The aim of this dissertation is to show that physicalism is compatible with the freedom of agents. The contemporary debates relative to the freedom of agents presuppose physicalism explicitly or tacitly. However, there are few attempts to account for ...
The aim of this dissertation is to show that physicalism is compatible with the freedom of agents. The contemporary debates relative to the freedom of agents presuppose physicalism explicitly or tacitly. However, there are few attempts to account for the relation of physicalism and the freedom of agents. In fact, even if one solves the problems proposed by determinism or indeterminism, one cannot guarantee the freedom of agents straightly. Because what they propose is only the diachronic threats to our freedom. However, physicalism itself seems to give the synchronic threat to it. Therefore, in order to account for the freedom of agents thoroughly, one must deal with not only the diachronic threats, but also the synchronic threat by physicalism itself. By settling these threats, I try to show that physicalism is compatible with freedom.
To do this work, in chapter 2, firstly I consider the appearances of the physicalistic threats to our freedom. These can be divided into the following three ways; (1) The threat of causal determinism which is intermediated by mind/body supervenience of physicalism(namely, the threat Ⅰ), (2) The threat of causal indeterminism which is intermediated by mind/body supervenience of physicalism(the threat Ⅱ), (3) The threat of mind/body supervenience of physicalism itself(the threat Ⅲ). If one accepts both physicalism and causal determinism(hereafter, CDP), one must solve the problems of 'the threat Ⅰ' and 'the threat Ⅲ'. And if one accepts both physicalism and causal indeterminism(hereafter, CIDP), one must solve the problems of 'the threat Ⅱ' and 'the threat Ⅲ'.
In Chapter 3, I argue for CIDP in a negative way. That is to say, I consider the Consequence Argument(shortly, CA), which shows CDP cannot secure the freedom of agents because of the problem of 'the threat Ⅰ'. If one intends to adhere to CDP, one should be able to incapacitate CA. However, I argue, it is difficult to get over CA.
In chapter 4, I critically explore an argument for CDP; Davidson's Anomalous Monism(shortly, AM). AM can be interpreted as an attempt to solve 'the threat Ⅰ', and also can be regarded as an strong objection to CA. But I argue that AM is no help to solve 'the threat Ⅰ'. The decisive reason for this is that AM cannot really secure alternative possibilities, which are regarded as a necessary condition of our freedom.
The reflections on AM lead us to consider three options to secure our freedom. The first one is to stick to CDP continuously, trying to show that alternative possibilities are not a necessary condition of our freedom(for example, Fischer's semi-compatibilism). The second is to try to secure alternative possibilities anyhow, allowing that alternative possibilities are a necessary condition of our freedom. This option is divided into two kinds. The one is the synchronic approach and the other is the diachronic approach. The former is to deny mind/body supervenience. Here, such an approach is not considered as an important one. The latter is to try to secure alternative possibilities by means of accepting causal indeterminism. This is CIDP, for which I argue positively in chapter 6.
In chapter 5, I critically explore Fischer's semi-compatibilism. His theory depends on Frankfurt-type examples decisively. If his theory is plausible, it seems that it solves the 'threat Ⅰ' in some degree. However, I argue that his semi-compatibilism is not so satisfactory one. In conclusion, in order to account for freedom one must abandon CDP and take CIDP.
In chapter 6, I argue for CIDP in a positive way. The essential work for CIDP is to solve 'the threat Ⅱ' and 'the threat Ⅲ'. I propose a model of incompatibilist libertarianism which is compatible with physicalism. On the basis of the model, I try to show that one can sufficiently solve of 'threat Ⅱ' and 'threat Ⅲ' In conclusion, I claim that if one accepts CIDP, one can show that physicalism is compatible with the freedom of agents.