경영자는 이익전망치를 통해 가치적합한 정보를 투자자들에게 전달할 수 있다. 또한 이익전망치가 기업가치에 대해 더욱 유용한 정보를 제공한다고 투자자들이 인식한다면 그 이익전망치가 정보의 비대칭을 줄이는데 더욱 효과적이다. 경영자가 이익전망치에 포함된 이익 ...

경영자는 이익전망치를 통해 가치적합한 정보를 투자자들에게 전달할 수 있다. 또한 이익전망치가 기업가치에 대해 더욱 유용한 정보를 제공한다고 투자자들이 인식한다면 그 이익전망치가 정보의 비대칭을 줄이는데 더욱 효과적이다. 경영자가 이익전망치에 포함된 이익정보에 시장이 보다 민감하게 반응을 보일 것으로 예측을 하면 이익전망치가 더욱 유용한 정보를 전달한다고 기대가 되어 이익전망치를 내놓을 가능성이 더욱 높아진다. 시장이 과거의 분기 이익발표일에 이익정보에 대해 보다 민감하게 반응하였다면 경영자는 이익전망치의 발표에도 시장이 그러한 반응을 보일 것으로 예측할 가능성이 높다. 이러한 논지에 따라 우리는 회사들이 더욱 커다란 이익반응계수를 가지고 있을 경우 경영자들이 이익전망치를 내어 놓을 가능성이 크다고 가설을 세운다. 자료 분석의 결과 가설과 일관되게 경영자의 이익전망치 발표는 회사의 이익반응계수와 정의관계를 가지고 있다는 증거를 발견하였다. 이러한 증거는 호재와 악재 소식 모두에서 발견되었다. 이러한 증거에 비추어 이 연구논문에서는 투자자들이 이익정보가 회사가치에 대해 보다 유용한 정보를 제공한다고 인식할 때 경영자가 이익전망치를 발표할 가능성이 높다고 결론을 내린다.

By forecasting earnings, managers are able to convey value-relevant information to investors. A management forecast is effective in reducing information asymmetry if investors perceive that the forecast is informative about the firm’s value. Thus, we ...

By forecasting earnings, managers are able to convey value-relevant information to investors. A management forecast is effective in reducing information asymmetry if investors perceive that the forecast is informative about the firm’s value. Thus, we argue that a manager is more likely to forecast earnings if the manager expects that the market will respond more strongly to the earnings news contained in the forecast. The manager likely anticipates a stronger market response if the market responded more strongly to the earnings news of prior quarters. Accordingly, we predict that managers are more likely to forecast earnings if their firms have larger historic ERCs. Consistent with this prediction, we find that management forecast issuance is positively associated with a firm’s historic ERC. This finding obtains for management forecasts both of good news and of bad news. We conclude that managers are more likely to forecast earnings when investors will perceive the earnings news as being more informative of the firm’s value.

Theory suggests that managers issue earnings forecasts to reduce information asymmetry. An earnings forecast is more effective in reducing information asymmetry if it contains earnings news that is relatively more informative about the firm’s value. W ...

Theory suggests that managers issue earnings forecasts to reduce information asymmetry. An earnings forecast is more effective in reducing information asymmetry if it contains earnings news that is relatively more informative about the firm’s value. We hypothesize that a manager is more likely to issue an earnings forecast if investors perceive that earnings are more informative. We measure earnings informativeness by estimating the firm’s earnings response coefficient (ERC) in quarters prior to the forecast issuance decision. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the firm’s historic ERC is positively associated with management’s issuance of earnings forecasts.

Using a sample of 2,070 firms and 18,680 firm-quarters, we find a strong positive association between a firm’s historic ERC and management’s issuance of earnings forecasts. This is consistent with our hypothesis that managers are more likely to issue ...

Using a sample of 2,070 firms and 18,680 firm-quarters, we find a strong positive association between a firm’s historic ERC and management’s issuance of earnings forecasts. This is consistent with our hypothesis that managers are more likely to issue earnings forecasts if investors perceive earnings to be more informative. The association continues to hold after we control for other variables such as earnings volatility, return volatility, and revisions in analysts’ forecasts of future earnings. In addition, we partition the management forecasts according to whether they convey good news or bad news and find that a firm’s historic ERC is positively associated with both types of forecasts. Finally, a firm’s ERC is positively associated with the future decision to forecast earnings, but there is no relation with past earnings forecasts, suggesting that the direction of causality is from the ERC to management forecast issuance rather than the other way around.

Prior research shows that managers are more likely to issue an unfavorable earnings forecast when the magnitude of the negative earnings surprise is larger (Kasznik and Lev, 1995). Our study contributes to the literature by showing that management forecast issuance is positively associated with earnings informativeness per unit of the earnings surprise, after controlling for the magnitude of the earnings surprise. Thus, we identify earnings informativeness as an incremental factor that motivates managers to forecast earnings.