Republicanism is a conception of political philosophy whose origins are retroactively traced to Aristotle, and it is recently revived by P. Pettit, F. Lovett, Q. Skinner, M. Viroli and J. Pocock. Petit, in particular, is thought to provide the most sy ...
Republicanism is a conception of political philosophy whose origins are retroactively traced to Aristotle, and it is recently revived by P. Pettit, F. Lovett, Q. Skinner, M. Viroli and J. Pocock. Petit, in particular, is thought to provide the most systematic form of neo-Roman republicanism, which takes freedom as non-domination as the supreme political value, and denies traditional Aristotelian republicanism of civic virtue and active political engagement. These neo-Roman Republicans argue that the republican combination of autonomy and publicity can end the long-standing debate of liberalism and communitarianism. Republicanism does not advocate a specific conception of good life, unlike communitarism, so it can be consistent with pluralism of modern society, and it can overcom the poverty of liberalism, which is based on the concept of freedom as non-interference.
On the other hand, criticism of the concept of freedom as non-domination and republicanism based on this concept has also been steadily raised. C. Sainz, I. Carter, M. H. Kramer, G. Lang, and Lee Myung-soon argue that there is virtually no difference between republican freedom and liberal freedom, and that the latter, like the former, can also be sensitive to domination. In the same vein, J. Christman and C. Larmore find it difficult to find a difference in republicanism and liberal equality. Meanwhile, V. Bader and Kwak Joon-hyuk also express worries that the monistic tendency of republicanism, which regards freedom as non-domination as the supreme political ideal, is difficult to be compatible with the pluralism of modern society.
Looking at the active discussion about freedom as non-domination and republicanism based on it, one gets the impression that the vigor has been somewhat weekened due to the inherent limitations of the concept of freedom as non-domination. By reformulating the concept of freedom as non-domination, this study aims to revive Republicans’ valid intuition in a more solid form, thereby renewing the idea of the public and political community as an alternative. If republicanism does not establish itself as another considerable alternative at a time when commutariam is declining and resonating, public debate on democracy risks idling helplessly in an unsatisfactory form of liberalism. As the theoretical resources of discussion based on the basic concepts of liberalism such as fairness, impartiality, and rights are gradually exhausted, the public debate of democracy today seems to be imbued with disorientation, timidity, and lethargy. This work begins with the idea that one possible alternative to overcoming this situation lies in republicanism based on the concept of freedom as non-domination. However, it seems that the current debate on republicanism does not show as much productivity as expected by failing to elaborate enough on the concept of domination. Therefore, this study, on the one hand, carries out fundamental historical reflections that encompass the Athenian and neo-Roman traditions of republicanism, on the other hand, take into account various political philosophical positions aimed at overcoming liberalism, i.e. the capability-centered approach of A. Sen, republicanism of M. Sandel, recognition theory of Honneth. This process also involves analyzing the position of liberal equality, represented by J. Rawls, in conjunction with republicanism.