crisis? Rather are the humanities as the one and only academic discipline being able to reflect philosophically and historically not called to reflect on this epochal crisis of postmodernity?

Already on the world-side various diagnostics are being employed to discover the causes of the economic crisis. Regrettably all of these seem to neglect the fact that due to the emergence of digital technology since the second half of 20th century the economy led by the financial industry has been moving onto the digital space, the topological structure of which is completely different from the space in which the economy thus far had been working.

2. The topological Structure of the Digital Space.

What is the spatiality of digital space constituted of bit and net? In the digital space the extension of space is minimized to as small as possible, losing its central topological significance. The digital space is not already complete, but is being spatialized through the networking process of the nodes with each other, and that the speed of networking approximates to the speed of light. Networking at the speed of light makes distance meaningless, evaporating the delay of time and realizing simultaneity and instantaneousity.

Furthermore in the digital space one position is not occupied only by one entity, but plural positions can be occupied by one entity, or one position can be occupied by a plural number of entities simultaneously and instantaneously. If we approve of Bergson, who sees the law of contradiction grounded in the exclusivity of extensional space in which one position is only for one thing and (in which others are excluded from the position if it is occupied by something else), we should see the digital space as the space in which contradiction is not sublated unlike Hegel's expectation, but is returning ceaselessly. Due to this ceaseless returning of contradiction the digital space remains always dynamic. It is the space of event, not of substance. In addition to that, as far as the contradiction is not sublated, the digital space sustains as the process of happening of radical difference. This process makes the digital space the space of drastic flux. As far as the contradictory situation generating drastic flux is never sublated, the phenomenon or events which can not be allowed formally or logically refuse to be eliminated. So the digital space is always inevitably unstable and risky to great degree.

For the sake of simplicity let us try to recapitulate point by point what is revealed as the spatiality of the digital space so far.
1) Space of flux with inflection 2) limitless and bottomless due to the absence of extension 3) space of paradox disobeying the law of contradiction 4) space of drastic amplification and expansion or contraction 5) space of event and emergence 6) space of uncertainty 7) space without center
8) space allowing no central regulation 9) space of anarchy 10) space of extreme volatility

These various characteristics converge finally on the fact that the digital space is the space of high risk.

3. On the Way to the risk based Economy

Now let's turn to the question what kind of significance the characteristics so far revealed have for the financial industry as it has existed since 1973. Needless to say, the behavior or activity of the financial market is implemented under conditions linked to the spatiality of digital space since the financial market has been sucked into the digital space. Moreover, we should remember the fact that all spatial

characteristics converge on the extreme riskiness of digital space. These two facts indicate that the business behaviors of the financial industry are concentrating mainly on taking measures to counter the high risk. Since the move onto the digital space, the financial market has been exposed to the future of volatility and extreme instability, so that the financial market inevitably demands derivatives hedging future risk. These derivatives are very attractive in that they generate the effect of leverage.

So the derivatives that are originally supposed to hedge the future-risk, turn into the object attracting speculation, having flowed into the digitalized financial market again. So the not yet actualized, virtual risks become a financial commodity to be traded speculatively under the name of hedge fund, which generates on its side the future-risk again which on its side demands the derivatives of second layer hedging the future risk caused by first layer derivatives. This process would iterate indefinitely in principle.

What is happening inside the process? In the process the inactualized future risk of the underlying asset, being separated from this underlying asset, is so virtualized in itself, and then the virtualization is proliferated so exponentially, that the deepening and the expanding of financial markets proceeds drastically. This fact indicates that digital space and derivatives share the same mode of being. So we dare to assert that the financial market and the digital economy activate each other into being and flourishing. On the flip side this process is the process of proliferation of risk in the same drastic manner.

What deserves special attention here is the fact that digital space by offering the conditions, under which the proliferation of risk is enabled, requires the introduction of the Cellular Automaton into the financial market, the successful product of IT and BT convergence based on complexity theory, because there is inferred the functional isomorphism between CA and the digitally virtualized financial market.

But the more important point in the introduction of CA into the financial market is that the simulation of financial market through CA seems to make the assessing of risk possible, and the so assessed value, translated into the price, begins to be traded in the financial market. This transforms the relation between the risk based on the uncertainty of future and the derivatives hedging the risk in a dramatic fashion. A kind of metamorphosis of mode of being happens, as it were, in that the derivatives are not any more the tool to offer security by hedging the risk, but becomes the commodity produced by processing the risk to a new sort of resource. Just as in the real market crude oil is the fundamental resource that keeps the economy working, so in the financial market risk is the resource that must be provided increasingly, which keeps the digitalized financial market expanding and deepening. Seen in this way, the economic prosperity we have enjoyed over the past 10 years is the result achieved through mining risk and amplifying it in order to produce the derivatives from it, which proliferate on its side. So a mysterious situation came into

being just before the financial crisis, where the daily trade volume of derivatives was more than ten times that of the real economy.

4. Risk based Economy and Highest Risk

The inside of the age in which we are living and the core of which the economy constitutes, is highly risky. In this age prosperity is being enjoyed through the creation and amplification of risks by means of financial engineering using technology like CA which simulates the complex adaptive system.

Is it then just a coincidence that one odd philosopher in the 20th century, Heidegger already called this century of technology 'highest risk', predicting the turn? Noticing the fact that this era is the one and only age in which the economy is operated through the proliferation of risk and the processing of it into resources, and that the proliferation and the processing is not operated by human beings but by the technology like CA used by the financial industry, there arises the suspicion: should this age, being equipped with numerous solution programs, really be referred to as an age of solution? Rather should the age not be called the age of highest risk, borrowing Heidegger's words? And if the risk is now facing the moment of implosion, is it not the right time for turning from the risk based economy?

5. Economic Aporia and Human Dwelling

But one thing is clear: if economic development is continued in the same way as it has up to now, this risk will be amplified indefinitely to become a fatal disaster like the second wave of a tsunami event. So the economic activities are now losing orientation, entering an aporia

Despite aporia there is fortunately a well known fact which was earlier not so well known. It is the fact that the there, the place in which implosion was broken out, is the home which was securitized through the subprime mortgage loan. This means that the virtual economy has pull on the house in its operation of proliferation of risk. Why has then the economy targeted the house? The reason is very simple. No one could abandon his home. So if there are lots of people who have no home, this guarantees a tremendous future demand for homes. But are there so many people who have no home, specifically in America? If the home means only shelter to survive, there is almost no one who has no home, at least in the advanced countries. Rather there would be more homes than the number of people. But a kind of enlightenment was taking place in which people are awakened to the fact that "home" means the house with a wide garden and with a swimming pool where one could enjoy a luxurious party. So there has been an increase in the number of people who regard themselves homeless and who are eager to buy a home. Then the financing becomes urgent in order to supply money to people who want to buy such a home. Where financing is

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needed, the virtual financial economy launches business to proliferate risk. And the best soil, on which risk is proliferated effectively and efficiently, is among people who have high credit risk. The proliferated risk can be disseminated and hidden into every corner of the market by means of financial engineering using digital technology culminating in CA simulation. This business was successful. Since the financial economy involves the home in its business, a happy drama has been displayed in that the profit of the financial industry has increased vertically which has triggered a rise in the price of homes and promoted the building of houses, which in turn activates the business (i.e. subprime mortgage loan) designed to produce risk which is supposed to promise huge profit to the financial industry.

Unfortunately some day this happy drama begins to turn into tragedy. Why? The home, in which the human being lives, is neither simply a location nor a habitat. What is the home? This question should be answered from the mode of being of humanity in Heideggerian way. The mode of being of the human being is grounded in his groundless mode of being that he always has possibility to fall in nothing as mortal. Human being always foregoes this fact and this inevitable future fact is always intervening in the present being of the human. This groundless mode of being of the human requires him to ground his being. This requirement, which the human being could never avoid, brings the human being to build a home from which his behavior to exist starts and to which it returns. So the home is not of the mode of flux and the flexible, but the mode of focus and ground, or 'Heimat'. Here we are able to grasp the ontological discrepancy between home and digital space in terms of spatiality. The existential human being could never lack such a home. Even the nomad has home as focus of his journey. It is only because the place at which he builds his home, allows his home no persistence, he is on the way from one home to another. The nomad also settles down. Even homeless people build a home. They do not lose themselves in the way at every moment. They also have home of which they go out and to which they return, even if this home is made of a cardboard box or is a subway station. The human being is not a nomad, but a wanderer due to his mortal mode of being. This mode of existential wandering requires him to build a home, in which he dwells. But the home could be unplaced and could not be built in digital space. In digital space no center and ground is allowed. And in it there is no place in the Heideggerian sense, but only location or address. In the digital space there is neither earth nor sky. Now we dare to assert that home is never placed in the digital space and is the last thing that could be circulated in the digital space. In spite of that, the home becomes circulated in the digital space by being securitized in the mode of the subprime mortgage created by financial tools like CA. This finally results in the economic crisis bursting both the digital space and the existential space simultaneously.

6. From Virtual Reality via Ubiquitous Computing to Poietic Dwelling

So the economic crisis pushing the human being into the existential crisis might be the chance for

philosopher to reflect on where humanity dwells. But the suspicion that the digital space is not the existential place of the human being is raised not by philosopher, but by a digital
technologist. And this suspicion gives birth to Ubiquitous Computing (UC). UC was first conceived by Mark Weiser who had been a technologist at Xerox. Weiser characterizes UC through terms like 'pervasive technology' or 'invisible technology.

Why does he call it 'invisible technology'? Firstly, the motive of Weiser to develop UC is to bring the relation between computer and human onto the right way. Secondly, Weiser's conception of UC shows important characteristics which slide away from the meaning of ubiquity in the ordinary use of the word. A ubiquitous computer it is normally thought to be that we carry computers everywhere and anytime with us, using them whenever and wherever we want. But the UC conceived by Weiser is to make computers pervasive in the life world and invisible.

Why does Weiser take liberty with the ordinary use of the word ubiquity? It is because in the normal sense of the ubiquity of the computer, it is not used as tool, but is set before human as device attracting attention of the consciousness of human and so blocking the natural flow of his actions. Weiser regards as the most contrary case to the HCI of his UC is the interaction between humans and computers in virtual reality. Contrary to VR, which pushes the human user away from the life world, in which he finds himself, into the not real reality through the IT technologies, the purpose of UC is to bring the user back to his life world. In order to fulfill this purpose, Weiser urges that the relation of computers to human users should restore the original genuine relation of the tools to human and so computers should recede into the background of the life world of the human being.

What deserves attention is that while developing his conception of UC, Weiser benefits partly from Heideggerian existential phenomenology of tool in "Being and Time" and comes across the problem hidden in the then HCI.

According to Heidegger, the mode of being of the human is not just to be, not just to survive, but to exist. Here the term 'existence' as the mode of being of humans is introduced to specify the unique mode of being of humans which is neither just positioned in an extended space like a physical body, nor just to survive in the natural environment like an animal. The mode of being of the human is distinguished in that while letting the fact that some day he will die intrude in the present moment of his life, he is always doing something. But while doing something, humans cannot dispense tools in any moment. Thus the human comes across everything other than himself as tools first and foremost. Important is that tools, being used in the existential situation of human and being incorporated into human doing in his existence, cannot be separated from the doing of human in the moment of doing. So the mode of being of tools is distinguished

through the fact that tools cannot be noticeable to the user and not distinguishable from him as long as the tools are in the mode of being as tools.

Another ontological characteristic of tool lies in the fact that every tool is only a tool when it is interrelated to another tool and that the interrelation of tools is finally converging on the situation of human existence. Here we already can presume how UC should be conceptualized to restore the computer as a tool for human existence.

1) Computers must be incorporated into the existential world of human beings and should not come to the foreground. They must recede into background, be calm and unnoticeable as "that which informs but doesn't demand our focus or attention" as Weiser says: (Weiser 1993)

2) A computer cannot be an isolated tool, but each computer must build nets with other computers. In the field of computer technology this net can be realized as networking.

3) As long as the relation, in which every tool is referred to each other, is finally converged on the situation of human existence, every computer networked to each other should be able to take the situation into account.

In order for UC to realize these three qualifications required for computers to be a genuine tool for humans, it becomes clear that the following three technologies must be developed.

　　　　1) Embedding Technology 2) Interconnecting Technology 3) Context aware technology

If we want to resume what we have discussed as the pivotal essential characteristics of UC in one sentence, it would be expressed as it was in the first sentence of the epoch making paper of Weiser "Computer for 21st century". "Specialized element of hardware and software, connected by wires, radio waves and infrared, will be so ubiquitous that no one will notice that presence"(M. Weiser, 1999,p.3)

After tracing back the original motive of the emergence of UC, it becomes clear which direction the attempt to apply UC should take. Weiser stresses: "The result of calm technology is to put us at home, in a familiar place." (Weiser, Seely Brown 1996, 4-5) Weiser's conception offers an opportunity to be aware of the fact that in the mode of human existence pushed into VR created by a computer, human is not at home, and does not dwell there. While criticizing virtual reality and attempting a new conception of HCI, Weiser makes UC imply the turn toward the place and the space where the human being lives and dwells.

Weiser would be overburdened, if he were asked to clarify what the home and the familiar space is to which UC puts us; rather it is the task of the philosopher like us. Fortunately, the way in which we

should take in implementing the task is already indicated. As far as the conception of UC is achieved by following the Heideggerian reflection, the place and the space to which UC puts us as Weiser expressed, is the existential space that Heidegger revealed in conjunction with his phenomenology of tool. But we should not forget the fact that as this phenomenology matured in his late thinking, the existential space in which the human being dwells, is revealed as the place where fourfold: earth, sky, divine, and mortal are gathering. Also, Christian Norberg Schulz who takes this Heideggerian topology over into the practical field of architecture sees the place from the perspective of the relation between natural landscape and village or city.

According to him the landscape is not the subjective product which is created through coloring subjective emotion on the nature understood as field of physical matter or storage of resource. Rather it is the ontological aura implying existential meaning cleared prior to human being. Humanity dwells in this aura by bringing this meaning fore through building house, road, village and city. The landscape is the ontological atmosphere calling the human being. In this respect the activity of building for dwelling is poiesis of physis in genuine original sense.

Following this line of thinking, UC, triggered by Weiser's drawing on Heidegger's ontology of tools which matures to fourfold ontology, is the chance to discover nature not as physical matter or resource, but as the ontological text from which the existential meaning originates and which so indicates the way of life of human being. UC supported by embedding technology should be embedded into things not to augment the function of things, but to make room for the opening of the poetic value of things.

7. Hope of High Line Park?

Is this expectation for poietic relation to things just an untimely illusionary vision?

But an encouraging event has been taking place in New York. On the one side of New York, Wall Street has been directing globalized financial industry in the digital space, pushing the world into the economic crisis. But on the other side of New York fresh sprouts starts gradually to appear, indicating the prospect for poietic future of city and economy. It is High Line Park with the concept of agri-tecture opened recently in New York. This park is not directly related to UC, but it shows the way, at least indirectly, how the modern economic infrastructure which lost its function, could be transformed into a poietic landscape. High Line used to be an elevated railway to transport goods and commodities by circulating New York. But from 1930 onwards it gradually had been losing its function, and eventually became a totally abandoned railway. Since then, it was seen as an eyesore in New York, which led to the plan of postmodern redevelopment to get rid of Highline at the end of 1980's. This plan was confronted with

resistance from some New Yorkers. As time went by, the abandoned rusty railway was gradually covered in wild grasses and flowers. There is now coming into being a natural, somewhat wild landscape, which is impossible to expect in a modern city like New York.

The New Yorkers were so touched by the landscape as to feel that some significant event had taken place in the city; but they did not know how to bring their feeling of significance, when touched by the landscape, into words. They simply said that they felt of themselves as Alice in Wonderland. Resisting against the redevelopment plan, they desperately needed architecture which could bring significance into words. Architect and Landscape designer group Diller Scofido & Renfro responded to the need with concept of agri-tecture. What is this agritecture? "Inspired by wild seeded landscape left after the railway had been abandoned, Diller Scofido & Renfro created a paving system that encourages natural growth which creates a pathless landscape" through a strategy of agri-tecture - part agriculture, part architecture -." (Architecture Lab. Online Architecture Magazine, 10 June 2009)

Highlighted from the Heideggerian perspective of architecture as poiesis of physis, the epoch making excellence of the agritecture building High Line Park will be revealed in a more clear way. High Line Park shows how the product of modern functionalism, the elevated railway, pervading into the earth, is transforming into an element of the landscape understood as a gathering of heaven, earth, mortal and divine.

The railway is, put in a Heideggerian way, the infrastructure supporting the modern techno economic space, in which every being comes into being only through being attached to the total enframing system, in which every being is ordered, produced into things other than itself, and consumed. In this technological space everything is not a thing of its own, but a resource to be manifactured into another product. In the techno economic space, nothing is allowed to be in its own place. Every being is homeless, ordered to be on the way to another place. Thus, the techno economic space comes true only through the transport system like a railway. Railway is not just an ontic way running through a city, but the most modern ontological way in which being comes true. But if the rail way looses its ontological meaning which is functional as a transport system, it is not allowed to be placed in the techno economic space. It must be abandoned and thrown away from the space. Such a destiny was confronting High Line. It had been abandoned to be an ugly rusting useless iron structure, but as time went by, a marvelous reversal had been taking place in the destiny confronting High Line. By being abandoned and thrown away from the techno economic space, High Line escaped from the techno economic space. This escape opened the chance for High Line to return to the poietic space, in which fourfold was gathering. As New Yorkers witnessed, in the rusting railway with grey and gloomy concrete, wild grasses were growing and the flowers were blooming. The railway rusting into nothing is, as it were, transforming into a place of vegetation inviting

grasses and flowers. So, the rusting railway and grey concrete was absorbed into the earth as a stratum of it and transformed into a place for vegetation, in which heaven and earth are gathering and pervading into each other. "Combining organic and building materials into a blend of changing proportions that accommodates the wild, the cultivated, the intimate, and the hyper-social." and recovering the rusting and perishing railway into being, High Line was given birth as poiesis of physis. Now, In New Yorkers a new landscape is opened by poiesis of physis taking place in High Line which used to be simply ugly and rusted infrastructure destroying the cityscape of New York.

8. Concluding Remark

Still the globalized life world finds itself in a very unstable situation due to the economic turmoil. The turmoil is not just that of one field among other fields of human life world. Rather it reflects the epochal crisis of the entire civilization in which technology and economy have converged on each other and in which the convergence has acquired the fundamental leading function of the civilization since modern time. This techno economic civilization has been resulted in the risk based economy backed by the technology of the modern era which is culminating in the postmodern digitalization of life world. The risk based economy is now facing the danger of collapse, longing for the chance of turn in the whirlpool of the crisis. One possible turn might follow the way cleared by Ubiquitous Computing, which could finally lead to the opening of space as place for gathering fourfold and of building as poiesis of physis in genuine original sense as is exemplified in the Highline Park. It transforms the modern techno economic space into poietic landscape, in which vegetation of nature and building activity of humanity is pervading into each other.

Needless to say, High Line Park is just a fraction of land in New York. Even UC which implies the potentiality to reduce the extension of functional space by enabling the function to recede into the background fails to notice the significance of High Line. Taking the cue from Highline Park, which transforms a modern defunctionalized space into poietic landscape, we have, being mediated through the technology of UC, the good fortune to let the space provided through the receding of functional space take place as a poiesis of physis.

Illuminated from High Line Park along with technology of UC in this way there is discovered a glimmer of hope for new beginning of the poietic dwelling, which will modify the constellation between human, heaven, earth, and divine. This tiny glimmer should keep being lightened in order for a new oikonomia(οἰκονομία) to emerge, oikonomia understood as prudent handling of matter in the original sense of the word. The Oikonomia would have then significant impact on the current constellation of

industry. The oikonomia would be configured not centered on financial industry, but on architecture. This architecture should be distinguished from the mega construction of luxurious sky crapper as in Dubai. The mega construction was attracting astronomical amount of hyper-capital. It is no more than another mode of money speculation promoted by the financial industry and no more than a huge display of luxurious signs. As we are now witnessing, this kind of mega construction find itself in the same crisis as the financial industry. The architecture responsible for the future oikonomia should be the architecture of poiesis, through which heaven and earth come into being not as storage of resource, but as ontological aura for humanity.

In order to realize the transition from economy to oikonomia mediated through poietic architecture using UC technology, the close collaboration of the architecture with economics and IT coordinated by humanities is urgently required.

The Moral Philosophy of The Scottish Enlightenment: The Theory of Adam Smith's 'sympathy' and 'impartial spectator'

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Ⅰ. Prologue

In the US (as well as in several other areas of the world) the 1980s saw attempts to promote a regressive, ideologically reactionary form of capitalism. A radical attempt the US witnessed was to redistribute income from the poorer to the economically more advantaged members of society. Increases in government defence spending and the government deficit were also legitimized by the rhetoric in favour of a dogmatic laissez-faire form of capitalism. Much of this was done "in the name of and using the authority of Adam Smith."

The New Right has been ideologically based on particularly the free-market theories of Adam Smith, which were revived in the second half of the twentieth century as a critique of 'big' government and economic and social intervention. This is called the liberal new right, or neoliberalism. Therefore, especially, many of the radical and regressive economic policies of the US and Britain were advocated in the name of Adam Smith's vision. However, for past half century the free market has not normally worked. The main reason of the failure was because those economic programmes "fragrantly misused" Smith's authority.

A careful exposition of Smith's work will show that Smith actually had severe misgivings about the moral desirability of the system of capitalism. Smith was not for deficit spending, increases in military spending, income redistribution schemes in favour of the rich, or dogmatic laissez-faire forms of capitalism. The most important argument of *The Wealth of Nations* is that a market economy is best able to improve the standard of living of the vast majority of the populace - that it can lead to what Smith called "universal

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opulence."

Smith had a diagnosis for today's "greed of Wall Street" crisis. He called promoters of excessive risk in search of profits "prodigals and projectors." The term "projector" is used by Smith not in the neutral sense of "one who forms a project," but in the pejorative sense, meaning "a promoter of bubble companies; a speculator; a cheat." Smith thought that relying entirely on an unregulated market economy can result in a dire predicament in which, as Smith writes, "a great part of the capital of the country is kept out of the hands which were most likely to make a profitable and advantageous use of it, and thrown into those which were most likely to waste and destroy it."

In spite of his deep moral misgivings, Smith nevertheless ultimately came out in favour of the system of capitalism. This was because the system of capitalism that Smith advocated was capable of generating economic growth. It was capable of increasing the wealth of nations and the material well-being of the common people. It is frequently believed that the great eighteenth-century Scottish moral philosopher Adam Smith was an extreme dogmatic defender of laissez-faire capitalism. It is also frequently held that Smith was totally in favour of the system of capitalism. Both of these common, popular interpretations of Smith are erroneous. A careful exposition of his work will demonstrate that Adam Smith was not a dogmatic proponent of laissez-faire capitalism. Therefore, Smith was not for deficit spending, increases in military spending, income redistribution schemes in favour of the rich, or dogmatic laissez-faire forms of capitalism. Moreover, Smith himself was not an unequivocal supporter of the system of capitalism.

Another important aspect of Smith that we have ignored for a long time is that he had had misgivings about the abuse of the free market and had written *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759) to which the question of ethics and the social formation of character were central.

After its immediate success, Moral Sentiments went into an eclipse from the beginning of the nineteenth century, and Smith was increasingly seen almost exclusively as the author of his second book, *The Wealth of Nations*. The neglect of *Moral Sentiments*, which has lasted through the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, has had two unfortunate effects. First, even though Smith was, in many ways, the pioneering analyst of the need for impartiality and universality in ethics, he has been fairly comprehensively ignored in contemporary ethics and philosophy. Second, since the ideas presented in *The Wealth of Nations* have been interpreted largely without reference to the framework of thought already developed in the *Moral Sentiments*, the typical understanding of *The Wealth of Nations* has been constrained, to the detriment of economics as a subject.

In this moment the universal value of global ethics is urgently needed, and the moral philosophy of

Scottish Enlightenment, Adam Smith in particular, is remarkably suggestive. Adam Smith, who thought the impartiality needed for social institutions to realize liberalism and ethics is self-regulating equipment, suggested 'sympathy' as a foundation of universal ethics. And he, by the concept of 'the impartial spectator,' enlarged sympathy to the standard of judging one's own emotion and behavior. This paper will be an attempt to introduce Adam Smith as a moral philosopher who groped for global ethics.

Ⅱ. Sympathy

The fundamental ethical issue that was explored by British Enlightenment philosophers, including Smith, Hutcheson and B. Mandeville, was, if the objective basis of ethics could be found in human nature, in a civil society free from an absolute monarch's coercion. From this point of view, Smith tried to define ethics as science. In other words, he tried to recognize humans as vulnerable and imperfect beings and to find their inner ethical basis given by God rather than suggesting a desirable ethical behavior for perfect humans.

Although Smith acknowledged that the pursuit of personal benefits serves as the driving force behind economic growth, he was well aware that in reality, it is possible that individuals, in particular merchants, do unfair harm to others while pursuing only their benefits, blinded by greed. That is why Smith puts strong emphasis on the importance of fairness, which is mainly about not doing unfair harm to others. For Smith, the crown jewel of ethics or law is fairness. Therefore, putting Smith's liberalism into practice requires a social system that would guarantee fairness.

As the title of his book *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* suggests, the element of human nature in which Smith found the basis of ethics is "senses," not "reason." Likewise, finding the basis of ethics in senses was a major characteristic of Scottish Enlightenment, which was influenced by the 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury.

In response to Hobbes' theory that human nature is fundamentally selfish and anti-social, Shaftesbury had argued that God provided human nature with a number of generous forms of affection, from family affection to a love for mankind, that naturally predispose men to live together. He emphasized feelings rather than reason as the source of morality. We approve of or take pleasure in the contemplation of virtue, and this is because we are by nature altruistic and not just selfish.

Smith was greatly influenced by David Hume. Nevertheless, what is notable is that Smith's ethical theory was particularly influenced by those of ancient philosophers. Indeed, Smith preferred that of Cicero, a stoic philosopher.

It was long ago suggested that Smith took one of his main philosophical concepts, that of 'sympathy,' from Polybius. In the course of his account of early societies, polybius declares the necessity of establishing mutual solidarity between parents and their children; if adults fail to give back to their parents the affection and care they received as children, this contemptuous behavior is disapproved of by society because each individual can foresee the possibility that the same might happen to him. This consideration is then extended by means of generalization to interpersonal relations outside the family. If someone receives assistance in a time of difficulty and does not return it, or perhaps repays good with evil, his conduct offends the observer, who shares the other party's indignation and imagines himself in his shoes. Polybius concludes from this that this sort of situation endows men with a certain sense of duty, which is the root of justice. Considering this connection, we can guess that the theory of Smith's sympathy developed from Polybius' theory.

For Smith, although moral rules and judgment could be based on reason, the ultimate basis for morality can only be found in senses. In this context, Smith regarded "sympathy," one of the human senses, as the source of morality.

In *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Smith devotes a great deal of space to a discussion of the nature of sympathy. *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* is based on a principle of sympathy. Smith thought that in human nature there is a moral sense or moral sentiments which intuitively decide what is moral. Smith referred to the moral sense as sympathy or fellow feelings.

> However selfish a man may be supposed to be, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotions we feel for the misery of others when we either see it or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. That we often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; this sentiment, like all the other original passions of human nature, is by no means confined to the virtuous and humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without it.

According to Smith, humans can feel what others feel as explained above because they can place themselves in others' situations using their imagination.

> By this imagination we place ourselves in someone else's situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body and become in some measure

the same person with him, and thence, form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them.

That this is the source of our fellow-feeling for the misery of others, that it is by changing places in fancy with the sufferer, and that we come either to conceive or to be affected by what he feels may be demonstrated by many obvious observations if it is not thought to be sufficient evident of itself.

David Hume had put forward a theory of the imagination from which Smith developed his own theory of the mind. For both Hume and Smith, the imagination is a mental faculty by means of which people create a distinctively human sphere within the natural world. It is the imagination that enables us to make connections between the perceived elements of both the physical and the moral world. The activity of the imagination is a spontaneous search for order, coherence, and agreement in the world. Smith takes these characteristics of sympathy from Hume, but he calls the sympathy for the person performing the action 'direct sympathy' and that for the person who is acted upon 'indirect.'

Smith talks of this imaginative striving both in moral terms as a desire for agreement and in aesthetic terms as a concern with beauty and harmony. This reflects a distinction between two fundamentally different kinds of imagination: one is concerned with persons as agents whereas the other has as its object things and events. We may call them - although Smith does not - practical and theoretical imagination, respectively. It is through practical imagination that we ascribe actions to persons and see persons as coherent or identical over time. In other words, practical imagination creates the moral world. This form of imagination Smith calls "sympathy." The theoretical imagination is, in Smith's view, the foundation for all the arts and sciences.

In short, Smith defined sympathy as placing oneself in others' situation, using his or her imagination, thus regarding sympathy as the foundation of moral sentiments.

Pity and compassion are words appropriated to signify our fellow-feeling with the sorrow of others. Sympathy, though its meaning was, perhaps, originally the same, may now, however, without much impropriety, be made use of to denote our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever.

Smith's foundation of ethics is thus humans' ability to share what others feel. That is because they can judge if someone's behavior is pertinent by thinking in his or her situation. Sympathy thus becomes the standard we use when we approve of or reject the pertinence of others' behavior or emotions. People's community life in a society requires understanding of each other's emotions and behavior, and it is such understanding that serves as the foundation of social solidarity. Smith points out that the principle of

sympathy enables such mutual understanding.

When a person falls into a certain situation, this person and a third person (spectator) can understand each other and share the same position through sympathy. In this process, the former can control his or her emotions from the point of view of the latter who is there as an observer. That is because sympathy allows the former to realize that the latter's feeling of the given situation is weaker than that of the former. The former then looks at him or herself from a third person's viewpoint in which the degree of feeling is weaker, and by doing so, the former can control and alleviate his or her strong emotions. Meanwhile, the third person, who becomes a spectator, tries his or her best to share what the former feels as intensely as possible. Therefore, sympathy can generate solidarity and cooperation among people.

Ⅲ. Impartial Spectator

Smith also expands the scope of this principle of sympathy, applying it not only to others' situations but also to one's own judgment of his or her emotions and behavior. According to Smith, one can make an accurate judgment of oneself when he or she is detached from his or her point of view to objectively see him or herself from a third person's perspective. Enter what Smith calls "impartial spectator," a third person in ourselves who makes a judgment of ourselves when we are seen from an objective point of view.

In this instance Smith himself points out a connection between Aristotle's theory and his own, stating that it closely agrees with his own treatment of the 'propriety and impropriety of conduct.'

Moreover, Aristotle's concept of virtue is defined not only by a subjective attitude but also by it being appropriate to a given situation, just like Smith's propriety. There is also another aspect of Smith's concept that has a parallel with Aristotle's Ethics: the 'point of propriety' differs for different passions so that an excess in some (e.g. the 'social' passions such as affection, friendship, esteem) is less blameworthy than an excess in others. Finally, for both philosophers, the ideal 'measure' expressed by propriety constitutes the perfection of moral action.

One element closely connected with these aspects of Smith's thoughts is represented by the key figure of moral judgement, the impartial spectator. He makes an evaluation that is objective because it is disinterested and thereby guards against the risk of being subjective.

A more common expression for "impartial spectator" would be "conscience." Smith acknowledges that every human is basically egocentric. However, he also says that people also have conscience with which

they can control their own behavior. Indeed, a major characteristic of Smith's view of humans is that egocentrism and conscience, the two contrasting senses, coexist in human nature. Furthermore, Smith says that different kinds of contrasting elements always coexist in reality. Such a position characterizes British empiricism which is about taking reality as it is and searching for rational solutions.

For Smith, it is thus the impartial spectator who enables us to have an objective view of ourselves and thus to make a fair judgment in given situations, thinking out of our own position. Thus, the impartial spectator mainly symbolizes impartiality or in other words, fairness, and this is Smith's standard of moral judgment. In sum, the key point of Smith's ethics is to be detached from a subjective perspective to think in an impartial manner, in other words, with fairness.

Smith says that everyone has a conscience called "impartial spectator" in him or her. Nevertheless, the power of the conscience is not always great enough to control a person's greed. This would thus serve as an example showing Smith's idea of natural balance reflected in his natural theology and the deception of nature related to this idea. So to speak, when people judge their own behavior, they tend to deceive their conscience by justifying their unfair behavior.

Smith says that there are two kinds of virtues: beneficence and justice. You cannot be forced to act beneficently and you cannot be punished for breaching this positive virtue. However, the negative virtue of justice must be conducted on pain of punishment.

Justice is based on fairness, and as mentioned above, the concept of "impartial spectator" also resides in impartiality, thus fairness. This clarifies once again that for Smith, impartiality (or fairness) is the foundation of moral judgment. While Smith's ethics begins with the principle of sympathy, it is concluded with the "impartial spectator." That is because ethics isn't something to be forced, but it is up to our free will to control our behavior. We can thus control our own behavior by judging ourselves from the perspective of the "impartial spectator."

The focus on fairness found in Smith's ethics is also seen in his idea of justice. Smith says, "If individuals take charge of the practice of justice, a scene of bloodshed and disorder are generated. That is why a public system must employ the power of the commonwealth to enforce the practice of justice. The law and the government constitute such a public system." In other words, the law refers to the justice that is formed by a social consensus about what the government enforces. Meanwhile, the government is the institution that enforces the law. As discussed so far, in Smith's ethical and philosophical system, justice and law are regarded as the most basic ethics that must be respected by all members of society.

Ⅳ. Epilogue

It is clear that Smith searches for the foundation of human ethics and law in human nature by thoroughly analyzing diverse aspects of human nature such as sympathy, self-love and conscience. This means that the liberalism suggested by Smith's ethics allows individuals to freely pursue their own benefits as long as they don't do unfair harm to others.

Adam Smith left almost no fortune when he died in 1790 because he had secretly used what he had for charity's sake. The epitaph on his grave located in Canongate Churchyard in Edinburgh is as follows: "Here are deposited the remains of ADAM SMITH. Author of the Theory of Moral Sentiments..." Such anecdotes of Smith widen our perspective.

Looking back at the economic order of the past two centuries in light of Smith's ethical view, it becomes certain how much his view were distorted by the theory and policies of national authorities, those with economic power and right-wing scholars, with all of them chanting "free markets." In fact, the adverse effects of free markets that Smith was concerned about still constitute a serious issue for humanity.

In the middle of the 1940's when the US economic crisis was more or less controlled by the New Deal, Karl Polanyi said, "The fundamental cause of the calamity consists in the utopian efforts to pursue economic liberalism made in an attempt to establish self-regulated market order." Saying this, Polanyi warned against the danger that could be caused by the economic order excessively focused on free markets. In other words, he was conveying the message that the Great Depression must serve as a wakeup call preventing the adverse effects of free markets from occurring again in the future. However, this message wasn't embraced.

Since the 1980's, the concept of "market-oriented economy" has become an absolute value, supported by the political and economic power and ideology of the New Right. However, the principle of free markets, also known as "financial liberalism" or "shareholder capitalism," brought a crisis to the global financial order in 2008, affecting all humanity.

'The invisible hand' of a free market which slapped the face of America in the 1920's" still slaps the face of humanity today.

Humanity accumulated the greatest wealth in history over the course of the 20th century. However, most of the wealth is possessed by only a small minority of the global population, leading to the pain of unemployment and poverty of an absolute majority. This foolish vicious cycle has never stopped.

The worldwide protests against the negative impacts of neoliberalism and financial capitalism clearly demonstrate that such a contradictory situation has gone to extremes. It is said that there are some causes of bipolarization of wealth and the financial crisis. First, plutocracy has encouraged the cozy relations between the government and large companies. Second, the New Right government has come up with a great number of policies unfavorable to low-income citizens. Considering such causes, what is needed is global ethics, which will establish fair order in normal and sustainable capitalism and free markets so that all humanity can be free from the economic crisis and enjoy stability. Under these circumstances, global communication efforts must be made to reach a consensus on such global ethics. Pursuit of global ethics should start by freeing ourselves from our distorted image of Adam Smith and by reflecting on his ethical view of "sympathy" and "impartial spectator." In that sense, his view is very meaningful and timely today because it can allow global citizens to understand the need to establish a global ethics based on love for humanity and to communicate with each other in an attempt to pursue sound and sustainable order in capitalism.

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"Gloracialization": Obstacle to Cultural Citizenship

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1. Introduction

The poignant observation by Ommundsen, Leach and Vandenberg in their introduction to the volume, *Cultural Citizenship and the Challenges of Globalization* (2010) frames this essay, and thus worth quoting at length. As they rightly underscore;

> Citizenship, culture and globalization…, can be an explosive mix, with the capacity to unsettle not only traditional modes of belonging, but also established ways of thinking about… belonging… destabilizing boundaries between culture and state, …sameness and difference, cultural citizenship… brings out tension between individual and group rights,…between principles of universalism and respect for cultural difference…this mix of citizenship, culture and globalization has had the effect of homogenizing … (and) has undermined traditional notions of individual and group identity…given rise to… identity politics. (Emphasis added).[1]

The *explosive* and *unsettling* tension between citizenship, culture and identity is a recurrent and dominant theme in Black American history, and remains perhaps its most enduring dynamics. Blacks were denied citizenship on alleged inferiority and cultural poverty; a reflection, supposedly, of a heritage of "darkness" and "primitivism". With the attainment of citizenship in the aftermath of the end of slavery, blacks assumed the burden of a complex, ill-defined, misunderstood, and often caricatured and maligned cultural identity; one associated with unflattering negative attributes.

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1 Wenche Ommundsen, Leach and Vandenberg, "Introduction" in Ommundsen, Leach & Vandenberg, eds., Cultural Citizenship and the Challenges of Globalization. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 2010, p2

Put differently, when Blacks became citizens and attempted to reclaim a credible cultural space, that culture, however they conceived it, remained a problematic entity. The historic tension between citizenship, culture and Black American identity seems irresoluble. This unending tension bolstered ethno-nationalistic consciousness and the quest for a counter-hegemonic, anti-American identity that challenged the legitimacy of the nation-state--Afrocentrism. This Afrocentric, cultural nationalist ideology has assumed prominence since the 1960s. It offered a frame for constructing a homogeneous and monolithic ethno-cultural African-centered identity for all Blacks, in reaction to alienation from, and rejection by, mainstream America.[2] It is emblematic of a desire to create, within the United States, what Arjun Appadurai terms an "ethnoscape"-- a distinct socio-cultural "landscape for group affiliation, cultural identification and identity politics."[3] Afrocentrism has become a signifier and incubator of collective identity, a weapon against perceived existential threats posed by the continuing tension between citizenship, culture and more recently, globalization. The Afrocentric, Black American "ethnoscape" is the product of a romantic ethno-cultural nationalistic imagination. It justifies homogenization of black identity on perceived immutable racial (Blackness) and ethnic (Africanness) experiences and attributes that transcended global boundaries. Regardless of location, peoples of African ancestry worldwide supposedly share immutable ethno-cultural identity.[4] This *gloracialized* conflation of the history and experiences of Black Americans and Black Diasporans worldwide, affirms a monolithic identity derived from the experience of racism and racialization. Ethnicity (Africanness) constitutes the substructure of this epistemology of resistance. This paper seeks to analyze the problematic global implications and ramifications of *gloracialized* worldview. Blacks did not develop in isolation. The Black experience in America constitutes part of a larger American and global history. Thus, an analysis of the implications of Afrocentric/Black cultural nationalist delineation of distinct Black/African ethno-cultural space in a world of simultaneous expansion and shrinkage of traditional boundaries of ethnic and cultural identifications seem pertinent. The "cultural challenge" this paper analyzes, therefore, is how Black cultural nationalist construction of a *gloracialized* ethno-cultural paradigm problematizes the complex reconfigurations of identity in the modern world.

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2 Molefi K. Asante, The Afrocentric Idea. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987. See also his, Afrocentricity. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1988. Clarence E. Walker, We Can't Go Home Again: An Argument About Afrocentrism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Stephen Howe, Afrocentrism: Mythical Pasts and Imagined Homes. London: Verso, 1998.

3 Arjun Appadurai, "Disjuncture and Difference in a Global Cultural Economy." In Mike Featherstone ed., Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization, and Modernity. London: Sage, 1990, p297.

4 Molefi Asante, The Painful Demise of Eurocentrism: An Afrocentric Response to Critics. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1999. See also, Marimba Ani, Yurugu: An African-Centered Critique of European Cultural Thought and Behavior. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1996; also her, Let The Circle Be Unbroken: The Implications of African Spirituality in the Diaspora. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1980.

2. Race, Culture and Globalization: The Afrocentric (Cultural Nationalist) Conundrum

In her call to "end" Blackness, Debra Dickerson (2004) contends that for too long, and detrimentally, Black Americans had used race as identitarian factor, and consequently had been alienated from mainstream America, while constraining their opportunity landscape. [5] In other words, racial essentialism, predicated on a philosophy of victimhood, had imprisoned blacks behind a veil of unrealistic and unrealizable expectations of remorse and restitution from whites. [6] Blackness represents both an existential anchor, and a weapon of cultural conflict. While not denying or even diminishing the historical and contemporary racial challenges that inform the Black experience, Dickerson urges Blacks to free themselves from the shackles of Blackness. Thus, she advocates de-essentializing perhaps the key dynamics of Black American history and experience. The appeal and utilization of race (Blackness) as a counter-hegemonic identity has become even more pronounced with globalization. Responding to critics of Afrocentrism, Molefi Asante, former chair of African American Studies at Temple University reaffirms the imperative of Blackness/ethnicity as unifying identitarian factors for Blacks, who, he contends, continue to engage an unrepentant, arrogant and almost insatiable culture of White domination. [7] In his view, globalization, which he likens to Europeanization, has only expanded and reinforced White cultural threats. He advocates racial essentialist response, the strengthening of Afrocentric (racialized) consciousness as strategy for Black survival in America and on the global scene. Asante depicts globalization as the old enemy (Eurocentrism) masquerading as a universal force to ensnare blacks deeper into the stranglehold of European oppression.

Emphasis on racialized discourse has serious implications for the future of race relations, especially with globalization, cosmopolitanism and the prospects of reconfigurations of identity. Modern Afrocentric insistence on delineating racial/cultural battle lines underscore rejection of cosmopolitanism and a reluctance to engage cultural pluralistic discourse. This is not a uniquely 20th century phenomenon in Black American history. Nineteenth century Black nationalists had invoked, and relied very much on, racial/cultural essentialist ethos that defined Blacks and Whites as culturally incompatible. Whites are portrayed as the antithesis of, and culturally destructive to, Blacks. [8] Given fundamentally conflicting cosmological roots, the two seem destined for separate trajectories. The rejection of cultural pluralism

5 Debra Dickerson, The End of Blackness: Returning the Souls of Black Folk to their Rightful Owners. New York: Anchor Books, 2004, p3-26

6 Ibid

7 Molefi Asante, The Painful Demise of Afrocentrism

8 Edwin Redkey, Black Exodus: Black Nationalism and Back-to-Africa Movement, 1890-1910. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1969. See also his, Respect Black: The Writings and Speeches of Henry McNeal Turner. New York: Arno Press, 1971. Sterling Johnson, Black Globalism: The International Politics of a Non-State Nation. London: Ashgate, 1998

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in the second half of the 19th century led ardent Black cultural nationalists to seek an independent all-Black (African) state where, presumably peoples of African descent would survive shielded from the domineering and destructive influence of Whites.[9] Traces of this cultural paranoia extended from the 19th century through Marcus Garvey, Malcolm X and the Nation of Islam, down to present day Afrocentrism. Modern Afrocentrists have developed this cultural nationalist paradigm solidly into a monolithic global racial/ethnic identity: Blackness and Africanness supposedly uniformly manifested and experienced by peoples of African descent across geographical spaces and historical times.

Undoubtedly, there is a compelling consideration for racial essentialism in Black American history. As several scholars acknowledge, the Black experience in America has been defined, and continues to be informed, by racism, economic exploitation and political marginalization. These historical and contemporary realities continue to shape and bolster the appeal of homogenizing cultural discourse. Notwithstanding, the resort to essentialism and the rejection of cosmopolitanism is a problematic alternative. In their attempts to impose a global monolithic identity on all Blacks/Africans, Afrocentrists soon realize that though globalization expands the frame of human interactions, it simultaneously shrinks traditional basis for distinct, isolative and provincial identities—race, ethnicity, culture, religion, etc. This "duality" of globalization has proven particularly troubling for those seeking to privilege essentialist discourse and ideology.

Simultaneous expansion of human encounters, and radical shrinkage in racial and ethnic boundaries, has consequences for identity. Shrinkage facilitates new forms of hybridized cosmopolitan identities, and thus, paradoxically, expands the terrain for cultural citizenship. Some critics welcome the prospect of new forms of hybrid/multi-identities as portending both greater human interdependence, and subversion of primordial/provincial notions of identities.[10] However, Black cultural nationalists remain skeptical. Reacting to the continuing marginalization of Blacks, they have persistently challenged the legitimacy of the nation-state, and have invoked racialized, ethno-cultural protest identity, domestically (Afrocentrism), which they expand into the global arena to include peoples of African ancestry in different geographical regions (notwithstanding historical experiences and domestic cultural realities).[11] This "loco-global" racial and monolithic identity is premised on the belief that the historical challenges confronting peoples of African ancestry are fundamentally similar and rooted in shared histories of oppression and domination,

9 Tunde Adeleke, UnAfrican Americans: Nineteenth Century Black Nationalists and the Civilizing Mission. Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1998. Bill McAdoo, Pre-Civil War Black Nationalism. New York: David Walker Press, 1983

10 Robin Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1997.

11 Molefi Asante, The Painful Demise of Eurocentrism; Marimba Ani, Yurugu

regardless of contemporary situations and locations—racism, colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, etc. Within this context, according to the Black cultural nationalist viewpoint, culture and ethnicity constitute the pillars of resistance, and thus should be protected and shielded at all cost from the seductive and destructive force of globalization.

Afrocentric scholars from the late Chancellor Williams and John H. Clarke down to Asante, Marimba Ani, Haki Madhubuti, among many others, have all in different contexts denounced globalization (Internationalism) which they equate with Europeanization and Americanization. They portray globalization as the extension and expansion of Americanization, which unleashes destructive effects on Blacks worldwide. [12] In opposition, they offer Afrocentrism and the construction of distinct ethnic/cultural enclaves. They manifest pathological disposition against, and disdain for, cultural citizenship, or any notions of cosmopolitan reconfiguration of identities. H. V. Perlmuter had argued that globalization would result in the "mixing" and "matching" identities, creating new forms of cosmopolitan, hybridized and complex identities.[13] Black cultural nationalists are not reassured. However it is conceived, this cosmopolitanism, this hybridization of identities remains fundamentally Eurocentric. Within the United States, Afrocentrists deem any "multicultural" construction of identity still very much problematic because of the continuing dominance of White values. Put differently, they view multiculturalism, or any forms of cosmopolitan identity as fundamentally political and culturally Eurocentric, the appearance of diversity notwithstanding. [14]

It should be understood that the Afrocentric distrust of multiculturalism and opposition to intercultural engagement reflect a worldview that locates Blacks and Whites as fundamentally of contradictory and irreconcilable cosmologies. Black Psychologist Nai'm Akbar describes Europeans and Africans as products of fundamentally incompatible worldviews. This is a consistent theme in Afrocentric epistemology.[15] The implication is clear--peoples of such fundamentally irreconcilable and conflicting worldviews and cosmologies could not coexist except in a *Herrenvolk* relationship in which one dominated the other. It became existentially imperative to frame a counter-hegemonic, ethnocentric

12 Ibid. See also, Chancellor Williams, The Destruction of Black Civilization. Chicago: Third World Press, 1976. Haki Madhubuti, Enemies:The Clash of Races. Chicago: Third World Press, 1978; Amos N. Wilson, Afrikan-Centered Consciousness Versus the New World Order. New York: Afrikan World InfoSystems, 1999

13 Cohen, Global Diasporas, p1754

14 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society (Revised edition). New York: W. W. Norton & Co, 1991

15 Na'im Akbar, "Africentric Social Sciences for Human Liberation." Journal of Black Studies, 14, number 4, June, 1984. See also, Algernon Austin, Achieving Blackness: Race, Black Nationalism, and Afrocentrism in the Twentieth Century. New York: New York University Press, 2006, chapt.5

identity for Blacks. Against this background, therefore, Black cultural nationalists look with jaundiced eyes at the global setting and see nothing but danger. In their view, cultural citizenship is meaningful only if it both affirms and validates original identities, while clearly identifying shared attributes and values rooted in common and complex historical and cultural experiences. Thus, they remain skeptical of the cosmopolitan ramifications of globalization. The conflation of multiple entities does not necessarily guarantee fair and adequate representation and embodiment. Multiculturalism, according Afrocentric critics, simply means "multiple" representation, often within the context of unequal and problematic power relations.

Afrocentric scholars reject the notion of cultural citizenship or new forms of hybridized cosmopolitan identities defined by cultural convergences. They deem inherited/original ethno-cultural identities distinct and immutable. Consequently, any conflation or reconfiguration of identities toward some "universal or cosmopolitan" ideal is denounced as disguised attempt to reinforce Eurocentric hegemony. It is difficult for a Black/African, thus socialized to develop the capacity to meaningfully engage and appreciate other cultures. Culture remains a battle-field, and globalization an extension of the terrain of cultural conflict. There is, however, an element of cultural citizenship embedded in Afrocentrism, one narrowly delineated by ethno-cultural (Blackness/Africanness) boundary: the construction of Africans and Diaspora blacks as "cultural citizens" who share racial and an African-rooted identity which allegedly has not been fundamentally impacted by centuries of existence among, and interaction with, others (Europeans). This global ethno-cultural citizenship exists as sub-layer, in opposition to, and as defense against, new forms of Diaspora, hybridized, cosmopolitan identities. This curious Afrocentric conflation of *time* and *space* obliterates differences in the experiences of Diaspora Blacks—differences of history, of cultural exposures and acculturation, of domestic economic and political realities. Presumably every Black person of African ancestry, regardless of location and historical experiences, share a homogenous, ahistoristic, ethno-cultural identity. Afrocentrists develop a sub-layer of cultural citizenship defined by race and ethnicity (Africanness) which they apply globally. This global cultural citizenship is rooted in the "globalization" of the Atlantic slave trade as well as the "globalization" of post-colonial migrations. They deem this global African-centered, ethno-cultural citizenship a bulwark against, even as it is being simultaneously threatened by, the cultural ramifications of new emerging transnational identities.

3. Diaspora Blacks, Cosmopolitanism and Cultural Citizenship:

The Afrocentric, Black cultural nationalist worldview acknowledges two competing "cultural citizenships"—a racialized, ethno-cultural (essentialist) one for Blacks, and the other, emanating from the cosmopolitan interplay between diverse communities, including Europeans. The underlying dynamics of both, of course, is race—Race (Blackness) as a unifying element for the former, and race (Whiteness) as a

dominant hegemonic force within the other supposedly cosmopolitan and universal entity. This *gloracial-ized* worldview has global implications. It ignores the facts of experiential differences, historically and culturally, among peoples of African descent. It delegitimizes and circumscribes the cultural citizenship capacity and adaptability of recent African migrant communities in different European settings. Cosmopolitan in outlook and disposition, these migrants actively embrace and validate the complex dimensions of the world around them. Though still marginalized economically and politically, they do not actively pursue cultural isolation. In other words, Diaspora Africans in Europe privilege both their original homeland identity and the newly acquired hybridized diasporic one. They do not envision a destruction of either, but consciously and enthusiastically assume cultural citizenship responsibilities. Judging by recent political developments, many are achieving significant levels of success. They aspire for, and are being elected to high political offices previously the exclusive preserve of the dominant society. Examples abound of African settlers and migrants in Europe assuming high profile local, state and national responsibilities. Their actions and accomplishments constitute repudiation and negation of racialized essentialist and conflict-driven identities.

While acknowledging the persistence of racial discrimination, economic and political marginalization, African migrants in Europe seek validation in metropolitan cultures and identity. What these global Africans demand, in their respective European settings, is the opportunity to be "cosmopolitan" (however imperfect), to assume the role of "cultural citizens" by not only representing their original homeland cultures and identities, but also embracing and immersing themselves in the cultures of their adopted nations. They demonstrate adaptability to, and compatibility with, multiple cultural experiences; a fundamental "cultural citizenship" principle. As I defined it elsewhere, cultural citizenship "implies the human capacity and willingness to deemphasize, or even transcend, essentialist constructions of citizenship and identity; whether based on nation, race, ethnicity or religion." [16] Or, as Nick Stevenson defines it, a cultural citizen is "a polyglot who is able to move comfortably within multiple and diverse communities while resisting the temptation to search for a purer and less complex identity." [17] Thus, cultural citizenship is akin to "ambassadorial" identity. To be "ambassadorial" is to posses the ability and capacity to engage and represent multiple roles, experiences, agencies and cultures. A cultural citizen possesses a certain level of comfort with multiple cultures. Globalization mandates such adaptability, perhaps more so because of the compression of *time* and *space*. As many acknowledge, globalization is a complex process of simultaneous expansion and contraction (globality and locality). [18] According

16 Tunde Adeleke, "Against Euro-Cultural Hegemony: Black Americans, Afrocentricity and Globalization" in Ommundsen, et al; Cultural Citizenship, p240.

17 Quoted in Ommundsen et al, Cultural Citizenship, p12

18 Peter Kivisto, Multiculturalism in a Global Society. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002, p1

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to Anthony Giddens, increased migrations have created both "distanciation' and "disembedding"—in which "contemporary social relations are no longer tied to particular places." Social relations are "less tied to "local contexts of interactions" and are being restructured "across infinite spans of time-space."[19] In essence, there is "time-space compression." This compels re-conception of culture as a dynamic and complex entity and experience as opposed to "a distinct and clearly defined category."[20] Culture, therefore, Wenche Ommundsen warns, should not be conceived as "an ethnic costume that can be taken out, brushed down, and worn on special occasions."[21]

Peoples of African descent across the globe exist and function in an increasingly complex world. The ever-expanding parameters of human encounters, and corresponding shrinkage of boundaries of inherited identities, compel adaptation to, and engaging, diverse and complex range of cultural experiences. The privileging of essentialist discourse makes it difficult to both contribute to, and gain from, the complex interplay of cultural experiences. Cosmopolitanism is not inherently and necessarily a hegemonic relationship. Disparate groups can benefits mutually from the experiencing of, and exposure to, diverse cultures, even in condition of social, economic and political inequality. The underlying word is *culture*. While the playing field of cultural encounters, even with globalization, remains uneven and unequal, cultural citizenship does not, and should not be construed to, imply cultural congruency and equality. By its very character, cultural citizenship embodies cultural tension. The cultural citizen is constantly negotiating tense and culturally jolting terrains. What matters is not the absence of tension and shock, but the ability of the individual to withstand those shocks and tensions, and accommodate diverse cultures within a context (space) that acknowledges and affirms differences. Essentialist constructions of identity compromise this adaptability. There is need to acknowledge the complexity of "Africanness" and "Blackness" and the problematic of constructing and imposing a monolithic racialized, ethno-nationalistic identity. Echoing Allen Chun and Ien Ang from a different, but not fundamentally dissimilar context, the modalities of "Africanness" and "Blackness" among peoples of African descent in the Diaspora argue strongly against imposition of a "homogenizing discourse" that could "hinder a more truly transnational… cosmopolitan imagination."[22]

The globalization of the Black/African experiences compels cultural adaptability. Today, generations of

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19 Ibid, p1-2

20 Ommundsen, et.al, Cultural Citizenship, p10

21 Ibid

22 Wenche Ommundsen, "IN REN JIA COUNTRY: Negotiating Cultural Belonging in Diaspora." In Ommundsen, et. al, Cultural Citizenship, p189. see also,
   Allen Chun, "Fuck Chineseness: On the Ambiguities of Ethnicity as Culture as Identity." Boundary, 23 (2), 1996, p111-138; Ien Ang, On Not Speaking Chinese: Living between Asia and the West. London: Routledge, 2001

Africans in different parts of the world are immersed in, and reaping the fruits of, cosmopolitan, hybridized, cross-cultural citizenship, one defined by the acceptance, and celebration of complex identities. As Kanyana Mutombo, an African immigrant and head of the Swiss anti-racism group observed at the first European Conference on Anti-Racism, "We are Europeanized, we have adopted Western culture."[23] African immigrants across Europe: Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Switzerland and Russia are now actively embracing, and becoming rewarded and empowered by mastery of, local languages, culture and politics. They pursue social integration as opposed to establishing and maintaining "parallel societies". This is demonstrated in the rich cultural reenactments of African/homeland cultural traditions among African immigrant communities, such as the annual Igbo New Yam festival in Cologne, Germany.[24]

The willingness of African immigrants to both embrace local cultures, while also affirming homeland identities has yielded tremendous benefits. Moussa Diallo, a Danish-Malian bass player, singer and composer has won a prestigious Danish Music award in recognition of his impact on Danish rock and pop culture. He envisioned himself as, "a bridge builder between Denmark and Mali," and seeks to "make the rich culture of Mali visible."[25] In October 2007, Ricardo Lumengo, a native Angolan was elected Member of Parliament in Bern, Switzerland.[26] Another African migrant, Nyamo Sabani from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, was appointed Swedish Minister of Integration.[27] There is also the annual Miss Africa in Denmark contest which represents a "unifying celebration for Africans and Danes."[28] Austria elected its first Black councilor, Cameroon native, Marie-Edwige Hartig, member of the Linz City Council, in September 2009.[29] The city of Oslo, Norway has a Nigeria member of its City Council. Joaquim Crima, a native of Guinea, placed third in his bid to become Russia's first elected official of African descent. He ran for the Mayor of a small town in Volgograd in October 2009.[30] Also Felicienne Lusamba Villoz-Muamba, a member of the Cantonal Parliament in Bern, Switzerland, was originally from the Congo. She is the first and only African woman to be elected into a state parliament in Switzerland.[31] In October 2010, Ghanaian native and medical doctor, Peter Bossman was elected Mayor of Piran, a town in southwestern Slovenia, becoming the first Mayor of African origin in Eastern

23 The African Courier, April-May 2007, p20

24 Ibid, October-November 2010, p18

25 Ibid, April-May 2007, p46

26 Ibid, June-July 2009, p6

27 Ibid, April-May 2009, p28

28 Ibid, August-September 2009, p46

29 Ibid,, December-January 2009/10, p32

30 Ibid, p32

31 Ibid, October-November 2009, p28

Europe. He was elected on the platform of Slovenia's governing Center-Left Social Democratic Party. [32] In Poland, Nigerian native, John Abraham Godson was sworn into the Polish Lower House of Parliament in December 2010, becoming the first Parliamentarian of African descent in the country. His declared his priority as "the promotion of better relations between Poles and Africans." There is an estimated 4000 African immigrants in Poland.[33] Similarly, Obiri Mokini, another Nigerian won the 2010 "*Drei-Koenigs-Preis*" award for promoting integration in the German State of Brandenburg. He has worked tirelessly to promote "peaceful coexistence among people of different religions, cultures." His organization "*Cagintua e.V*" works for "better understanding between migrants and Germans through the promotion of cultural exchange."[34] In May 2011, Congolese native Elombo Bolayela was elected into parliament in the state of Bremen, Germany, occupying the highest political office ever attained by a person of African ancestry in Germany.[35] Also Nigerian born Ade Ogunyena was also voted into the City Council of Bremen in May 2011.[36]

Since its foundation in 2000, *Humanitas Africa* has focused on the dissemination of information, raising awareness, and building cultural bridges between African immigrants and the Czech population.[37]

I reference these developments across Europe to underscore that African immigrants seem to reject homogenized, race-based constructions of identity, the enduring challenges of racism, socio-economic and political marginalization in their respective contexts notwithstanding. They do not aspire for "ethnoscapes" or "parallel societies," but rather seem to embrace cosmopolitanism and cultural citizenship, determined to validate and celebrate their rich and complex cultural experiences and identities. They seem to function as "cultural bridges", demonstrated by periodic reenactments of homeland cultures and traditions, even as they strive, through literacy and language, to embrace local cultures. Rather than exist as "parallel societies" or enclaves of cultural antagonism, they consciously seek authentication in the cultural complexities of their environments. They endeavor to affirm and validate their complex identity. As Kenyan born Catherine Gathoni put it in her acceptance speech after winning the Miss Africa in Denmark crown, "Africa or Danish! Is it possible to be both or is it s matter of being either one of the other?" [38] Admitting to being torn between conflicting demands of dual nationality (Kenya and Denmark), between the demand to be "real Dane" and "real African", Gathoni declares; "I wish for a new kind of Danish

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32 Ibid, December-January 2010/11, p36

33 Ibid, February-March 2011, p22

34 Ibid, p40

35 Ibid, August-September 2011, p24

36 Ibid

37 Ibid, February-March 2009, p-----

38 Ibid, October-November 2008, p48

identity that will include my African identity. An identity where I can be proud to be Danish just as well as I can be proud to say that I am African."[39] This is precisely what cultural citizenship should approximate—the ability to engage and validate multiple experiences and cultures.

4. Conclusion

Gloracialization fosters ethno-centric cultural enclaves "parallel societies", zones of isolation. It is a cynical, zero-sum, absolutist paradigm which privileges racialized ethno-cultural identity, and dismisses "cultural citizenship" as inherently hegemonic and inimical to the interest of underprivileged and underrepresented groups. While a *gloracialized* worldview might serve a useful purpose in a specific domestic context (due to the peculiarities of history), the complexities of the broader global environment call for an equally nuanced response. There are complex modalities of "Africanness" and "Blackness". This reality itself argues strongly against rigid doctrinaire posturing. As cultural citizens and "ambassadors", blacks living among different nationalities and cultures must resist rigidly ideological and essentialist delineation of ethnic and cultural boundaries. As argued above, culture is a dynamic entity, some might say, *process*. Thus, citizenship and identity in an ever-changing and dynamic environment must reflect this dynamism. While the history of racism might justify, for some blacks, escapist and isolative cultural identities, contemporary transnational or post-national realities compel a much more cosmopolitan orientation, which does not necessarily obligate abandonment of inherited original identities and culture. Thus, *gloracialization* becomes anachronistic, whether in the United States or elsewhere. Regardless of past history and present conditions, blacks must engage *difference*, and consciously embrace the new cosmopolitanism. This facilitates cultural competency and enriches the self.

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Overcoming Emotions, Conquering Fate:
Reflections on Descartes's Ethics

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Emotions in Ethical Deliberations

In the history of the Western philosophical tradition, we find an abundance of ethical theories that aim to different extents at some degree of universality in moral deliberations as an exercise of the rational faculty. These ethical positions tend to rely on a sharp demarcation between reason and the emotions: rationality has usually received the elevated status as that which defines human beings, while the emotions and feelings seemed to signify a weakness, an incompleteness of the human condition which threatens not only our rationality but also the possibility of a moral life. The Stoics, for example, have defined the good life as one that is in complete control of the emotions, something understood to be "excessive impulses which are disobedient to reason."[1] Similarly for Kant, emotions were seen as inclinations enticing the will to act on motives other than that of duty as dictated by reason. Ethics has therefore been geared towards finding means to remedy the emotions so that they do not imperil human rationality. Such dichotomization of reason and emotions in moral deliberations has, however, come under scrutiny in the past few decades as a response to the question of whether a good life can really be achieved through the complete divorce from one's feelings or emotions such as love and joy. Also, more contemporary theorists of the emotions have argued that emotions are evaluative experiences closely related to one's beliefs and thoughts, hence to a certain extent a significant or even a crucial element of reason itself.[2] Regarding the emotions as an evaluative experience seems to necessitate taking into account numerous particular factors such as personal history, cultural environments, social norms, all of which significantly contribute to

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1 Arthur J. Pomeroy, *Arius Didymus: Epitome of Stoic Ethics* (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 1999), 65.

2 See, for example, Martha C. Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), and Robert C. Solomon, *Not Passion's Slave: Emotions and Choice* (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2007).

the construction of one's personality, psychology, and mental states. An ethical theory that incorporates human emotions and its various evaluative components as an aspect that has important moral implications seems to answer more comprehensively to the demands for a richer understanding of the diversity in moral deliberations.

This paper is an attempt to dip into the rich resource of the history of Western philosophy in order to uncover a fine example of an ethics uncharacteristic of its time, which has as its basis a universality of the human condition yet at the same time centers around the rational use of human emotions as a tool in achieving the good life. By dipping into this tradition, I hope to shed some light on a rather unknown and obscure yet crucial aspect of an all-too-important figure in the philosophical canon – the ethical thoughts of René Descartes. My interest in this issue grew out of a curiosity not only in the role of the emotions in moral deliberations for the reasons mentioned above, but also in the fact that the father of modern rationalism and the mind-body dualism himself proposed an emotion, "generosity" in particular, as the tool to achieve the greatest happiness that can be had in a good life in his last work, *The Passions of the Soul* (1649). This is even more surprising if we consider his proposal in the context of both the quest for knowledge in his time, when the development of the "New Science" was at its peak, and his other works such as the *Discourse on the Method* (1637) which rely heavily on a mechanistic analysis of the physical world with the goal of becoming "lords and masters of nature."[3] We find that Descartes's moral thoughts remarkably reveal a dimension of human life over which humans have no direct control, but is nonetheless a major obstacle in achieving the good life, namely, fate. It seems that in order to attain the good life and the highest happiness, it is not sufficient that humans become "lords and masters of nature." *The Passions of the Soul* proposes a solution that would render humans "lords and masters of the emotions" through the use of "generosity" so that humans are not affected by things that are beyond their control. I will begin with a brief account of Descartes's theory of the emotions, and proceed to an analysis of "vain desires" which Descartes considers to be a deficiency of the emotions and hence the cause of human dissatisfaction. I will then examine his proposed remedies for such deficiency through the reflection of divine providence and through the development and use of "generosity."

A Physiological Account of the Emotions

At this point, it might be useful to provide a brief account of Descartes's physiological account of the emotions, or what he calls the "passions of the soul."

Descartes made clear in the Prefatory Letters of The Passions of the Soul that he intended to explain

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3 René Descartes, *Discourse on the Method*, in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, Vol. 1, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 142-143.

the passions "only as a natural philosopher, and not as a rhetorician or even as a moral philosopher,"[4] so some technicality might not altogether be out of order here. Passions of the soul in the general sense are perceptions, which are a kind of thoughts. The passions of the soul in the restricted sense5, or the emotions, are perceptions that are caused by the body, are neural, and are "referred to the soul"[6] in similar ways that sensations such as heat are referred to external objects and appetites such as thirst or hunger are referred to the body. The passions are modes of the mind-body union which are caused by the movements or agitations of the "animal spirits"[7] through the arteries and nerves into the brain, thereby causing the "little gland" or the pineal gland[8] to move in certain ways corresponding to the different movements of the animal spirits. The soul or the mind feels and perceives this action, and further causes the animal spirits to enter the muscles in different ways, thereby generating actions in the body.

Despite the technicality, two important points need to be noted here. Firstly, the passions have a twofold function: they are an integral part of a "maintenance system" of the body that aims to ensure the survival of the mind-body union.[9] They are naturally good, and they "dispose the soul to want the things for which they prepare the body. Thus the feeling of fear moves the soul to want to flee, that of courage to want to fight, and similarly with the others."[10] Another function, more morally relevant, is that "It is on the passions alone that all the good and evil of this life depends."[11] Since the soul receives the passions "passively" as a result of the movements of the animal spirits and the pineal gland, it requires the will to act on those passions in a way that would generate a proper response to them in order not to "overreact."

It is thus through the control and correct use of the passions alone that humans, as mind-body composites, can attain happiness and a good life. The difficulty in doing so, however, emerges in the second point: in theorizing about the emotions or the passions, Descartes is not considering humans in terms of their distinct substances. As moral beings, humans are neither merely *res cogitans* or thinking things nor *res*

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4 René Descartes, *The Passions of the Soul*, 327.

5 Henceforth referred to as "the passions."

6 Although Descartes did not provide further explanations about the concept of "referring" to something, Stephen H. Voss suggests that "we 'refer' our perception to an object just in case we spontaneously judge that the action causing our perception is within that object."See René Descartes, *The Passions of the Soul*, trans. Stephen H. Voss, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), 30.

7 In article 10 of the *Passions*, Descartes defines the "animal spirits" as "the most lively and finest parts of the blood, which have been rarefied by the heat in the heart."
    See René Descartes, *The Passions of the Soul*, 331. (article 10)

8 See Ibid., article 32.

9 For a detailed analysis of this issue, see Amélie Rorty, "Descartes on Thinking with the Body," in *The Cambridge Companion to Descartes*, ed. John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 371-392.

10 René Descartes, *The Passions of the Soul*, 343. (article 40)

11 Ibid., 404. (article 212)

*extens*a or extended things. As subjects of emotions, genuine human beings are necessarily mind-body composites whose interactions are not perceived as "pure thoughts of a mind distinct from a body"[12] but as confused and obscure perceptions of mind and body united. The passions, as modes of the mind-body union, are not "clear and distinct," but rather "confused and obscure" thoughts[13] about which one cannot have absolutely certain, but only morally certain, knowledge that can be false. The mastery and correct use of the passions which alone leads to the moral development of a person therefore requires a process much more complex than a merely technical or physiological one.

Controlling the Passions

How exactly, then, are we supposed to go about controlling the passions? The key to the answer, I believe, lies in Descartes's emphasis on the role of desire in human actions. Since the passions alone "cannot lead us to perform any action except by means of the desire they produce,"[14] the "chief utility of morality" becomes a matter of controlling desires so that they conform to true knowledge rather than be swayed by errors. To Descartes, the error commonly committed with respect to desires is the failure to distinguish things that depend absolutely on us from things that do not depend on us in any way. Humans are, however, naturally inclined to have "vain desires" or desires for things that do not depend on us as a response to the impetus of the mind-body union to preserve itself. Yet since desires are passions which the soul receives passively, they can only be controlled in an indirect manner through the training of the will, that is, by controlling the effects that such passions have on us and our reactions to them. Descartes proposes two remedies for vain desires: the first is through the use of "generosity," and the second through "frequent reflection upon divine providence."[15] As reflection upon divine providence seems to be a necessary condition for the development and use of "generosity," and as Descartes's account of vain desires rests upon a distinction between things that depend on us and things that do not, let us first take a look at what it means to reflect upon divine providence:

> We should reflect upon the fact that nothing can possibly happen other than as Providence has determined from all eternity.
> Providence is … a fate or immutable necessity, … we can desire only what we consider in some way to be possible; and things which do not depend on us can be considered possibly only in so far

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12 René Descartes, "Letter to Regius, January 1642," in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, Vol. 3, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch and Anthony Kenny (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 206.

13 See René Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy*, 281. (article 190)

14 René Descartes, *The Passions of the Soul*, 379. (article 144)

15 See Ibid., 380. (article145)

as … we judge that they may happen and that similar things have happened at other times.[16]

Descartes's second remedy seems to coincide in some aspects with the Stoics' belief that in desiring something we consider the thing desired to be epistemologically possible, and that once we realize that it is not, since God did not will it to happen, such knowledge is sufficient to terminate our desire for it.

Yet Descartes's position seems somewhat more complex than the Stoics', as he recognizes not only that desires are future-directed, thus making their possibility not wholly predictable, but also that desires and other passions are not avoidable to the mind-body union in its attempt to protect and preserve itself.

We must therefore be cautious in separating out what depends only on us, and direct our desires only to them. As for things that do not depend on us, although they are to be regarded as "wholly fated and immutable" and thus not something we should direct our desires to, we must still consider the reasons that make them more or less predictable in order to use them as guidance for our actions. Consider Descartes's example:

> …suppose we have business in some place to which we might travel by two different routes, one usually much safer than the other. And suppose providence decrees that if we go by the route we regard as safer we shall not avoid being robbed, whereas we may travel by the other route without any danger. Nevertheless, we should not be indifferent as to which one we choose, or rely upon the immutable fatality of this decree. Reason insists that we choose the route which is usually the safer and our desire in this case must be fulfilled when we have followed this route, whatever evil may befall us; for, since any such evil was inevitable from our point of view, we had no reason to wish to be exempt from it: we had reason only to do the best that our intellect was able to recognize…[17]

Descartes seems to suggest here that despite our disappointment due to the frustration of our desires, we can still gain satisfaction by following reason's dictates, which is our most valuable asset. What becomes apparent in the above example is that for Descartes, the acceptance of divine providence does not mean a complete surrender to fate without a rational consideration or decision. We still have to use our best ability in thinking or reasoning about possible outcomes by using past events as our source of information. Should our estimation of the future be wrong, we can still gain satisfaction from the fact that we have attempted to reason as best as we possibly could and have resolutely followed the dictates of reason in carrying out an action.

16 Ibid. 380. (article 145)

17 Ibid., 380-381. (article 146)

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Although a "complete satisfaction" can be attained by limiting desire only to things whose fulfillment is up to us only, it is also to be noted that such limitation or control is not as much directed towards the objects of our desire as it is to our reactions or responses to them. Reflection upon divine providence helps us in accepting that whatever happens, happens necessarily because it is the will of an omnipotent God who is supremely good. However, God's omnipotence does not guarantee that all our desires will be fulfilled. I propose that Descartes's second remedy of vain desires through the reflection upon divine providence serves to help us gain "complete satisfaction" not merely by limiting what we desire, but much more importantly by controlling our passions that are related to sadness, which include regret, remorse, and repentance,[18] all of which tend to arise when our desires are frustrated. We may then see that the major obstacle to human satisfaction or happiness turns out not to be vain desires, but rather regret, remorse, and repentance,[19] which differ from desire in that these three passions arise through reasoning about alternative possibilities such as what might have happened had we chosen a different course of action. Reflecting upon divine providence is a fitting remedy not because it terminates all of our desires, but because it reminds us that we could not have chosen otherwise, and thereby undercuts the basis of the concepts of regret, remorse, and repentance.[20]

What remains to be observed is that the control of the passions, especially of desire, by minimizing the possibility of regret, remorse, and repentance seems to be a remedy of the symptoms or the outcomes of vain desires more than of their cause, since it primarily addresses the effects of the frustration of our desires. Reflection upon divine providence alone does not prevent us from being affected by stimuli that may arouse desires. It is rather Descartes's first remedy, that of developing and using "generosity," that addresses the causes of vain desires, to which I will now proceed.

On "Generosity"

"Generosity" is first and foremost a passion, an emotion, which through habituation becomes a virtue. The virtue of "generosity" is both key to the other virtues and a remedy for the defects of the passions, which are crucial elements for one's emotional well-being as well as moral development. It closely

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18 See Ibid., 402 (article 209), 392 (article 177), and 396 (article 191) for definitions of these passions respectively.

19 Descartes wrote to Princess Elizabeth in his letter dated August 4, 1645, that "nothing can impede our contentment except desire and regret or repentance; but if we always do whatever our reason tells us, even if events show us afterwards that we have gone wrong, we will never have any grounds for repentance, because it was not our own fault." See René Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, Vol. 3, 258.

20 An unavoidable question that Descartes's second remedy raises is whether humans can be said to have free will if every event is ascribed to God's will. For an excellent discussion on this issue, see Deborah J. Brown, *Descartes and the Passionate Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 165-187.

combines the highest power of the will with the disposition to use that will well.

Descartes defines "generosity" as a legitimate self-esteem, which seems to a certain extent to echo Aristotle's notion of megalopsychia or magnanimity. The main difference between the two seems to be Descartes's affinity with the Stoics in holding that virtue is in no way dependent on fortune.In article 54 of The Passions of the Soul, Descartes mentions "magnanimity" as a kind of esteem. In the history of ideas, magnanimity has been closely tied to the notion of legitimate self-esteem. Aristotle defined virtue or moral excellence as a habitual action according to the right reasons, which is the ground for legitimate self-esteem.[21] A magnanimous person esteems his own excellence which consists of the unity of the virtues (prudence, temperance, justice, and courage) and the proper use of the virtues according to the golden mean, neither too excessively nor too meagerly. Since magnanimous people gain satisfaction through themselves without having to rely on others, they tend not to be self-consumed but generous to others, and they tend not to take excessive pride in their own goodness. Such people, according to Aristotle, deserve the highest reward for humans, which is proper honor. Magnanimity is therefore deemed the "crown of the virtues."

In mentioning "magnanimity" as a kind of self-esteem in article 54, it is generally understood that Descartes subscribes to the ancient Greek's definition of the virtues and the relationship between the virtues and self-esteem.
However, in article 153, Descartes makes a sudden shift to the word "generosity" to refer to such virtue. His definition has two components, as follows:

> The first consists in knowing that nothing truly belongs to him but this freedom to dispose his volitions, and that he ought to be praised or blamed for no other reason than his using this freedom well or badly. The second consists in his feeling within himself a firm and constant resolution to use it well – that is, never to lack the will to undertake and carry out whatever he judges to be best. To do that is to pursue virtue in a perfect manner.[22]

"Generosity" has, according to this definition, both a cognitive and a conative component. The cognitive component consists of knowledge of the will's freedom and value, and the conative component of feeling within oneself a firm and constant resolution to use the will well in carrying out actions that one judges

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21 See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1999), 18. (Book II, Chapter I, 1103a14-25)

22 René Descartes, *The Passions of the Soul*, 384. (article 153)

to be best.[23] On the surface, this definition does not seem to divert drastically from that of magnanimity to necessitate a change of terms, since magnanimity also includes in it the idea that only actions resulting from the use of a free will deserves legitimate esteem. The question remains as to what "generosity" is supposed to convey that "magnanimity" does not.

Brown[24] and Cottingham[25] have suggested that the significance of Descartes's change of terms from "magnanimity" to "generosity" does not really lie in the difference in meanings. Rather, it depicts a genuine shift in emphasis in the ancient, traditional conception of the virtues. That is to say, the notion of *phronesis* or practical wisdom has acquired a level of importance distinctive from that in the ancient account, and it is in the second part of Descartes's definition of "generosity" above that this distinction becomes apparent – acting with a firm and constant resolution to use the will well. We may say, then, that Descartes's notion of "generosity" is a prominent example of the tendency in modern ethics to distance itself from the ancient emphasis on the unity of virtues and increasingly lean towards the conception that a decision based on a firm and resolute judgment is at the heart of the virtues. Although Descartes himself never undermined the importance of knowledge in the development of the virtues, especially in his earlier works, his diversion to an increasing emphasis on a firm and constant resolution to use the will well can nevertheless be detected in The Passions of the Soul.[26] His justifications appear in many of the Letters which express that the value of our actions do not rest on a moral judgment based on pure knowledge as moral situations do not usually allow us to employ any knowledge more certain than probability.

The possibility of error in our reasoning is no ground for blame if we had carried out that action through the good use of the will, that is, by resolutely acting according to what we judge to be best. Consider the following letter to Princess Elizabeth:

> It is also not necessary that our reason should be free from error; it is sufficient if our conscience testifies that we have never lacked resolution and virtue to carry out whatever we have judged the best course. So virtue by itself is sufficient to make us content in this life.[27]

As mind-body composites that perceive the passions only confusedly and obscurely, humans' quest for the good life is based on probability or "moral certainty" rather than on "absolute certainty." Moral

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23 See Brown, *Descartes and the Passionate Mind*, 190.

24 Ibid., 191.

25 John Cottingham, *Philosophy and the Good Life* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 99-100.

26 See, for example, *The Passions of the Soul*, 390. (article 170)

27 René Descartes, "Letter to Princess Elizabeth, 4 August 1645," in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, Vol. 3, 258.

certainty is certainty which is "sufficient to regulate our behavior, or which measures up to the certainty we have on matters relating to the conduct of life which we never normally doubt, though we know that it is possible, absolutely speaking, that they may be false."[28] Absolute certainty, on the other hand, arises when we believe that "it is wholly impossible that something should be otherwise than we judge it to be."[29] It rests on a metaphysical foundation – on God's omnipotence and the infallibility of the faculty he gave us for distinguishing truth from falsehood. Such absolute certainty, nevertheless, has no place in moral deliberation, for Descartes is here not considering humans as mere thinking things, but as genuine human beings, as mind-body composites. Since the passions, which are modes of this composite, can only be perceived confusedly and obscurely, any knowledge that we may derive from them can thus be at best morally but never absolutely certain. Yet for Descartes, such moral certainty is sufficient for moral deliberation.

Generosity is a type of esteem and love and joy directed at oneself. Through self-esteem, one comes to feel love and joy towards oneself. Unlike pride, generosity is legitimate self-esteem. The question that remains to be asked is: how can this legitimate self-esteem remedy the defects or the disorder of the passions? The passions of the soul, as stated earlier, are caused by actions in the body, i.e, the movements of the animal spirits and the pineal gland. Such a movement is naturally joined to a certain "thought" (such as "this dog is scary") and results in a certain passion (such as fear) which causes the soul to want the person to flee.
A passion is defective when it causes an unreasonable overreaction. Such defect, says Descartes, can be fixed either by habitually attending the will to other thoughts so as to alter the movements in the body, or to habitually separate the movements from the thought and employing the will in joining them to others so as to produce a different passion. Such acts of habituation cannot be undertaken without the recognition of our own free will and the firm and constant resolution to use it well, in this case to control the unruly passions. In other words, generosity is required in fixing the defects of the passions. Moreover, when we have successfully applied the will to fix the disorders of the passions, we esteem ourselves in having done so (a thought), which in turn affects the movements in the body in ways that help strengthen and maintain the passion of generosity itself even further, and eventually transforming it into a virtue once it becomes a habit.[30] Generosity is a remedy of the causes of vain desires in the sense that it helps restrict what we may esteem or value to only what is entirely up to us, namely our free will and our good use of it. A generous person

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28 René Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy*, 289. (article 205)

29 Ibid., 290. (article 206)

30 "…if we occupy ourselves frequently in considering the nature of free will and the many advantages which proceed from a firm resolution to make good use of it – while also considering, on the other hand, the many vain and useless cares which trouble ambitious people – we may arouse the passion of generosity in ourselves and then acquire the virtue." See René Descartes, *The Passions of the Soul*, 388. (article 160)

therefore has no contempt, envy, fear, or anger towards others since such emotions are closely tied to valuing things that are not entirely up to us. A generous person also has no vain desires since she does not esteem or value things that are not up to her. She does not regard herself as inferior or superior to anyone, is humble, since she recognizes the presence of free will in others as well.

Emotions in Descartes' Ethics

What, then, are we supposed to make of Descartes's ethics? What does it have to offer us? An obvious and blunt answer to this seems to be an opportunity to reevaluate the role of the emotions in moral reasonings, the inseparable relationship between reason and the emotions in attaining the good life, and the need to incorporate what might be seen as individual character traits into the realm of ethics. But this is not distinctive to Descartes alone. Rather, by positioning the passions or the emotions at the center of his ethical thoughts, Descartes seems to underscore the role of the body in ethical thinking. Although ultimately emotions are thoughts, they are not disembodied thoughts as they receive their impetus from the body. In order to comprehend diverse responses in moral situations, different specificities that contribute to the construction of the body may need to be taken into account. Furthermore, by acknowledging the difficulty in requiring absolute certainty in moral deliberations of humans as *humans*, and not merely as thinking, rational beings, Descartes's ethics fully recognizes not only the practical limitations of human beings, but also the unpredictability and arbitrariness of the world which bears upon them. An ethics that leaves room for human limitations and errors seems to be more realistic to the human condition and more favorable to the actual attainment of the good life. Finally, by proposing reflection upon divine providence and "generosity" as remedies for the defects of the emotions, Descartes's ethics can be regarded as an "inward turn," that is, from the ideal of being "lords and masters of nature" to being lords and masters of our own emotions, of ourselves. The fact that *The Passions of the Soul* was Descartes's last work may reveal to us that conquering nature through the New Science did not necessarily bring about happiness or a good life. There are and will always be things that are beyond human domination, and they tend to cause the gravest unhappiness to those whose desire for control is directed outward. By attempting instead to conquer one's emotion, Descartes's ethics tends towards an ethic of active resignation rather than of dominance, an ethic of character rather than of pure reason. I would like to end this paper with a final quote from Descartes's letter to Chanut, dated June 15, 1646, which, I believe, best illustrates my last point: "So instead of finding ways to preserve life, I have found another, much easier and surer way, which is not to fear death."[31]

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31 René Descartes, "Letter to Chanut, 15 June 1646," in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, Vol. 3, 289.

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