This study is divided into two parts: the first part is about the international politics of non-proliferation and South Korea's nuclear policy, and the second part is on North Korea's nuclear policy.
Part I has conducted research on three research q ...
This study is divided into two parts: the first part is about the international politics of non-proliferation and South Korea's nuclear policy, and the second part is on North Korea's nuclear policy.
Part I has conducted research on three research questions.
First, it is an analysis of the factors of international politics of nuclear nonproliferation that constrained the scope and content of South Korea's nuclear policy. The U.S. and the Soviet Union first developed nuclear weapons and jointly launched a nuclear nonproliferation regime.
This chapter analyzes the evolution of the NPT regime, various international norms, regimes, security guarantees, formation of security alliances, and multilateral security cooperation structures to strengthen the NPT regime, whereas international sanctions and penalties are also considered.
Under the NPT regime, more than 20 countries that dreamed of nuclear armament would give up their nuclear programs weapons, which requires further analysis on why they abandoned their program. Marking its 50th anniversary in 2020, the nuclear nonproliferation regime faces many challenges. As a result of this study, South Korea and other countries facing external nuclear threats can come up with policy implications on how to utilize the NPT regime and the five nuclear weapon states and UNSC more effectively to address threats coming from spread of nuclear weapons.
Second, shocked by Nixon's unilateral withdrawal of U.S. Forces Korea, Park Chung-hee attempted to develop nuclear weapons to enhance the autonomy of South Korea's defense. Through this study, the only official document of the Park Chung-hee era to direct a nuclear weapon development was discovered and the U.S. government’s declassified documents during the 1970s which blocked South Korea’s nuclear program were also collected and translated by the author into Korean.
Until now, it has been widely known in the international politics study that there is “an autonomy vs. security tradeoff” model which explains that a weak alliance partner concedes autonomy on condition that a strong alliance partner provides security. However, when South Korea attempted to develop nuclear weapons, the United States forced South Korea to choose one out of the two options: a nuclear weapon development and termination of the US-ROK alliance, or a continuous security provision by the United States under the alliance. Therefore, when it comes to nuclear weapons, nuclear armament means an end of alliance, while abandonment of nuclear weapon development means a continuing security alliance. Thus, there is no “autonomy vs. security tradeoff in the area of nuclear weapons. This study also discovers historical record of changing US tactical nuclear arsenal in South Korea during the Cold War and provides policy implications on how the U.S. nuclear strategy and policies on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia has evolved and will evolve.
Third, South Korea continued to develop its peaceful use of nuclear energy by complying with the U.S.-imposed nuclear nonproliferation obligations, making it the fifth-largest country in the world's nuclear power generation in the 2010s. In this chapter, through an analysis of the development process of Korean nuclear power, it explained that the success factors of nuclear power were harmonized with three factors: leaders' vision, fostering excellent research manpower, and supporting nuclear power in terms of national development strategy. It also discovered the tradeoff relationship of Korean nuclear power's autonomy versus energy generation. In other words, the abandonment of even peaceful uranium enrichment and reprocessing under the US pressure constrained South Korea’s autonomy, but the United States provided full support with nuclear technology and funds for the nuclear energy development of South Korea. The study also explains the process, level and scope of the Korea-U.S. nuclear cooperation since the 1970s, provides evaluation of the revised Korea-U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement, and analyzes the politicization of nuclear safety issues and the need for nationwide governance system with the participation of all the stakeholders in the nuclear energy sector to plan a wise and future oriented nuclear energy development plan.
Part 2 of this study is about North Korea's nuclear policy. North Korea's nuclear program was accomplished by Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un throughout three generations. The 30 years of Rodong Sinmun shows us vividly the cause of North Korea's nuclear weapon development, the process of enhancing its technological capabilities, and the external nuclear game played by Kim Jong-un after his announcement of a nuclear weapon state. The Part 2 of this study result was published as (Han Yong-sup, "The Fate of North Korea's Nuclear Weapons" by Park Young-sa in 2018).
In this book, North Korea's nuclear and missile development proved to be the result of consecutive efforts for three generations of the Kim Family. North Korea emphasized its nuclear weapons as a defensive deterrence against the U.S. hostile policy during the Kim Jong-il era. However, Kim Jong Un threatened to use nuclear weapons against the U.S. mainland, the US military bases in the Asia-Pacific region and South Korea and Japan, which are allied with the U.S. as offensive nuclear weapons. With the confidence as a nuclear power, Kim Jong Un is to coerce and compel against the United States and South Korea. North Korea is developing and using nuclear-peace logic to instigate South Korea to remove Washington's hostile policy toward the North if it wants peace on the Korean Peninsula.
According to Rodong Sinmun from the 1990s to 2018, since the North Korean nuclear issue emerged, North Korea has defined denuclearization=freeze=closure=disablement= shutdown. Such first ever finding is unique and notable. Therefore, this study pointed out that the goal of verifiable dismantlement should be aimed at denuclearizing North Korea in the future. Otherwise, all the efforts to denuclearize North Korea will result in vain.