필자는 이 논문에서 도날드 데이비슨이 자신의 획기적 논문 "행위, 이유, 그리고 원인"(ACR) 에서 옹호했던 중심 논제, 즉, 이유설명이 일종의 인과적 설명이라는 논제에 이의를 제기한다. 필자는 이 논제를 옹호하는 데이비슨의 주장이 두 가지 면에서 결점을 가지고 있 ...

필자는 이 논문에서 도날드 데이비슨이 자신의 획기적 논문 "행위, 이유, 그리고 원인"(ACR) 에서 옹호했던 중심 논제, 즉, 이유설명이 일종의 인과적 설명이라는 논제에 이의를 제기한다. 필자는 이 논제를 옹호하는 데이비슨의 주장이 두 가지 면에서 결점을 가지고 있음을 보인다: 1) 그 주장은 의도적 행위에 관한 부정확한 정의를 수반하고 있으며 2) 의도에 대해 지니고 있었던 비합리적 편견위에 근거하고 있다. 필자는 이러한 결점들을 드러내고 아울러 "행동 속의 의도(intentions-in-action)" 라는 개념을 결정적으로 사용하는 이유설명에 대한 하나의 완전한 분석을 제시한다. 필자가 제시하는 이 분석은ACR의 중심주제가 오류임을 입증한다: 이유 설명은 일종의 인과적 설명이 아니다.

In this paper I challenge the central thesis that Donald Davidson championed in his landmark article Actions Reasons, and Causes (ARC), the thesis that reason explanations are a species of causal explanation. I show that Davidson’s argument for that t ...

In this paper I challenge the central thesis that Donald Davidson championed in his landmark article Actions Reasons, and Causes (ARC), the thesis that reason explanations are a species of causal explanation. I show that Davidson’s argument for that thesis is flawed in two respects: 1) it involves an incorrect definition of intentional action and 2) it is based upon an irrational prejudice against intentions. In addition to exposing these flaws, I provide a complete analysis of reason explanations, one that makes crucial use of the concept of intentions-in-action. The analysis I provide demonstrates that the central thesis of ARC is false: reason explanations are not a species of causal explanation.

In the early 1960s there raged a debate within philosophical circles over the corect understanding of reason explanations, the form of explanation used to understand or explain intentional actions. Do such explanations function conceptually in the sam ...

In the early 1960s there raged a debate within philosophical circles over the corect understanding of reason explanations, the form of explanation used to understand or explain intentional actions. Do such explanations function conceptually in the same way that causal explanations do or are they fundamentally different By the latter half of the decade, this debate had largely subsided, and virtually everyone concerned now agrees that the decisive factor in ending this debate was the publication of Donald Davidsons Actions, Reasons, and Causes (ARC) in 1963.

Rarely has a single article been so influential or effective in settling a philosophical debate. However, while its influence upon the field is unquestionable, a careful reading of ARC suggests that its influence ought to be a source of embarrassment rather than inspiration, for as I show in this project, the central argument of ARC, that reason explanations are a species of causal explanation, is deeply flawed. Indeed, I show that Davidsons argument for the central thesis of ARC rests crucially upon an unjustified ontological prejudice against intentions. The central argument of ARC is cogent only insofar as we fail to see, or choose to ignore, the role of intentions in intentional action; and Davidson succeeded in persuading a generation of philosophers to accept a causal analysis of reason explanations precisely by obfuscating and diverting attention away from a correct understanding of the role of intentions in intentional action.

I this project I seek to remedy the situation by both exposing the flaw in the argument for the view that reason explanations are causal explanations and by providing a complete analysis of reason explanations that makes no use of the concept of causality. The positive argument of this project provides solid grounds for denying that reason explanations are causal explanations.

One of the main theses defended in this project is that reason explanations are not a species of causal explanation and, hence, that they provide no information on the causal history of intentional actions. This is not to say that intentional actions ...

One of the main theses defended in this project is that reason explanations are not a species of causal explanation and, hence, that they provide no information on the causal history of intentional actions. This is not to say that intentional actions do not have causes, but only that reason explanations do not inform us of their causes. The defence of this thesis is likely to have significant implications for the philosophy of action, the philosophy mind, and cognitive science. In particular, this thesis forces philosophers to rethink a major doctrine of 20th century analytic philosophy and also adds to the growing stock of considerations leading researchers to reconsider the significance of folk-psychological terminology. For if reason explanations provides no specific information on the causal history of the intentional actions that they explain, of what value are reason-explanations to the science of the human mind