Because the definition of tragedy makes the catharsis of pity(eleos) and fear(phobos) essential to the genre, the plots of tragedies are best structured in such a way as to represent the kinds of actions that are best suited to arouse those emotions. ...
Because the definition of tragedy makes the catharsis of pity(eleos) and fear(phobos) essential to the genre, the plots of tragedies are best structured in such a way as to represent the kinds of actions that are best suited to arouse those emotions. A good tragedy should not depict the fall of decent men from good fortune into misfortune, since this does not excite pity or fear, but is miaron, “disgusting,” literally “dirty” or “polluted,” provoking feelings of shock or revulsion. This evidently constitutes the opposite of catharsis, whether we take that term to mean “cleansing,” “purification,” “purgation” or “clarification.”
The Poetics also specifically connects catharsis with mimēsis: the pleasure proper to tragedy(oikeia hēdonē) is “the pleasure that comes from pity and fear by means of representation.” Aristotle distinguishes between feeling pity and fear because of real events(which is not pleasant), and feeling these emotions because of a representation(which is pleasant). This distinction is confirmed by 1448b10-12: we derive pleasure from looking at representations even of things that are in actuality painful to contemplate, like the most despised animals and corpses; these objects are “impure” – once again evoking the idea of catharsis.
Aristotle’s response to Plato’s attack on poetry is also a response to Plato’s view of the emotions. Indeed, when Socrates challenges those defenders of poetry “who are not poets but love poetry” to prove in prose that poetry is beneficial to society, Plato may already have had Aristotle in mind. One of Plato’s main objections to mimetic poetry is that it can nourish emotions – such as pity, lust and indignation – which would be better suppressed or restrained by the reasoning part of the soul. Mimetic and dramatic poetry is dangerous because the arousal of such emotions may make it difficult to restrain them in one’s everyday circumstances, putting the appetitive part of the soul in charge. Even the temporary experience of being under the control of such emotions can permanently affect the soul of the spectator, since nurturing feelings of pity for others’ sufferings on the stage makes it difficult to restrain such a reaction toward one’s own misfortunes in life.
If Aristotle’s theory of catharsis is to hold, he needs to refute Plato on this point. Aristotle explains tragic catharsis by comparing it with the healing of people suffering from ecstatic outbreaks of emotion(enthousiasmos); these people are cured by “cathartic songs,” which excite their souls and thereby relieve their excessive emotions. Jakob Bernays argued that the catharsis which we obtain from watching a tragedy operates similarly, arousing and releasing undesirable feelings of pity and fear. The weakness of his approach is his assumption that Aristotle held the same wholly negative opinion of the emotions that Bernays attributes to Plato, and would therefore regard them as needing to be cleaned out periodically. Aristotle recognized that well‑balanced emotional reactions are a crucial factor in making correct choices(prohairesis) and thus in forming and maintaining a settled good character(ēthos). Sometimes one should feel such emotions as pity, anger or fear, if they are felt towards the right object, to the proper degree, in the correct way and at the right time. Proper compassion, justified anger and the right degree of courage can and should affect moral choice. We must feel the emotions rightly for the circumstances: if we have too much fear, we are cowardly; if too little, we are foolhardy. Only if we feel the correct amount of fear relative to the situation do we attain courage. Virtue lies in our having such appropriate reactions, reaching the mean between the extremes relative to ourselves.
A disposition to feel emotion correctly in this way is essential to the development of good character. If we force ourselves to act justly, but in fact long to act otherwise, we are self‑controlled(enkrateis) but not fully virtuous, since our desires are not in tune with our actions. Just as we become good by habitually doing good, until good action becomes a “second nature” to us, so too by feeling emotion appropriately we become habituated to having the correct emotional responses. Because the emotions also have a cognitive component, such reactions help us to take the correct decisions, so that we approach nearer to the virtuous mean.