The main objective of this research is to derive a theoretical framework on regulatory agencies’ responses to the constraints of regulatory resources. In particular, we have analyzed the behavior of regulators to cope with the lack of regulatory resou ...
The main objective of this research is to derive a theoretical framework on regulatory agencies’ responses to the constraints of regulatory resources. In particular, we have analyzed the behavior of regulators to cope with the lack of regulatory resources in the aftermath of major accidents. As a result, the response behavior of regulatory agencies under regulatory resource constraints has been divided into three categories. First, regulatory agencies can execute resource management. Resource management is to improve ways of working to utilize available resource at a maximum for organizational missions. An organization under resource constraints can execute various resource management, including, for example, rearranging personnel and departments to make more efficient use of resources, reducing the cost of operations by rationalizing work processes, or redefining organizational goals. Second, regulatory agencies can show decoupling behavior, which refers to the separation between the formal act and the substantive act. If the change in organizational behavior required by the outside is inconsistent with the interests or practices of the organization, the organization will assume the behavioral change to achieve external legitimacy but will not actually change it. Even if regulations have been strengthened by large accidents, regulators lacking resources can implement formal regulatory reforms, but they may actually behave in a similar way before the accidents. Causal indeterminacy and incomplete information make it impossible for external stakeholders to monitor the agencies’ behaviors and performance, which in turn makes decoupling possible. For example, even when, as part of resource management, relocation of resources, departments, and personnel, and structural change happen, actual enforcement activities and execution performance may not change. Third, regulatory agencies can reveal regulatory delegation behavior. An organization contracts out its production of products or services to external organizations when internalizing its production costs more. Regulatory agencies under resource constraints can also behave similarly to entrusting regulatory tasks to external organizations. In particular, as with any governmental organization, it may be difficult to manage resources and secure additional resources to properly enforce enhanced regulations as regulators subject to various constraints in terms of manpower, budget, and organization. In this situation, the regulatory agencies can deviate from the limits of the resource constraint by delegating some of the regulatory tasks to external organizations. Moreover, there is another advantage that can be relatively free from a primary responsibility and blame upon regulatory failure. The delegated Self regulation and delegation of regulatory authorities to local governments can be major delegation behaviors.
In addition, this study empirically investigated in regulatory agencies’ comprehensive response patterns after major accidents. We categorized characteristic behaviors of regulatory agencies responding to major accidents by analyzing the first response documents (usually countermeasure to prevent recurrence) announced by the agencies for major accidents. As a result, first, the characteristic behavior of regulatory agencies is strengthening regulations without enforcement plan. This is explainable by the behavior preventing restrictions on strategic choice responding to potential regulatory failures, and resource constraints, and the need to set priorities for the selection strategy under resource limits. The second characteristic is the expansion or transfer of authority. Regulatory agencies showed the behaviors of transferring or expanding their regulatory authorities after the accidents. In addition to problem-solving for regulatory delivery system, organizations’ general tendency of preferring expansion and 'passing the buck' to escape the blame for the failure to other organizations are presented to explain the behaviors. The final characteristic is ‘making boundaries of responsibilities.’ A typical example is the reform of accident response manual. Reforming the manual tends to be perceived as a natural behavior to improve the problems of the accident response system revealed by regulatory failure. However, this can be interpreted not simply as an effort to respond effectively but as a behavior that clearly specifies the responsibilities of the regulatory authorities in relation to future regulatory failures.