본 연구에서는 공개기업의 청산가치와 주식 가격이, 주식시장에서의 정보획득이 내생적으로 이루어질 경우, 최고경영자 보상에 미치는 영향에 대해 알아보았다. 우리는 기업의 내부자는 시장기반 보상계약을 통해 경영자가 더 많은 노력을 하게 만들고, 이로 인하여 더 높 ...

본 연구에서는 공개기업의 청산가치와 주식 가격이, 주식시장에서의 정보획득이 내생적으로 이루어질 경우, 최고경영자 보상에 미치는 영향에 대해 알아보았다. 우리는 기업의 내부자는 시장기반 보상계약을 통해 경영자가 더 많은 노력을 하게 만들고, 이로 인하여 더 높은 수준의 수입을 얻을 수 있다는 사실을 확인했다. 또한 정보비용을 비롯하여 다른 외생변수들이 경영자 유인 계약이 미치는 영향 역시 조사했다. 이 경우 외생변수들이 계약에 직접적으로 영향을 주는 직접효과와 투자자 정보획득을 통해 영향을 미치는 간접효과가 존재하며, 이들의 상호작용에 의하여 전체적인 효과가 결정된다. 마지막으로 우리는 시장기반 경영자 유인계약이 사회전체의 후생을 증가시킨다는 사실을 확인했다.

The paper investigates how a publicly traded firm's liquidation value and stock price are used in the executive compensation contract when information acquisition in the asset market is endogenized. We find that the inside owners can increase their pa ...

The paper investigates how a publicly traded firm's liquidation value and stock price are used in the executive compensation contract when information acquisition in the asset market is endogenized. We find that the inside owners can increase their payoff by incorporating the stock price into the contract even when the stock price does not contain any information about the managerial effort. It is because the increase in the firm's liquidation value always dominates that in the executive compensation.
We analyze comparative statistics of the optimal contract. If information cost in the asset market displays an intermediate value, exogenous parameters generate direct effects and indirect effects via information market. Otherwise, the indirect effects disappear and only the direct effects have influence on the optimal contract. Finally, we find that the market-based contract leads to a higher social welfare compared to the contract excluding the stock price.

he paper investigates how a publicly traded firm's liquidation value and stock price are used in the executive compensation contract when information acquisition in the asset market is endogenized. We find that the inside owners can increase their pay ...

he paper investigates how a publicly traded firm's liquidation value and stock price are used in the executive compensation contract when information acquisition in the asset market is endogenized. We find that the inside owners can increase their payoff by incorporating the stock price into the contract even when the stock price does not contain any information about the managerial effort. It is because the increase in the firm's liquidation value always dominates that in the executive compensation.
We analyze comparative statistics of the optimal contract. If information cost in the asset market displays an intermediate value, exogenous parameters generate direct effects and indirect effects via information market. Otherwise, the indirect effects disappear and only the direct effects have influence on the optimal contract. Finally, we find that the market-based contract leads to a higher social welfare compared to the contract excluding the stock price.

This research is expected to contribute to the literature. To the best of our knowledge, there are two papers by Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) and Kang and Liu (2010), which study market-based managerial contract under endogenous information acquisitio ...

This research is expected to contribute to the literature. To the best of our knowledge, there are two papers by Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) and Kang and Liu (2010), which study market-based managerial contract under endogenous information acquisition. In this research, we propose a managerial contract model in which information market equilibrium is determined when all traders have equivalent expected utility as in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). By adopting the notion of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), this research takes into account extreme case where all traders remain uninformed and stock prices do not contain any information about managerial effort. The results of the research are expected to provide theoretical basis for adopting stock option plans. Bebchuk and Grinstein(2005) point out that executive compensations for top managements drastically increase in U.S. during last decades, which causes debates about proper managerial compensation schemes. In the research, we analyze how incorporating stock prices into the managerial contract affects moral hazard problem of the executive and social welfare.