The study analyzes three aspects of 1166 NATO standardized documents: the Standardization Agreement (STANAG) and the Standard Document (Std). The first aspect is how NATO constructs strategic and operational interoperability across materials and opera ...
The study analyzes three aspects of 1166 NATO standardized documents: the Standardization Agreement (STANAG) and the Standard Document (Std). The first aspect is how NATO constructs strategic and operational interoperability across materials and operations. Second, which side of command relations NATO weigh more for the supreme commander? On the operational command (OPCOM) or operational control(OPCON)? The third relates with the Tactical Data Link(TDL), critical physical elements of the modern command and control (C2) system. The purpose of this is to extract the implications for South Korea's military preparedness and the transition of wartime OPCON.
First, the number of standardization documents has soared since 2013. The share of STANAG was 37% by 2012, but 63% after 2013. In 63 out of the 77 categories of Std, sub-documents increased by 100 to 1500 percent. Since 2013, material STANAG has risen by 120% and operation STANAG by 290%. In addition, 75 new operational doctrines were promulgated since 2013, up from 4 of the previous period. The main reason is the Russian threat. This situation implies that the ROK-US alliance should strengthen interoperability and have a relevant system amid the intensifying North Korean nuclear threat.
The second issue is the top commander’s command relation. The NATO supreme commander, SACEUR, exercises operational command (OPCOM), but the highest commander of the ROK-U.S. combined forces command (CFR) has operational control(OPCON), which is lower in authority than OPCOM. The standardization document defines the status of the SACEUR as a military-strategic level commander. He directs many operations outlined in standardized documents and comprehensively exercises the relevant authority. SACEUR can consult with member states regarding operational requirements and military forces through the National Coordination Committee, the National Defense Policy Planning Committee, and the National Defense Planning Process (NDPP), which is officially not possible afor CRF top commander of now because OPCON limits the scope of authority. And the limits will continue even if the transition of current wartime OPCON after the OPCON transition to South Korea.
The division between peacetime and wartime operation is also a clear difference. SACEUR directs all operations without such time distinction. Therefore, there is no risk that might happen during the commander replacing process. But the CFR divides between peacetime and wartime operation, so there rises risk.
Third, TDL is a crucial technological element that enables South Korea to command and control the U.S.-ROK combined operation. Still, the U.S.-ROK military capability imbalance directly influences and technical gap, including related hardware and software across the network, is not narrow. Overcoming military-political obstacles is also challenging. NATO links evolved in the order of Link-1, Link-11, Link-16, Link-22. During the Cold War, the U.S. provided links. After the post-Cold War period, the scope of joint development of TDL between the U.S. and NATO countries expanded, enhancing interoperability. As a result, NATO's TDL is getting more militarily and politically aligned with the U.S. beyond the technical aspects. Nevertheless, the difference between NATO and the United States is clear. Although the two sides have jointly improved link-16 and jointly developed link-22, the status of links remains unchanged due to the unique U.S. technology related to the code system.
Standardization documents give the U.S.-ROK alliance the following implications: First of all, the alliance needs to strengthen interoperability, develop the combined operational doctrine, and share military reform to respond to the military threat from outside. NATO has such structures as Standardization Commission and the Alliance Change Command (ACT), which are responsible for such missions. But there are virtually no dedicated organizations in the U.S.-ROK alliance. Next, the alliance should eliminate or dilute the gap between peacetime and wartime. In addition, the alliance should consider leveling up the command relation of the top CFR commander to OPCOM+. In addition, the alliance should consider establishing a standing combined force like the NATO Standing Force.
Specifically, I suggest constructing a permanent U.S.-ROK combined force. Both countries contribute brigade-level force at the beginning and division level force at the final stage to form a permanent combined force. The commanders rotate between the two countries, and the commander at the time of war declaration becomes the wartime commander of the CFR forces. The multi-year operation of the unit will ultimately secure South Korea's wartime operational capabilities.