This research project deals with the latest legal issues concerning damages for violation of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act(hereinafter “Monopoly Regulation Law”). Suppose that there are companies which supply the same kind of competing pr ...
This research project deals with the latest legal issues concerning damages for violation of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act(hereinafter “Monopoly Regulation Law”). Suppose that there are companies which supply the same kind of competing products in the market agreed to price-fixing cartel in which they raise prices above competitive levels. Legal issues here involve following questions: who has a standing to sue the perpetrator? What are the specific contents of the compensation for damage? In regard to foreign experiences, domestic debates, and legal cases, there are at least four issues involved in this subject matter. First, does the Monopoly Regulation Law not only ensure the public institution of competitive order, but also protect private interest of the participants in the market. Second, Who has the standing to bring damages actions under the Article 56 of Monopoly Regulation Law: competitors, direct purchasers or indirect purchasers? Third, when the claimant passed the overchage on to the subsequent purchaser, is the defendant allowed to assert a passing-on defense? Finally, in order to achieve the objective of deterring cartel, should the claimant be allowed to request a Civil Law remedies such as restitution?
Above all, as to the purpose of it, there is no doubt that Monopoly Regulation Law performs public function which establishes sound competition order of what it ought to be. Nonetheless, in order for the establishment of the competitive order not fall into the trap of being void and abstract, promoting the ideal of protecting the private right of those participating in the market cannot be excluded. In other words, the Monopoly Regulation Law pursues both ideals: First, it intends to ensure fair and competitive market order. Second, it also intends to protect the private interest participating in the market. In Korea, these aspects are well manifested in all the civil sanctions of Monopoly Regulation law, i.e. the liability for the compensation of damage. In respect of this purpose, the standing for the damages claims according to Liability for Damages rule under the Article 56 of Monopoly Regulation Law should not be limited to competitor who actually compete with the price-fixing cartel violater. Moreover, the law should be interpreted to permit the indirect purchaser who is the customer of the direct purchaser the standing to sue for damages. In this research project, the researchers argue that the conclusion is consistent with comparative study with the United States, the European Union and Germany, and also is consistent with the function of compensation and prevention of damages.
Subsequently, as long as the standing of indirect purchaser is recognized with regard to passing-on defence, damages of overcharge which direct purchaser shifted onto indirect purchaser are included in claim for damages against cartel infringer. And, logically, there is a possibility of excess compensation or double responsibility risk. Even though the federal legal system of the United States allowed passing-on defence, they recognized applications of passing-on defence within limited required facts. Limited required facts are as follows. (i) The reasonableness of cartel infringer and passing-on damages. (ii) The first purchaser shall not have further loss in terms of operating income. Although there are some differences in expressions, this tendency is accepted in the courts of both the European Union and the Germany. The comparative legal experience of a rigorous application for passing-on defence is considered suitable for the following reason. (i) Tightening function for the violations of Monopoly Regulation Law by compensation for damage (ii) The claim for damages of indirect purchaser is difficult to prove in practice because of difficulties in proving a causal relationship, calculation of damages, negligibility of damages, thus double responsibility risk of cartel infringer is theoretically possible but not likely to happen. Recently, Supreme Court of Korea decided in a similar stand.
(Supreme Court Decision 2010Da93790 Decided November 29, 2011).
Finally, this research project emphasized the necessity of requiring the restitution of the profit earned from the illegal practice by cartel infringer in order to achieve the purpose of deterring the violations of Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act. This conclusion may require many explanations and legal grounds for legal professionals who are used to the dualism of public-private law. But this conclusion is considered obvious by public legal sentiment. Apparently, it is not suitable to presume the profit of cartel infringers as equivalent to the damages of victims, as the intellectual property laws provide with regard to similar cases, considering the violation of the Monopoly Regulation Law. But this research project emphasizes the collective redress procedures of the legal right of many victims who incurred a small amount of damages, and furthermore this research project emphasizes the necessity of tightening inhibitory function by the adoption of aggravated damages when hard core of Monopoly Regulation Law occurs.