The EU has been pursuing a single Europe through “Europeanization” of politics, economy, and culture. In the policy area, a significant portion of policies on topics such as welfare and immigration, which were previously in charge of the state, were t ...
The EU has been pursuing a single Europe through “Europeanization” of politics, economy, and culture. In the policy area, a significant portion of policies on topics such as welfare and immigration, which were previously in charge of the state, were transferred to the EU level. However, the UK officially decided to leave the EU due to the belief that only the elected power is the true power, that is, the unreasonable interference of the Executive Committee, and the 'restriction on the freedom of movement' that cannot be changed by the UK alone. . Starting with Brexit, Italy is also threatening European integration with exit. In addition, in the Swedish general election on September 11, 2022, the right-wing coalition, including the Swedish Democratic Party, secured 176 seats out of a total of 349 seats, which exceeded the majority by one seat. In particular, the far-right Sweden Democrats quickly became the second party in the parliament, winning 73 seats after the Social Democratic Party (107 seats), which was the center-left ruling party. The momentum of far-right populism has been confirmed again and again in France and Italy. This study was about whether the EU will change from a 'close coalition' to a 'loose coalition' after Brexit, a measure to control the pace of integration and expand national policy autonomy. However, contrary to expectations, it is sensed that the EU Commission's authority is being strengthened due to the spread of COVID-19. Therefore, it is questionable whether the powers of transnational organizations will be expanded in the post-Brexit era along with the end of COVID-19. Therefore, studying how the governance of the EU will change has many implications in preparing Korea's trade and regional policies, as well as policies toward the EU.
In the first year of this study, the analysis was focused on the changes in governance in the economic aspect of the EU after Brexit. Through this, it can be seen that the focus of the EU's cohesion policy to reduce regional economic imbalance is shifting from regional to people-centered. First, it was found that the EU's spatially-oriented regional policy could be one of the various causes of Brexit. Second, in order to reduce regional economic imbalance after Brexit, it was found that the EU is shifting its solidarity policy from space-centered to people-centered and sector-specific projects. The EU's solidarity policy is used in the same sense as regional policies for resolving economic imbalances between countries and regions. In other words, the cohesion policy in the EU is synonymous with regional policy. Since the EU's cohesion policy is a space-oriented policy and high-tech industries are centered on the capital, there is an aspect that has fixed the underdevelopment of small towns and regions except for the capital. The EU's regional policy cannot be freed from criticism that it reduced the capacity of British local autonomy and deepened its dependence on the EU, which ultimately acted as a micro-cause of Brexit. For the past 30 years, EU regional policies have played a very important role in supporting the efficient use of resources in all regions of the EU, especially through support for start-up companies, fostering SMEs, and supporting innovation. However, each member state often used funds differently from the EU's regional policy objectives. The UK's domestic policy for regional development finds little in common between the economic and social cohesion historically characterized by the EU Structural Funds. UK regional policies focused solely on economic efficiency with the aim of promoting growth and competitiveness or reducing unemployment. Unlike other European countries, there is no commitment to social justice. In the UK, the purpose of regional policy was mainly to develop regional economy with the aim of improving the national economic efficiency. If local policies had a social dimension, they were only concerned with mitigating the negative consequences of structural changes, particularly unemployment.
This UK regional policy objective contrasts with the basic philosophy of regional policy in many continental European countries, where the goal of economic efficiency entails a commitment to social equity. In the case of Germany, regional policy includes the constitutional goal of 'equal living conditions'. France's regional policy is also supported by its constitutional obligation to "promote equality between regional authorities that combines regional economic competitiveness and social cohesion". Similar provisions exist in the Italian constitution, and policy measures in various countries such as Finland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland are based on the policy goals for ‘balanced development’ and ‘solidarity’. This is also reflected in the objectives of the EU cohesion policy set out in Articles 174 to 178 of the EU Functions Treaty.
Regions with a large knowledge-intensive workforce are mainly national capitals. Regions that attract knowledge-intensive industries are more likely to prosper. Even in the EU, only a small number of regions that are considered favorable to productivity growth have experienced improvements in productivity levels. EU regional policies were implemented for political reasons rather than economic ones. As a result, the economic disparity between regions could not be resolved and a culture of leaving the EU was created. In other words, the 'spatial-oriented' regional policy of the region resulted in the fixation of the underdeveloped regions. According to this study, not only the UK region facing the chaos caused by COVID-19 and Brexit, but also the EU region that may be economically impacted, if the same goals and continuity are not ensured, the EU as a whole will lose competitiveness and the three proliferation of populist parties predicted to be unstoppable. To prevent this, a coherent institutional mechanism for regional and urban development will have to be fundamentally reorganized. In addition, an attempt should be made to shift from the central government-level regional policy implementation to the local government-level regional policyism. In other words, it was found that a bottom-up approach to regional policies is required, and policies that focus on the space of the region and individuals, including unskilled workers, must be paralleled, excluding the reinforcement of multi-layered governance and the selection of regions for political purposes.
The second year study analyzed changes in the EU's political aspects after Brexit. The rapid political and economic development since the 1990s has led to the growth of far-right parties in Europe. There are factors favorable to the growth of the far-right, such as those who are marginalized from political and economic development, the rapid increase in immigrants, and the entry into a multicultural society. This change in the nature of European integration is marked by the full adoption of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism, represented by the single market and economic and monetary union, made Europeans lose their hiding place in the face of unlimited competition and the logic of capital. Recently, far-right parties are showing that they are no longer a ‘protest party’ or a ‘rejection party’. In the second year of this study, by examining how the far-right parties express their European skepticism after Brexit, the change in the influence of the far-right parties at the EU level was investigated. Based on the results of the analysis, their resistance to European integration is expected to have implications for EU integration and development in the future, as well as for Korea.
To understand the rise of far-right populism, we need to recognize the importance of ‘supply’. In other words, it is necessary to understand how populist parties themselves attempt to appeal their message to a wider audience. Instead of co-adopting or imitating the messages of far-right populists under the false assumption that the success of far-right populism simply reflects the will of the people, we need to understand how the far-right party itself is fulfilling the needs of the masses. Far-right populism is not simply driven by demand. A number of factors, including cultural, economic, and personal, increase voter preference. However, this insecurity alone is not enough to give the far-right party a chance and ensure the party's own success. This is where the supply comes in. How parties seize these opportunities is critical to understanding the electoral appeal of far-right populists to a wide range of social groups.
Some far-right populist parties, particularly those in Western Europe and Northern Europe, have demonstrated that a normalization strategy can expand support beyond their entrenched voting base. In other words, it has proven that it can moderate the “white message” outraged by low levels of education and job insecurity. This is because it distances itself from the links between fascism and right-wing extremism, reaching voters who are uncomfortable with choosing a blatantly racist party. Although diverse, these far-right parties have important commonalities. In other words, they justify their positions on various policies on socio-economic issues based on the ideology that drew the boundary between in-group and out-group. They also advance a democratic vision that puts the in-group first in terms of policy and public goods provision.
What makes far-right populist parties successful is the way they justify their nationalist messages, especially outgroup exclusion. This is done not through a view embodied by fascists or far-right parties, but through civil discrimination that seeks to exclude those who do not support our values of democracy and tolerance. Through this civic-nationalist story, far-right populists justify their exclusion. They propose a solution to the multiple anxieties of voters using rhetoric that excludes diverse population groups, that they threaten society's consensus of values and thus threaten social stability and prosperity. The adoption of this form of citizen-nationalism, which excludes people based on ideological rather than biological criteria for nationality, can be seen as a new 'winner's formula' for far-right populist parties in many ways, appealing to a wide range of social groups with different backgrounds and preferences.
In order to prevent the spread of far-right Euroskepticism and to strengthen the unity of the EU, it is necessary to strengthen the European project of ‘cultural globalization’ and the democratic landscape. The EU will have to rapidly spread values such as democracy, inequality, and a norm-driven order. The need for a study on the universalization of Euroskepticism by far-right parties after Brexit is not just because of interest in European integration. In recent years in Korea too, the far-right forces are raising their voices due to an increase in nationalist issues such as the entry into a post-industrial society, the increase in foreign workers, the conflict with Japan over the Dokdo issue, and economic subordination. In the Northeast Asian Community discourse, the European case is also presented as an alternative to overcome conflicts and achieve win-win and common development. However, the universalization of far-right forces in Europe shows that regionalism cannot completely eliminate far-right nationalism.
With the spread of COVID-19, support from European voters appeared to be shifting back from radicalism to mainstream parties. But today, the far right is rapidly adapting to new technologies to spread ideology, recruit members and mobilize resources through online and social media platforms. Therefore, when the spread of COVID-19 in Europe stops, it is highly likely that they will launch three new spreads centered on opposition to the climate movement. Therefore, in order to predict and prepare for the future of our society after the end of COVID-19, the analysis of the European far-right group is absolutely necessary.
In the third year of this study, structural changes in the UK and EU after Brexit, in particular, the possibility of changes in the multi-layered governance system were analyzed. After Brexit, the structural changes between the UK and the EU that could be caused by the UK's withdrawal from the EU's cohesive policy were reviewed. The end of the UK's participation in the EU cohesion policy due to Brexit is highly likely to have an impact on the deepening of regional inequality in the UK in the short and long term. This is not solely due to direct losses from the cessation of EU financial aid that has been transferred to poorer cities and regions in the UK. ERDF, a regional policy instrument in the UK, is not limited to financial support. It is important to note that over several decades, management practices related to money have become deeply engraved into domestic policy activities and governance structures. Above all, the operating method for the implementation of the ERDF's strategic economic development policy was introduced rather than the fund itself. This shows the way of 'Europeanization' of the practice of policy in the context of ERDF and economic development policy. This includes formal and informal activities, knowledge and information sharing policy learning and partnership work.
Discontinuation of EU cohesion in the UK means the dismantling of a system of regional policy governance based on several key elements including strategic partnerships, multi-layered governance and transparent and long-term budget allocation. In the UK, the EU cohesion policy instrument, ERDF, is not limited to financial support. Most importantly, over the decades, money management practices have become deeply embedded in domestic policy activities and governance structures. Above all, the fund itself played an important role in introducing an operational method for the governance of the ERDF's strategic economic development policy. This shows the way of Europeanization of the practice of policy in the context of ERDF and economic development policy. This includes formal and informal activities, knowledge and information sharing policy learning and partnership work. In general, EU cohesion policies, especially ERDF, have had greater involvement and influence at the sub-national level in the development of regional economic policies at the national and EU levels within a multi-layered governance framework. Moreover, multi-layered governance has enabled a variety of non-state actors to be directly involved in solving economic development problems through vertical and horizontal institutional partnerships. Indeed, in the UK, one of the most centralized European countries, the management and enforcement of EU cohesion policies has played an important role in transferring economic executive power and influence to local authorities for decades. Therefore, the new UK regional policy has continued to engage key regional stakeholders in the evaluation of the concept and implementation of economic development based on this solid foundation.
The EU cannot be free from criticism of the lack of social consensus surrounding Brexit and the failure to address regional inequality. It also failed to maintain social cohesion in disaster situations. In particular, there is a duty to prevent the spread of far-right forces due to the failure of the agreement among member states over the Ukraine crisis. As the vulnerability and instability of globalization become more evident, the EU will rather strengthen its supranational authority in unexpected disasters or crises. Instead of entrusting member states to create rules and norms to drive economic recovery in member countries, such as global supply chain recovery, regional trade promotion, and foreign direct investment, the EU combines a top-down approach at the EU level and a bottom-up approach at the regional and city levels. It seems that the government will actively seek to strengthen the multi-layered government system.