본 연구는 대리인 이론 관점에서 미국의 12개 대기업(Air Products, Albany International, Corning, Dupont, GE, IBM, Johnson and Johnson, Kodak, Mead-Westvaco, Sealed Air, Shell Chemical, 3M)과 한국기반 대기업의 조직 앙트라프러뉴십을 비교한 연구로 기업의 혁 ...

본 연구는 대리인 이론 관점에서 미국의 12개 대기업(Air Products, Albany International, Corning, Dupont, GE, IBM, Johnson and Johnson, Kodak, Mead-Westvaco, Sealed Air, Shell Chemical, 3M)과 한국기반 대기업의 조직 앙트라프러뉴십을 비교한 연구로 기업의 혁신 프로젝트 조직에서 나타나는 대리인 위험요소를 두 국가 기반의 기업을 중심으로 살펴보았다.
기존의 대리인 이론에서 설명하던 대리인 위험 문제를 혁신 프로젝트 기반에서 살펴본 결과 미국의 경우보다는 한국기업의 사례에서 그 위험요소가 적은 것으로 나타났다. 기업문화의 특성으로 인해 한국 사례에서의 대리인들은 실패에 대한 위험을 적게 느끼고 있었으며, 비공식적, 개인적인 커뮤니케이션이 빈번하여 주인과 대리인 사이에서 나타날 수 있는 대리인 문제가 적은 것으로 나타났다. 특히 혁신 프로젝트와 같은 위험이 높고, 불확실성이 높은 상황에서의 모니터링은 감시를 위한 모니터링 보다는 코칭 및 가이드를 기반으로 한 모니터링 방법이 효과적인 것으로 나타났으며, 금전적인 인센티브를 대리인에게 지불하는 것보다 프로젝트 조직에서는 프로젝트의 결과로 인해 얻을 수 있는 부정적인 요인들을 제거해 주는 것이 조직 앙트라프러뉴십에 더욱 효과적인 방법임을 발견하였다.

We examine agency relationships between managers and project team leaders in corporate entrepreneurship activities in twelve U.S.-based corporations and one Korean-based firm. Our multicase analysis suggests that agency risks are lower in the Korean c ...

We examine agency relationships between managers and project team leaders in corporate entrepreneurship activities in twelve U.S.-based corporations and one Korean-based firm. Our multicase analysis suggests that agency risks are lower in the Korean company due to close, frequent interactions between principals and agents, and low fear of failure. While agency theory would predict this should lead to lower need for monitoring and incentives, we found high levels of both in the Korean firm. These results suggest that interests may align when there is high guidance-based monitoring and incentives that are accompanied by low consequences of failure.

We examine agency relationships between managers and project team leaders in corporate entrepreneurship activities in twelve U.S.-based corporations and one Korean-based firm. Our multicase analysis suggests that agency risks are lower in the Korean c ...

We examine agency relationships between managers and project team leaders in corporate entrepreneurship activities in twelve U.S.-based corporations and one Korean-based firm. Our multicase analysis suggests that agency risks are lower in the Korean company due to close, frequent interactions between principals and agents, and low fear of failure. While agency theory would predict this should lead to lower need for monitoring and incentives, we found high levels of both in the Korean firm. These results suggest that interests may align when there is high guidance-based monitoring and incentives that are accompanied by low consequences of failure.

Agency theory has been criticized for being too narrow and restrictive to particular contexts (Wright et al., 2001; Phan and Yoshikawa, 2000). These restrictions call into question the ability of agency theory to explain diverse situations such as inn ...

Agency theory has been criticized for being too narrow and restrictive to particular contexts (Wright et al., 2001; Phan and Yoshikawa, 2000). These restrictions call into question the ability of agency theory to explain diverse situations such as innovation-based corporate entrepreneurship and different national settings. We believe, however, that agency theoretical principals provide a useful lens for exploring these contexts. Yet rather than assume there will be agency risks, and that monitoring and incentive practices are therefore necessary, we may view monitoring and incentive practices as explaining lower agency risks. But in order to do this, agency theory would need to account for the particular nature of monitoring. Guidance-based monitoring may act as a better preventive than practices aimed at observation and assessment, as extended agency perspectives emphasize (Hendry, 2002). These practices could be built into an innovation program at the outset. In addition, incentives need to account for both the downsides and upsides of entrepreneurial activities. Removing disincentives may be a necessary first step in motivating an entrepreneur to achieve management's goals.
Future research could extend our insights on monitoring and incentives. As our data suggests, the Korean organization combines high guidance with high involvement, while entrepreneurs in the U.S. tend to value independence coupled with advice when needed. In addition, while the Korean organization provides high upside rewards, with less concern about the downsides, the U.S.-based companies tended to be more concerned with reducing the downside, seemingly convinced the intrinsic and intangible upsides are sufficient. Additional studies could examine further the role of advisors to entrepreneurs, and the balance of removing disincentives versus providing incentives in entrepreneurship across organizations and national cultures.
We recognize several limitations in our study that provide additional opportunities for future research. While we have examined twelve U.S.-based companies across a diversity of industries, we only examined one Korean company. We intend to extend our research to additional Korean-based corporations, to distinguish between company practices and national culture. Future research could extend this study to other Asian countries, and to countries beyond the U.S. and Asia.
In addition, we focused on agency theory for this study. Additional theories should be employed to broaden the lens through which we examine corporations embedded in different cultures. Stewardship theory, for example, represents a more recent effort to explain relationships where agents have motives aligned with principals, and who meet their personal needs by pursuing organizational objectives (Davis, Shoorman, and Donaldson, 1997). This, and other perspectives, can help us better understand the phenomenon of corporate entrepreneurship across national cultures and inform managers involved in this difficult but rewarding activity.