Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are generally defined as integrations of computation, networking, and physical processes. They monitor and interact with physical processes, usually with feedback loops where physical processes affect computations and vic ...
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are generally defined as integrations of computation, networking, and physical processes. They monitor and interact with physical processes, usually with feedback loops where physical processes affect computations and vice versa. CPSs are heterogeneous by nature, because the integration of heterogeneous technologies has enabled the emergence of the CPSs. To make CPSs safe and reliable, not only the cyber components such as embedded computing systems but also the physical components such as mechanical systems should be designed and manufactured without defect and the embedded systems are required to be regularly updated to fix latent bugs in embedded software.
We have been resolved criminal issues arising from defective product via the theory of criminal product liability. CPSs that have been developed as consumer products could be considered as a sort of manufactured product, but it could not be expected that the theory of criminal product liability would also bring about a satisfactory resolution for the case of defective CPSs. According to the theory of criminal product liability, there is a duty upon a manufacturer to design and manufacture a defect-free product. But most if not all software contains serious flaws and defects and it has been acknowledged that it is impossible to develop a software product that is entirely free of flaws and defects. Considering that software defects should be treated as unforeseeable risks of harm, it would be very difficult to argue that, for example, accidents caused by latent software defects in cyber-physical vehicle systems such as autonomous cars are attributable to the manufacturer and he should be held criminal responsible for the failure of CPVSs.
Regulations regarding protection of information privacy in the internet would be also insufficient, because there could be plenty of CPSs that are not connected to the internet. Problems caused by attack and invasion of the computer information network system has been generally discussed in the light of data privacy protection, but the safety and legal liability issues of CPSs encompass not only the privacy protection of their users, but also the protection of very personal, legally protected interest such as human life, bodily integrity, and property. Attack and protection mechanisms of CPSs are also somewhat different to those of traditional IT systems. Every component, namely cyber, physical, and cyber-physical components including their integration, can be a potential target of criminal malicious misuse. To deal with the increasing risk arising from attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in CPSs, we maybe need a new legal, crimianl framework that incorporates the key features of CPSs.
Critical CPSs such as medical devices should be designed to allow software updates to fix latent failures and bugs in the computational process, and it could be required to impose criminal duties on manufacturers to supply security updates to ensure their reliability and safety. But it would not be reasonable to demand that all the manufacturers of CPSs should take such a responsibility. Complex, large scale CPSs such as intelligent transportation system, smart grid and smart building need proactive protection and fast restoration to prevent system failure. In regulating risks associated with such CPSs, criminal law should not function retrospectively but prospectively to mitigate physical or cyber incidents.