This study treats the relation between the Good in the Republic and the One in the Parmenides of Plato. It has become a well-known issue by the Neo-Platonism. The Good goes beyond the essence in dignity and power according to Plato in the Republic VI ...
This study treats the relation between the Good in the Republic and the One in the Parmenides of Plato. It has become a well-known issue by the Neo-Platonism. The Good goes beyond the essence in dignity and power according to Plato in the Republic VI. On the contrary, the One is neither one nor is if it is one as Plato concludes in the first hypothesis of the Parmenides. The Neoplatonists however regard the Good and the One as identical because they think that they are both the same God. They interpret the conclusion that the One is not in any way, in the sense that it goes beyond the essence just like the Good in the Republic in the Metaphor of the Sun. But it cannot be interpreted in such a sense, but in a sense, that the thing that is one is neither the predicate 'one' nor the thing that is. Therefore, the One and the Good are not the same, as they are the same God, but different in a different sense. But the point is not to explain the difference, but how they are related to each other. For this purpose the study shows firstly, how the Idea of the Good in the Republic can be understood in relation to the theory of Ideas in the Phaedo, then how the One in the Parmenides can be understood in relation to the critique on the theory of Ideas in the middle Plato, at last how they are related to each other. The Metaphor of the Sun doesn't appear firstly in the Republic VI, but did already in the biographical narration of the Phaedo, where Plato explains through the metaphor of the eclipse, how he gets to his theory of Ideas. According to Plato in the Phaedo the Ideas are nothing but the forms of beings which are seen in the logoi. Here, it's being which is compared to the Sun in the metaphor of the eclipse. The reason why knowledge, predication and essence are possible due to the Good and the reason why the Good goes beyond the essence in dignity and power are explained by the being. The reason why the being is nevertheless called the Good, can be explained by that it is pursued, seen from the theory of Ideas, because it determinates the essence while going beyond it. The reason why it is called 'the Idea' of the Good, can as well be explained in respect to the theory of Ideas. On the contrary, the conclusion that the One is neither one nor is if it is one, is to be understood in the context of the critique on the theory of Ideas in the first half of the Parmenides. According to the theory of Ideas in the middle Plato the Ideas are themselves as such. But for the existence of such Ideas, the determination of something is required. Plato criticizes the theory of Ideas in regard to the requirement. But the Ideas are not, if they are seen from the requirement. It results therefore that the One is not in any way. The relation of the One to the Good is like that of the requirement of the being to the being. This relation is explained not in the first, but rather in the second and third hypotheses. The study tries to interpret the relation on the base of the Sophistes.